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ABSTRACT OF ENTIRE THESIS 
 
 
Investors or fund managers are all striving to beat the market and chase higher returns in 
order to enhance performance of their investments. Usually, the return of the investment 
is compared to a benchmark, often constructed from the returns of the market or the 
returns from the peer or industry sector that our asset class belongs to. Although the 
three chapters in this Doctoral Thesis are on different areas of asset management, they 
all have one important common denominator of asset management: performance. In 
particular, the three chapters are aimed at determining the factors and components that 
instigate higher returns and the enhancement of performance of index portfolios and 
mutual funds.  
 
The first chapter in this thesis examines whether short-term variation in the ranking of 
size and style index returns in the UK equity market is better predictable and exploitable 
by means of quantitative or momentum style rotation strategies. In other words, we 
attempt to answer whether an investor should employ a more complex, quantitative 
model or a simple momentum-based model to forecast index returns and apply various 
trading strategies. Using a number of long only and long/short strategies, we are able to 
assess the profitability and, therefore, performance of these two alternative methods. In 
particular, we use the UK size and style benchmark indexes, FTSE 350 Value, FTSE 
350 Growth, FTSE Small Cap and FTSE 100 index in the period from January 1987 to 
April 2006. In our quantitative approach, we use the set of most appropriate minimum 
number of macroeconomic, fundamental and market variables that can be used to 
forecast which one of our style indexes has the highest probability to be ranked first, 
second, third or last in a particular month. In other words, these probabilities provide us 
with an indication of the best performing index to the worst performing index. This 
implies that our dependent variable is the ranking of the index return in a particular 
month. Therefore, as our forecasting model, we choose a recursive ordered logit model 
that gives us month-by-month probabilities of rank-order for each of four indexes 
separately. Based on these probabilities, we devise a number of long-only and 
long/short trading strategies, which are ultimately able to enhance the profitability and 
performance of these index portfolios. As an alternative to this complex quantitative 
forecasting approach, we apply a variety of momentum strategies during the same 
trading period, to assess if similar results can be obtained through a much simpler 
approach. Our momentum trading strategies are based on different formation and 
holding periods, varying from 1 month to 12 months, to test the robustness of the 
momentum approach. The results suggest that trading rules based on simple short-term 
momentum strategies are able to generate higher Sharpe ratios and greater end-of-period 
wealth at a reasonable level of transaction costs than our quantitatively based trading 
rules, which is particularly pronounced among the long-only strategies.   
 
A number of past studies have ascertained that good performance of mutual funds is 
driven by asset allocation, market timing and stock-picking ability. In the second 
chapter we attempt to establish whether it is in fact the fund manager that affects the 
performance of a mutual fund. Using a unique database of 258 UK fund manager 
changes from April 2002 until December 2005, we examine whether a fund manager 
plays a determining role in the performance of the mutual funds. Applying an event 
study methodology, the performance (abnormal returns) of the funds pre- and post-
12 
manager change is measured in three methods: the benchmark-adjusted model, mean-
adjusted model and the information ratio. For the benchmark-adjusted model we use (1) 
benchmark index defined by the investment objectives of a fund and (2) peer group 
benchmark. Furthermore, we assess whether the impact of a change is more pronounced 
among male or female managed funds, emerging or developed market funds, bond or 
equity funds and whether the persistence of performance depends on fund‟s style, i.e. 
growth, value or small cap. We also examine the persistence of the top performing 
funds compared with the bottom performing funds pre- and post management change. 
Our results show clearly across different categories of funds that a change in fund 
manager can have a significant impact on fund performance, at least in the first year 
following the event. However, in the second and the third year following managers‟ 
change, the performance starts descending largely, we believe, due to exceptionally bad 
conditions in financial markets during 2007 and 2008, which are the last two years of 
our data sample. Our findings suggest that the performance of the female managed 
funds is more volatile in the pre-event period as opposed to the post event, when the 
female manager is replaced. We document that funds‟ performance improves more on 
average after a female fund manager has been replaced in comparison to the male 
managers. In addition, for the majority of the categories of funds the improvement of 
the performance in the post event period lasts for duration of about eighteen months 
after a new fund manager takes over.  Finally, we find persistence in performance of the 
bottom performing funds compared with the top performing funds pre-and post 
management change.  
 
Finally, the third chapter is devoted to examining the effect that a manager replacement 
has on fund flows and the extent to which these flows are influenced by the 
performance of the funds. Mutual fund managers have always had to deal with the 
fundamental conflict between long-term investment strategies and daily liquidity 
requirements due to shareholder flow. In other words, we attempt to answer the question 
of whether the level of fund flows increases or decreases once a fund manager is 
replaced. Therefore, using an event study methodology and unbalanced panel data 
analysis, we examine the trend of the fund flows preceding the fund manager change 
and the level of flow once a new fund manager takes over.  Due to the significant 
downturn in financial markets during 2007 and 2008, investors have reacted to 
declining or volatile markets by withdrawing their assets in whole hosts. Our findings 
suggest that fund flows substantially deteriorate after the manager leaves the fund, 
which is especially pronounced in the turbulent periods of 2007 and 2008. Moreover, 
we find that there is a negative relationship between fund flows and returns over longer 
period horizons and a positive relationship over shorter periods. In particular, using the 
panel data analysis we show that good (poor) past performance causes increases 
(decreases) in subsequent fund flows. However, we find no evidence that the gender of 
the fund manager, the market in which the fund invests or the type of the fund plays any 
determining role for the size of the fund flows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
Quantitative or Momentum based Multi-Style Rotation? 
UK Experience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine whether short-term variation in the ranking of 
size and style index returns in the UK equity market is better predictable and exploitable 
by means of quantitative or momentum style rotation strategies. Using UK index data, 
we assess the profitability of a number of long-only and long/short multi-style rotation 
strategies based on these two alternative methods. The findings suggest that trading 
rules based on simple short-term momentum strategies are able to generate higher 
Sharpe ratios and greater end-of-period wealth at a reasonable level of transaction costs 
than our quantitatively based trading rules. This result is particularly pronounced among 
the long-only strategies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of size and style rotation is prominent in the equity market and has 
attracted extensive research and study.  More precisely, it is the potential profitability of 
size and style rotation strategies that has fascinated not only the researchers, but 
investors as well. Consistent style approach is often the preferred investment strategy 
with mutual funds and traditional asset managers. Although we can identify significant 
number of value, growth, large capitalisation and small capitalisation funds, there is 
extensive evidence which suggests that each of those styles does not persistently 
outperform the market or the remaining three styles. This implies that being style 
consistent is risky as it can lead to underperformance due to inevitable reversal in the 
performance of the selected style. Specifically, the existing literature suggests that better 
performance can be generated by applying style rotation between pairs of styles at the 
opposite end of the spectrum, namely: value vs. growth rotation and small vs. large 
rotation. However, there is no reason why an investor should switch from value to 
growth stock when the forecast suggests so, if large cap stocks are expected to perform 
better than both value and growth style. In other words, we believe that more profit 
potential lies in the multi-style rotation which is enabling investors to switch across all 
four styles. Arshanapalli, Switzer and Panju (2005) and Ahmed et al. (2002) show 
potential profits arising from multi-style rotation strategies opposed to single-style 
rotation strategies in the US market.  Therefore, creating a strategy that will enable us to 
successfully switch from one style performing at its best in one period of time to 
another style expected to be the best performer in the next period, is of essence. 
Although there are a number of studies that provide evidence on the benefits and 
profitability of size and style rotation in particular, there are only a few that are 
concentrated on the UK financial market. Furthermore, much of equity style timing 
literature focuses on shifting between pairs of risky assets or between one risky and one 
riskless asset class, using a binomial approach. Our study differs from other literature on 
the UK markets in that it implements a multi-style rotation approach.  
 
In this study, we examine whether short-term variation in the ranking of size and style 
index returns in the UK equity market is better predictable and exploitable by means of 
quantitative or momentum multi-style rotation strategies. In other words, we attempt to 
answer whether an investor should employ a more complex, quantitative model or a 
15 
simple momentum-based model to forecast index returns and apply various trading 
strategies. We assess the profitability of a number of long-only and long/short trading 
strategies based on these two alternative methods, using data on UK equity style and 
size indexes. Our quantitative method of multi-style rotation is based on a number of 
financial and macroeconomic factors, which in turn aid in the forecasting of the best 
performing index. The various variables included in our quantitative model perform 
differently during different periods, and will therefore have a change in impact on our 
indexes at different points in time. As a result, our quantitative model, which takes into 
consideration the impact of the variables and their changes on our indexes, will 
potentially entail a greater strength of forecasting the best performing index. On the 
other hand, our simpler method of forecasting the best performing index, the 
momentum strategy, relies solely on the past returns of each corresponding index. 
Short-term past performance of each index has proven to be a strong predictor of future 
performance with different holding periods for each corresponding index. This can be 
seen in Table 1.1 and Figures 1.1 and 1.2, which show the trend of the returns for the 
size and style indexes respectively. The recent increase in availability and popularity of 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) as well as the existence of style index futures contracts 
makes the suggested trading strategies very cost effective, in terms of lower comparable 
costs and high liquidity. 
 
1.1. Characteristics of Value and Growth Stocks 
 
When making portfolio allocation decisions, investors and fund managers tend to 
categorize their assets into broad classes into which they will allocate their funds 
accordingly. Therefore, the concept of style in financial markets depicts the investment 
perspective of a fund.  
 
There are different types of equity investment styles that an investor or a fund manager 
can invest into. Equity investment styles include domestic versus international, 
company size, such as large and small, and investment approach, such as growth and 
value. One of the investment styles an investor can follow is by investing in value 
stocks. A value stock tends to trade at a lower price relative to its fundamentals, such as 
dividends, earnings, book value, cash-flow and sales, and to its industry peers. Having a 
high dividend yield, a low price-to-book ratio and a low price-to-earnings ratio are some 
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of the characteristics associated to value stocks. A value investor will mainly base his 
criteria on quantitative factors, such as asset values, cash flows and discounted future 
earnings. Therefore, an investor investing in value stocks believes that the market is not 
always efficient and that it is possible to find companies that are trading for less than 
they are worth. As a consequence, these companies will then have the potential to 
increase in share price when the market corrects its valuation error, and this will 
ultimately benefit the value investor.  
 
Value stocks can be located in any industry, however they are often found in industries 
that have faced difficult times or that are currently facing market overreaction to a piece 
of news or information affecting the industry. In other words, these type of stocks are 
prominent in cyclical industries.    
 
Growth stocks comprise of earnings that are expected to grow at an above average rate 
relative to the market. Therefore, they are classified as stocks that have high price per 
earnings, price to book and price to sales ratios. More often than not, a growth stock 
does not pay a dividend, as the company would prefer reinvest the retained earnings in 
capital projects.  In general, a growth investor looks to invest into rapidly expanding 
industries, such as new technology. Therefore, investors in growth stocks are prepared 
to pay for the growth stocks as they believe that their value will increase in the future. 
As a comparison to value investing, growth investors use a qualitative approach to 
evaluate the health of the company. These investors concentrate on the value 
judgements of the company, its markets, its management, and its ability to extract future 
earnings growth from its industry.  However, an investor engaging into growth 
investing needs to be cautious as such a strategy entails substantial risks. It is often the 
case that growth stocks are overvalued and these stocks are known as glamour stocks.  
 
1.2. Characteristics of Small and large Capitalization Stocks 
 
Furthermore, another type of style investing comprises of the size of the stocks. More 
precisely, companies are usually classified in terms of size or market capitalization. As 
a general guideline, companies that have a market capitalization of £2 billion or more 
17 
are classified as large capitalization stocks1. Moreover, companies that have a market 
capitalization of about less than £500 million are considered as small capitalization 
stocks. There are various advantages and disadvantages related to investing in small 
capitalization stocks and large capitalization stocks, which are fully explained in the 
following section. 
 
1.2.1. Advantages of Small Capitalization Stocks 
  Small capitalization stocks have a huge growth potential and have a chance of 
becoming one of the biggest companies in the industry. Most of the successful 
large capitalization companies were at one stage small business and this 
provides the investor with great expectations that the small company will expand 
and provide substantial profits.  
  Due to the fact that it is uncommon of mutual funds to invest in small 
capitalization stocks, this gives a great opportunity to an individual investor who 
is able to recognize companies with growing potential. Mutual funds have 
regulatory restrictions that limit them from buying large portions of any one 
issuer‟s shares; therefore, some mutual funds would not be able to give a 
meaningful position of the small cap stock in the fund.   
  Furthermore, there is a lack of analyst coverage on small capitalization stocks. 
This is can be considered as a great advantage to the investor due to the fact that 
there is a possibility that the small capitalization stocks are improperly priced. 
As a result, the investor will be able to gain from these inefficiencies that are 
caused by the lack of coverage in the market.   
  Historically, small cap stocks exhibit much better returns for investors than large 
cap stocks as shown in Reinganum (1992), and Fama et al. (1992). 
 
1.2.2. Disadvantages of Small Capitalization Stocks 
  Small capitalization stocks are far more risky and volatile relative to the blue-
chip and large companies. The risk associated to small-cap companies comes in 
                                                 
1
 Bodie, Z., Kane, A. and Marcus, A.  Investments, International Edition, McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2002. 
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the form of the fierce competition that they face from large companies. 
Moreover, small capitalization stocks are vulnerable to adequate amounts of 
volatility due to their size, which is not favourable from an investor‟s point of 
view, as shown in Jensen and Mercer (2002) and Timmermann and Peres-Quiros 
(2000).   
  Although there is an advantage that the small capitalization stocks have less 
coverage, this may is also considered as a disadvantage. There is a fewer amount 
of readily available information which poses a problem to the investor, known as 
the familiarity bias.  Simply, investors and fund managers will need to devote 
more time in order to uncover the small capitalization stocks, due to the fact that 
most financial ratios and reports and published for the larger companies.  
 
1.2.3. Advantages of Large Capitalization Stocks 
  Large capitalization stocks have is the fact that these companies have readily 
available information on them. This is a benefit to the investors as they will be 
able to use the financial reports and ratios provided to them to make the 
appropriate decisions on the valuation of the company in question. Therefore, 
this will also translate as being time consuming to the investor.  
 
1.3. History of Performance of UK FTSE Size and Style Indices  
 
In order to show changing trends in UK FTSE Equity Style Indices, we examine the 
ranking frequency of each index. In other words, Table 1.1 shows the amount of times 
each index has been ranked first, second, third and fourth. From the results of the table, 
we can see that the FTSE Small-Cap index has been ranked first the most times from all 
four indices from the period February 1987 to April 2006. In other words, the index 
exhibited the most times (92 times) the highest return in comparison to the other three 
indexes over the months in our analysis. However, the FTSE Small-Cap also was 
ranked fourth 93 times (the highest frequency among all indexes for being ranked 
fourth), indicating the volatility of its returns. Furthermore, we see that the FTSE Value 
and FTSE Growth were ranked first 54 and 55 times respectively, with FTSE Large-
Cap having the lowest frequency of being ranked first (30 times). From the table we can 
deduce that the four indexes are ranked first at different periods. An investor only 
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choosing to hold the FTSE Small-Cap index based on the fact that it was ranked first the 
highest number of times, may not realize that the particular index was ranked last more 
times. As a result, s/he may not take advantage of the fact that other indexes exhibited 
highest returns during particular months. 
 
 
 
To further show the changing trends in UK FTSE Equity Style Indices, we graphed the 
monthly time series returns for the FTSE Small-Cap Index, FTSE Large-Cap Index, 
FTSE Growth 350 Index and FTSE Value 350 Index, from 1988 to 2006. It is evident 
that different times of the economic cycles favour different types of stocks. Figure 1.1 
depicts the time series returns for the FTSE Small-Cap and the FTSE Large-Cap2. From 
the graph it can be seen that the FTSE Small-Cap experiences more extreme movements 
as a comparison to the FTSE Large-Cap Index. In the first half of our sample, the FTSE 
Small-Cap has a good cycle from 1993 to 1995, followed by a slight fall in returns at 
the end of year 1995. Furthermore, the Small-Cap experienced good cycles in the period 
ranges of 1996 to 1999 and from 2004 to the end of our sample, April 2006. The FTSE 
Large-Cap experienced similar trends as FTSE Small-Cap; however, the frequency 
variations for the FTSE Small-Cap are larger. From the negative aspect, both the small-
caps and the large-caps had a bad cycle from 2001 to 2003. However, the magnitude 
was higher for the small-caps.  From our whole sample, 65% of the months the FTSE 
Small-Cap had a positive return whereas the FTSE Large-Cap had a positive return 62% 
of the time. 
 
                                                 
2
 We also show the changing trends of the four style and size indices through their respective moving 
averages, which is shown in Appendix A, Figures 1.1 and 1.2.  
Table 1.1 Frequency of Monthly Rankings for each Style and Size Index, 
February 1987 to April 2006 
 
Small-Cap 
Returns 
Large-Cap 
Returns 
Value 
Returns 
Growth 
Returns 
Ranked First 92 30 54 55 
Ranked Second 26 78 71 56 
Ranked Third 20 83 66 62 
Ranked Fourth 93 40 40 58 
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Figure 1.1: Time Series Returns of FTSE Small-Cap and FTSE Large-Cap Indices  
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Taking into account the FTSE Growth 350 Index and the FTSE Value 350 Index, Figure 
1.2 illustrates the variations in trends for the two indices. It is clear from the graph that 
the two indices experience similar trends; however, the magnitude of the variations is 
greater for the FTSE Value 350 Index. Both indices had a good cycle from 1995 to 
1999. This depicts the unprecedented rise of growth stocks in the technology boom of 
the late 1990s and their subsequent demise. Furthermore, the value stocks experienced 
higher returns from 2004 to April 2006 (end of our sample) as a comparison to growth 
stocks. Moreover, 65% of the time the value stocks entailed positive returns, while the 
growth stocks had a positive return 66% of the time.    
 
Indeed, changing trends and cycles affect the different indices in different ways and 
magnitudes. Effective implementation of switching between the different indices at 
favourable times would ensure maximum profit and performance enhancement for the 
investors. Nevertheless, the implementation of successful rotation between the indices 
requires a realistic assessment of the degree of forecasting ability. 
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Figure 1.2: Time Series returns of FTSE Growth 350 and FTSE Value350 Indices  
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This implies that if an investor switches or rotates between the different styles, 
depending on the period when each style is performing at its best, s/he will be able to 
achieve substantial profits. However, prior to investing in the next best performing 
style, it is essential for the investor or the fund manager to know which style will 
outperform the rest in the next period. Unfortunately, it is not a simple procedure to able 
to know which style will outperform and accurate market timing is necessary.  
 
1.4. Equity Style Timing 
 
There have been numerous studies carried out that confirm the benefits of market 
timing, with the work of Sharpe (1975) being the most influential one. His study was 
one of the first that depicted the usefulness of market timing between cash and equities 
and showed the benefits that such strategies delivered. However, he also highlighted 
that market timing strategies do require a substantial amount of forecasting accuracy in 
order to enhance the performance. The topic of market timing as a strategy has 
remained controversial among many researchers and practitioners, as according to the 
efficient market hypothesis, prices exhibit random walk behaviour. It is difficult to 
predict when a bubble or an economic crash will surface in the market and when it will 
terminate.  Therefore, in order for an investor or a fund manager to time the market, 
various factors and indicators can be of assistance and used as signalling tools.      
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Indeed, there are several ways to construct style-timing models, which are based on the 
theories of the economic cycle, business cycle, stock valuation, mean reversion 
hypothesis, seasonal indicators and technical indicators. The economic cycle is one of 
the indicators that can assist in style timing and, consequently, deciding which equity 
style index to invest in. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that a style trend 
reflects the economic cycle. In the case of a strong economy, and a high GDP forecast, 
there is an implication to invest in value stocks. Therefore, an investor who invests in 
value stocks will expect the prices of the stocks to rise in conjunction to the state of the 
economy. Furthermore, rising interest rates have proven to negatively affect the growth 
stocks by a greater magnitude as comparison to the value stocks.   
 
Moreover, stock valuation is another tool which can be used as indicator of style timing 
and performance. The forecast of the price per earnings spread between the growth 
index and the value index is a model used for style timing. The price per earnings ratio 
is higher for the growth index than it is for the value index, which implies that growth 
stocks have a higher growth potential. Furthermore, the model also assumes that the 
price per earnings spread between the growth index and the value index remains at the 
equilibrium level in the long run. However, when the forecasted price per earnings 
spread narrows, the value index is expected to perform better and the signal is therefore 
directed towards the investment of value stocks (Fabozzi, 1998).  
 
The residual risk spread between the indexes is based on the mean reversion hypothesis 
and is another method of style timing. According to the mean reversion hypothesis, the 
style trend mirrors the mean reversion of the overvalued and undervalued stocks. In the 
case of an increase in residual risk for a particular stock, it implies that the stock is 
performing poorly relative to the market and its industry, or it is neglected by the 
investors.  
 
Other signals for style switching come in the form of seasonal indicators. There is a 
general rise in the price of stocks during the month of January. This is due to the fact 
that many investors choose to sell their stocks during the month of December in order to 
claim a capital loss for tax purposes. As soon as the new year starts, these investors 
reinvest their funds in the market and, therefore, the prices of the stocks automatically 
rise. Value stocks and especially small capitalization stocks have historically tended to 
23 
rise in price at the beginning of the month of January3. However, recently the January 
effect has become well known to the public and has become less evident. As a 
consequence, the effect has shifted to the month of December, where the stock prices 
rise at the end of the month as an anticipation to the January effect.   
 
Moreover, factors within the business cycle itself can be implemented as indicators used 
for equity style timing. Profit expectations on a company and its default premium on 
bonds are a source of indication for style switching. Furthermore, business expansion 
tends to coincide with large capitalization stocks, as these stocks react to the expansion 
faster than the small capitalization stocks. In addition, a rise in the risk premium for the 
small capitalization stocks is a signal for the investors to switch to the large 
capitalization stocks. In the case of a depreciating domestic currency, the large 
capitalization stocks are able to benefit as a comparison to the small capitalization 
stocks.  
 
Therefore, with the aid of relevant macroeconomic, financial and market factors, an 
investor is able to determine and forecast which equity style index will outperform the 
rest of the style and size indexes. Through this style timing process, the investor or the 
fund manager will then be able to successfully switch or rotate between the style 
indexes so as to achieve superior performance enhancement.  
 
Based on the historical performance of different style and size indices, it is evident that 
there are times when an investor is better off holding growth stocks and times when 
value stocks turn to lead. The same criteria can be applied to small and large 
capitalization stocks. For this reason, it is highly beneficial to be aware of when each 
style or size index is outperforming in order to take advantage of the possible profits 
incurred. In our study we show by using a complex quantitative model to forecast the 
best performing style and size index, an investor is able to incur reasonable profits 
above the best performing buy-and-hold strategy. However, an investor that chooses to 
follow a simple momentum based strategy in an attempt to forecast the best performing 
index is likely to sustain even higher return on their investment.  
 
                                                 
3
 Chen and de Bondt (2004) undertook a study of style momentum within the S&P500 Index and found 
that small-cap stocks, value stocks and no-dividend stocks earn exceptionally large returns in January.  
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1.5. Objective of the Research 
 
The first objective of this study is to assess the driving forces behind the different style 
indices. In particular, we analyse the cyclical changes in the financial markets and in the 
economy in general, that affect the trends and returns of style indices. 
 
The second objective of this study is to emphasize the various benefits that style 
rotation strategies can offer to an investor or a fund manager. This study attempts to 
assess the likely higher gains that style rotation of different indices can incur as a 
comparison to investing in solely one style index.     
 
Above all, this study is focused at evaluating whether short-term variation in the 
ranking of size and style index returns in the UK equity market is better predictable and 
exploitable by means of quantitative or momentum multi-style rotation strategies. The 
use of the two methods will allow us to compare the profitability of various strategies 
incurred by each method.  
 
1.6. Significance of the Research 
 
There have been a few studies that have tackled to outline the benefits of style rotation 
strategies within the UK equity market. However, these studies are based on analysing 
the benefits of rotating between return spreads of style and size indices through the 
implementation of binary models. This is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, 
which models four different market segments simultaneously. We demonstrate the 
enhanced profitability for investors of rotating between four different indices, FTSE 
Small-Cap, FTSE Large-Cap, FTSE Value 350 and FTSE Growth 350.  
 
In addition, our research applies a multinomial ordered logit model for the UK equity 
market, which has not been introduced in the style-timing arena in previous studies. 
Through the ordered logit model we are able to accentuate the potential for increased 
profitability in multi-style rotation as opposed to binomial or two-way style rotation. 
 
Furthermore, our study contributes to the existing literature of style investing by 
comparing the results obtained from the multinomial ordered logit model to those of the 
momentum model. In order to assess whether similar results can be obtained without 
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going through subjective and complex quantitative process, we implement a number of 
momentum-based multi-style rotation strategies using the same data set and sample 
period as in the quantitative model. 
 
The structure of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two comprises of the 
literature review, which discusses the earlier findings related to this study. Section three 
contains the description used in this chapter. Section four explains the methodology of 
the forecasting variables and the model used in this study. Section five outlines the 
different style rotation strategies implemented. Section six represents some preliminary 
results and the last section represents the conclusion and future contributions.   
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2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
The concept of equity market timing has attracted many studies to date and there exists 
a wide literature on style timing in general.  This review of the literature is intended to 
cover most indicative and influential studies that have been accomplished. 
 
2.1. Predictability of Equity Style Returns  
 
A study by Amenc et al. (2003) has illustrated the benefits of a new form of market 
neutral portfolio strategy that aims at delivering absolute return over the business cycle 
through systematic equity style timing decisions. Using monthly return data of the 
S&P500 during the period 1997-2002, they found that absolute returns of style 
differentials are achieved using tactical style allocation and tactical timing strategies. In 
order to test for predictability in the style index returns, they divided the data in three 
sub-periods: calibration period (estimation of coefficients), training period (generating 
forecasts and computing hit ratios) and trading period (implementation of the 
forecasting model). Using a logit regression and variables such as the term-spread, 
short-term rate, credit spreads, B/M, P/E ratios, dividend payout ratios, return on bond 
indexes, liquidity indicators, currency rates, commodity prices, inflation, economic 
growth, unemployment and consumer confidence, they found strong evidence 
predictability in value and size style differentials. Furthermore, they implemented a 
beta-neutral strategy that generated abnormal return from timing of the four style 
indexes, while maintaining a zero exposure with respect to S&P500. Moreover, they 
showed that the market neutral timing strategy can be employed to Exchange Traded 
Funds, resulting in substantially higher annualized returns (controlling for transaction 
costs), lower volatility and higher Sharpe ratios than the S&P500 index.  
 
Kao and Shumaker (1999) undertook a study on equity style timing. They found that 
timing strategies in the US market, based on asset class and size, have historically 
provided more opportunity for out-performance than a timing strategy based on value. 
During the period 1979-1997, primarily they analysed the properties of style spreads 
and the extents to which seasonality (value stocks tend to outperform in the first 
calendar quarter and growth stocks tend to outperform in the fourth quarter) and serial 
correlation have an effect. Further, they analysed the extent to which macroeconomic 
factors have an effect on equity style timing by applying a nonparametric technique 
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known as the recursive partitioning algorithm (RPA) to explain this relationship. They 
conclude that a long-short strategy earned an annual return of 5.05% and the model had 
a 74% accuracy rate when applied to out-of-sample data. In addition they applied their 
analysis to pension fund strategies, pointing out that a sponsor can fund or de-fund 
managers whose styles are in or out of favour.    
 
Moreover, Asness et al. (2000) criticized this approach as it may be susceptible to 
uncovering spurious ex post relationships due to the fact that all the variables may be 
economically meaningful and as a result becomes difficult to determine which of the 
observed relations are real and which are artefacts of the data. Using US data between 
the periods 1982 to 1999, they proposed an approach of forecasting the style spread 
through the spread in valuation multiples between a value portfolio and a growth 
portfolio (the value spread) and the spread in expected earnings growth between a 
growth portfolio and a value portfolio (the earnings growth spread). This measure had 
shown to be statistically and economically significant and forecasts near-historic highs 
in the expected one–year return of value stocks versus growth stocks.  
 
Kester (1990) examined the comparative benefits and required predictive accuracy of 
market timing with small firm stocks. He examined two approaches to market timing; 
(1) shifting from cash equivalents to small stocks and vice versa and (2) shifting form 
large firm stocks to small firm stocks and vice versa. His data incorporated monthly 
returns from 1934-1988 for US stocks. Kester criticized Sharpe‟s (1975) approach of 
assuming transaction costs of 2 per cent as they are not representative of the transaction 
costs incurred by large, institutional investors which highly dominate the market. By 
using 0.25 per cent transaction cost, the potential gains from market timing are 
significantly higher than reported by Sharpe. In a perfect market timing scenario with 
annual portfolio revisions and transaction costs of 2 per cent, the return advantage of 
market timing with small stocks and cash equivalents is 7.71 per cent. However, with 
monthly portfolio revisions and 0.25 per cent transaction costs, the return advantage of 
market timing with small stocks and cash equivalents increases to 28.26 per cent. 
Furthermore, as transaction costs decrease so does the level of predictive accuracy. The 
benefit of reduction of transaction costs from 2 to 0.25 per cent is a decline in the level 
of predictive accuracy from 71 to 66 per cent with large stocks and cash equivalents, 
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from 72 to 68 per cent with small stocks and cash equivalents and 67 to 60 per cent for 
market timing for small and large-firm stocks.   
 
Copeland and Copeland (1999) explored the market timing strategies through style and 
size rotation using the Market Volatility Index (VIX). They proposed two strategies that 
implied volatility options on stock index futures as market timing signals and found 
portfolio returns enhanced considerably. In the first strategy, when the estimate of 
expected future volatility increased, there was a shift from growth stocks to value 
stocks. This is due to the fact that rising uncertainty for the future leads to a decline in 
confidence for the growth stocks. Moreover, value stocks are considered to be 
undervalued in the market and a rise in volatility implies a mean reversion for the value 
stocks. Furthermore, in the case of a decrease in volatility, the portfolio is shifted from 
value stocks to growth stocks. The second strategy consists of the changes in size 
rotation. When the implied volatility increases, there is a shift to large stocks in the 
portfolio and vice versa. They employed historical and implied volatility estimators of 
the S&P500 and monthly return data between 1981 and 1997 in order to find the 
relevant variables for the value (P/E, price-to-book ratio and dividend yield) and growth 
(sales growth, return on equity and dividend payout). When the trading position was 
long value and short growth, the returns were positive in 26 out of 32 cases. 
Consequently, using larger changes in the VIX (20 per cent or higher) resulted as a best 
approach to the long value/short growth strategy. However, when the trading position 
was to long large stocks and short small stocks (volatility increase), the futures on the 
large-cap portfolio outperformed futures on the short-cap portfolio in 31 out of 32 cases. 
According to Fama and French (1992) firm size and beta are highly correlated, which 
may lead to the fact that the trading rule based on size was more successful than the 
trading rule based on style.      
 
A recent study by Bauer and Dahlquist (2001) concur with Sharpe (1975) that market 
timing is a complex trading strategy. However, the difficulty does vary over time which 
implies that there is scope to beat a buy-and-hold strategy and earn higher returns. They 
used a new measure of investment performance known as the “roulette wheel”, in order 
to analyze monthly, quarterly and annual market-timing strategies during the period 
1926-1999 switching between large-cap and small-cap stocks. The roulette wheel 
provides a simple measure as there is there is an equal chance of investing in small-cap 
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stocks or large-cap stocks.  Using this approach for monthly market-timing, the buy-
and-hold large cap strategy slightly beat the switching strategy between small- and 
large-cap stocks. This measure provides the clarity of identifying the attractiveness of a 
buy-and-hold strategy for certain asset classes, especially when transaction costs are 
considered. Furthermore, it clearly shows the simplicity for active market-timing 
strategies to outperform buy-and-hold strategies during certain time periods. According 
to their results, a 0.13 percent greater forecasting accuracy is needed per basis point of 
one-way transaction costs when switching between large-cap stocks and T-bills, as 
opposed to buying and holding large-cap stocks. However, by buying-and-holding 
large-cap stocks, an investor would have beaten the roulette wheel approach 90 percent 
of the time in 1995, whereas in 1981 the situation was reversed. The authors conclude 
that in certain years beating the market with active timing is a challenging process.  
 
Ferson and Harvey (1991) presented a study on the sources of predictability in portfolio 
returns and whether this predictability is a reflection of market inefficiency. Using 
monthly data of the S&P500 over the period 1959-1986, they implemented a multi-beta 
asset pricing model using risk factors related to the stock market, unexpected inflation, 
consumer expenditures and interest rates. According to their results they found that 
changes in portfolios‟ exposures to risk (betas) and changes in the premiums the market 
offers for accepting risks account for the majority of the predictable variation in 
portfolio returns. However, their results showed that the risk premium change was the 
most important indicator of predictability of portfolio returns, as risk premiums change 
is positively correlated with the business cycle and is higher in January than in the other 
eleven months.  In addition, interest rate and inflation premiums are the most important 
factors in predicting bond portfolio returns. Furthermore, the authors demonstrated that 
a large portion of the predictable variation is explained by the multiple-beta model in 
most of the cases. Therefore, this validates that a small fraction of the predictability is 
justified by market inefficiencies.  
 
There have been a number of studies which had confirmed that value stock strategies 
outperform growth stock strategies in the U.S. However, Bauman et al. (1998) used data 
from France, Germany, Japan and U.K, and tested whether the same applies to twenty 
international markets during the period 1986-1996. From their evaluations they found 
that their results did not differ to the results of studies on U.S. markets. Value stocks 
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outperformed the growth stocks in majority of the years and in most of the countries 
with a large margin. Furthermore, a small-company effect was observed in most of the 
years of the study, but the differences in performance between large value stocks and 
large growth stocks were greater than between small value stocks and small growth 
stocks.   
 
Reinganum (1999) undertook a study to illustrate the importance of market 
capitalization exposure in portfolio management over time. Specifically, he focused on 
the differential return between small-cap and large-cap stocks. In his previous study, 
Reinganum (1992) stated that the relationship between market capitalization and 
performance varies over time and it is this variability that is in part predictable. In his 
current study, he investigated NYSE stocks between the periods of 1925 to 1998. The 
first part of his study includes the long-run return characteristics of portfolios formed on 
the basis of market capitalization. Then, he documented the variability of the 
relationship between market capitalization and stock returns. Finally, he illustrated the 
benefits that investors can potentially gain by exploiting this variability. According to 
his results, the average return of the smallest-cap portfolio is 22.72% per year and it is 
12.19% for the largest-cap portfolio. Therefore, over long investment horizons, smaller-
cap stocks outperform the larger-cap stocks, and there is an inverse relationship between 
market capitalization and portfolios returns. Furthermore, the concept of seasonality is 
evident in small-cap stocks, as nearly one half of the annual performance for small-cap 
stocks occurs in January. However, when considering shorter investment horizons, the 
average return for the small-cap stocks declines. Even so, the short-cap stocks still 
outperform the large-cap stocks.  Therefore the relationship between market 
capitalization and stock returns is highly variable after excluding different types of 
outliers on average returns. Such outliers include the exclusion of ten best and worst 
years of small-cap stocks. Using three different active investment strategies, Reinganum 
found that a strategy with greater flexibility in shifting market capitalization will 
enhance returns to the investors.     
 
Moreover Coggin (1998) focused his work on the existence of long-term memory in 
equity style index returns. The long-run memory property of the mean-reverting model 
of stock returns implies that stock returns are negatively serially correlated and the 
serial correlation becomes more negative as the length of the holding period increases. 
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Therefore, stock returns will revert to their historical mean. In his study, Coggin 
examined the random walk and long-term memory hypotheses for eleven U.S. broad 
market and equity style indexes (value, growth, small and large) during the period 1963-
1975, using two statistical methodologies: the variance ration test and the modified 
rescaled range (R/S) statistic. According to his findings, the random walk null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for broad market indexes and for the equity style indexes, 
implying that they do follow a random walk Furthermore, the results from the R/S test 
indicate that there is no evidence of long-term memory in broad market or equity style 
indexes and stock index returns are not mean-reverting.   
 
Due to the fact that capital flows to emerging markets increased dramatically in the 
nineties, Desrosiers at al. (2004) analysed the effect of style timing strategies in 
emerging markets. They examined the performance of relative value (price-to-book) 
and relative strength (price momentum) strategies during the period of October 1995-
October 2004. Both strategies on emerging market indices post a non-significant 
positive market risk-adjusted return at 5% level. Due to the fact that the two strategies 
exhibit negative correlation, an implication for diversification and style timing between 
both strategies arises. Furthermore, the authors tested a style timing strategy over the 26 
emerging market countries, using a conditioning criterion related to changes in wealth 
and risk aversion. The authors assumed that a high-risk aversion would support relative 
value strategy while a low risk-aversion would favour a relative strength strategy. They 
determined a monthly preference for a relative value or strength strategy according to 
whether the past twelve-month excess return of the equally-weighted emerging market 
index is negative or positive. Consistent with their results, the style timing strategy 
indicates a significant market risk-adjusted return of 1.46% per month. Nevertheless, 
the results remain robust to the inclusion of transaction costs.  
 
2.2. Style Rotation 
 
Levis and Liodakis (1999) analysed the potential profitability of style rotation strategies 
in the United Kingdom. Their study was based on value/growth and small/large cap 
segments of the market during the period 1968-1997. They used a Monte Carlo 
simulation to assess the average gains of style rotation after accounting for transaction 
costs. Furthermore, using a style rotation model based on macroeconomic variables they 
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test the ability to forecast the direction of the style spread at a given month. In the 
results of the out-of-sample tests, they found a strong evidence of out-performance for 
small versus large and little evidence for value versus growth style rotation strategies. 
More specifically, their results suggest that forecasting the size spread needs a 65%-
70% accuracy rate in order to outperform the long term small-cap strategy. In addition, 
an accuracy rate of more than 80% is required to outperform the value buy-and-hold 
strategy. Furthermore, by applying a logit regression model they found a significant 
relation between economic cycles and equity style spreads. Their findings suggest that 
style rotation strategies based on small and large firms have high potential to be 
successful whereas for value and growth firms the probability of success is low. 
Therefore, the probability of style rotation strategies depends on the temporal volatility 
of the underlying return spread between the styles.  
 
Levis and Tessaromatis (2003) carried out a study using value and growth indices for 
the FTSE100 and FTSE250 during the period January 1987 to October 2001. They 
found, using implementation rules to control for risk, that style rotation strategies are 
profitable for investors with different benchmarks and risk constraints. Firstly, they 
developed a model based on macroeconomic variables in order to forecast the direction 
and magnitude of value/growth spread. Secondly, they assessed the implementation of 
the style rotation on hedge funds, traditional fund managers and style-consistent 
managers. Thirdly, they controlled for the risk characteristics of portfolio in terms of 
tracking errors relative to the benchmark. As a result, they show that the value/growth 
spread can be predicted using the financial and macroeconomic variables. By 
controlling for risk, the style rotation strategy is profitable for both the hedge fund 
managers and the traditional fund managers.     
 
A further study that examined style and size rotation strategies within the UK equity 
market was by Todorovic (2005). The study focused at forecasting index return spreads 
between FTSE Small-Cap and FTSE 100 Index, and FTSE Growth 350 and FTSE 
Value 350 Index. Using a binomial logit model for the period between January 1987 
and May 2005, the out-of-sample results indicated that style rotation strategies are 
profitable for investors at transactions cost levels of up to 1,140 basis points for the size 
indices and 183 basis points for the style indices.  
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Moreover, Wang (2005) added support to the consistent literature that style momentum 
and logit-based style rotation strategies do generate profits. Using US (NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ) monthly observations from 1960 to 2001, he evaluated that style 
momentum profits are generated from cross-style differences in average returns; 
however, the Fama-French model fails to accurately capture the cross-section of the 
average returns. He applied a logit model based on the Fama-French three factors to 
predict relative style performance. According to his findings, neither the pricing errors 
of the three factor model nor the cross-sectional differences in average returns are 
responsible for style momentum profits. In fact, multifactor beta rotation and the 
covariances between rotating betas and the common risk factors account for the profits 
of style rotation strategies.     
 
Furthermore, Arshanapalli et al. (1998) implemented the concept of style rotation 
strategies across international markets. Specifically, they evaluated the relationships 
among beta, size, book-to-market and average regional industry portfolio returns in 
eighteen equity markets during the period 1975-1995. Their objectives were aimed at 
examining the value investing strategy across North America, Europe, the Pacific Basin 
and international (U.S. and non U.S. markets), to test whether the value stocks are more 
riskier than growth stocks and to examine the fit of the Fama and French (1996) three-
factor model internationally. According to their results, they find that the value stocks 
have outperformed the growth stocks for every investment horizon and geographic 
region over the period 1975-1995. Regardless of the geographic region, if investors had 
invested in value stocks they would have obtained superior returns. Furthermore, their 
results of the Sharpe ratios for value investing were larger than for growth investing, 
which implies that such strategies are not fundamentally riskier in eighteen equity 
markets. Finally, their findings confirm that the three-factor model explains most of the 
variation in average returns on industry portfolios and, therefore, suggests that the 
returns are largely explained by size and book-to-market effects.  
 
Jacobs and Levy (1996) agreed with previous study of Brinson et al. (1991) that it is 
asset allocation that has the largest impact on investment fund returns rather than stock 
selection. They used a comparative analysis of naïve returns, which does not take into 
account the effects of related factors, and pure returns of style rotation. For the pure 
returns they controlled for macroeconomic and fundamental factors that vary across 
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stocks with different attributes. According to the results, they found that the pure returns 
of the style rotation portfolio are substantially higher than the naïve returns and the 
strategy outperformed the market from 1990 to 1994. Moreover, the volatility level was 
substantially lower for a pure strategy as compared to the naïve strategy.  
 
Lucas et al. (2002) showed that the impact of firm-specific characteristics, such as size 
and book-to-price, on future excess stock returns varies over time. They used U.S. data 
from 1984 to 1999 and showed that the variation is particularly predictable. By linking 
the impact of macroeconomic conditions, using the term structure variable and the 
business cycle indicator, they found excess returns to style rotating investment 
strategies. Nonetheless, the result of the returns were robust to various ways of risk-
correction, choice of holding period (monthly, quarterly, semi-annual and annual), way 
of portfolio construction and outlier control. However, the authors reported that a 
rotating size and book-to-price based style strategy, using the business cycle approach, 
generated the best overall performance before and after risk correction. 
 
2.3. Multi-Style Rotation 
 
Arshanapalli, Switzer and Panju (2005) concentrated on equity style timing and 
developed a multi-style rotation model for the Russell large-cap and small-cap growth 
and value style indexes. They used a multinomial timing model based on 
macroeconomic and fundamental public information and modelled the four different 
market segments concurrently. Their results for the out-of-sample tests suggest that the 
active multi-style rotation strategies can be developed in order to outperform the best 
performing buy-and-hold strategy even when accounting for transaction costs. Their 
sample data was during the period 1979-2000. According to the results, there is a 
138.38% out-performance of their model as a comparison to the best performing buy-
and-hold equity style index (Russell 1000 Value Index), without taking into account the 
transaction costs, and a 63.64% out-performance with transaction costs. Therefore, their 
study suggests that excess returns can be achieved even when controlling for transaction 
costs.   
 
In a study by Ahmed et al. (2002), the potential profits arising from multi-style rotation 
strategies opposed to single-style rotation strategies were shown. Ahemd et al. 
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contended that moderate multi-style rotation gives a portfolio an excellent chance of 
outperforming the market index for US data during the period 1979-1997. For the 
period 1982 to 1993, the joint investment in small-cap and growth stocks perform the 
best, where as between 1982 to 1983 large and value perform the best. Specifically, 
using tactical asset allocation for single-style strategies, a manger who correctly 
forecasts the outperforming market sector would have added more than $2 to terminal 
wealth per $1 initial investment over the sample period. Having an initial investment of 
$10,000 in 1981, the terminal wealth would be $92,000 in 1997 by investing 65% in 
large stocks and 35% in small stocks. On the other hand, a manager that is engaged in 
multi-style rotation strategies would incur a terminal wealth of $264,000 for the same 
period.      
 
2.4. Momentum 
 
All the evidence noted above shows the profitability of long-only style rotation 
strategies based on quantitative forecasting models. Wang (2005) suggests that style 
rotation strategies in spirit are comparable to technical trading rules, such as relative 
strength indicator which is a form of a momentum strategy. This implies that the use of 
momentum based style rotation should achieve similar results as a quantitatively based 
one. Evidence of profitability of various momentum strategies in the US can be found in 
Lo and McKinlay (1990) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) for example. Levellen 
(2002) documents that the momentum is pronounced in style index portfolio based 
trading and that, in some cases, it is even stronger than in individual stocks. In the UK, 
Ellis and Thomas (2004) find that momentum profits prevail for holding periods greater 
than five months when five percent of transaction costs4 are incorporated to their 
momentum strategies on the FTSE 350 index.  
 
Since its first inspection by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) momentum return has been 
one of the most intriguing challenges to finance academics and researchers. The 
persistence of stock return for intermediate horizon (six to twelve months) is evident 
across markets, across industries, among asset classes and in equity styles. Simply, 
momentum trading refers to the trading strategy of buying past winners (stocks that 
exhibit high returns) and selling past losers (stocks that exhibit low returns).  Jegadeesh 
                                                 
4
 See Carhart (1997) for the impact of transaction costs on the profitability of momentum strategies 
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and Titman (2001) examine the trading strategy over intermediate horizon, from three 
months to twelve months, and document that the strategy of buying winners and selling 
losers over the previous three to twelve months also achieve an abnormal profit of 
twelve percent per year in the US market. Furthermore, a study by Chen and De Bondt 
(2004) concentrated on style momentum strategies within the S&P-500, where an 
investor buys an equity style with characteristics that are in favour and sells an equity 
style with characteristics that are out of favour. However, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
document that the momentum contrarian trading strategy of buying past losers and 
selling past winners can also achieve abnormal profit in the long-term, especially from 
three to five years. In such case, long-term past losers outperform long-term past 
winners. Nonetheless, even taking into account transaction costs, momentum strategies 
continue to exhibit abnormal returns. Ellis and Thomas (2004) focused on the UK 
market and incorporated five percent of transaction costs to their momentum strategies 
on the FTSE 350. Their results confirmed that momentum profits prevail for holding 
periods greater than five months.  
 
It is evident from the review of the literature that 1) style returns are predictable, but the 
degree of predictability depends on the specification of the forecasting model; 2) 
quantitatively based two-way style rotation is profitable, however there is significantly 
more potential in multi-style rotation; 3) style rotation can be implemented by using 
simple momentum approach rather than a complex quantitative one and 4) transaction 
costs do play a significant role in the profitability of these strategies. In addition of 
taking into account these four issues when devising our trading strategies, we will 
include the possibility of short-selling a style which is expected to be out of favour, as 
our strategies can be applicable in the ETF and futures markets where short-selling is 
permitted.  
 
From the review of the literature, it is not difficult to observe that most studies of style 
rotation have used a binomial approach, with an exception two that employed a 
multinomial approach for the US market. To the best of our knowledge, this is a first 
study in the UK that models four different market segments simultaneously. Our study 
further adds to the existing literature by employing two different methods of style-
rotation, the ordered logit model, which has not been used in the style-timing arena in 
previous studies, and a momentum-based model.  
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3. THE CHOICE OF DATA  
 
In order to create a valid model from which an investor will be able to forecast the best 
performing style, it is of great importance to establish the types of variables that will 
provide an accurate prediction and ultimately enhance the performance of the 
investment. Furthermore, it is crucial to set suitable criteria from which the forecasting 
model will be developed and determine the appropriate estimation method that will be 
applied.  
 
3.1. Equity Size and Style Index Selection    
 
For this study we developed a multinomial timing model based on macroeconomic and 
fundamental public information, used to forecast the best performing UK FTSE index5. 
Furthermore, we implement a number of momentum-based multi-style rotation 
strategies using the same data set and sample period as in the quantitative model. We 
employed our analysis and modelling on indices rather than on individual stocks due to 
several reasons. It is far simpler to trade on indices through ETFs (Exchange Traded 
Funds) and futures as a comparison to individual stocks. Further to this, it is easier and 
less expensive to trade in indices due to their market acceptance as basket trades or 
block trades.  Indices have less liquidity constraints and they require less rebalancing of 
individual stocks as opposed to customised portfolios. In scenarios where switching or 
rotating between different stocks is frequent, the transaction costs are high. Although 
our multinomial style timing model requires a higher frequency of switching or rotating 
between the different styles, the transaction costs remain lower due to the fact that we 
implement our strategies on indices. Our monthly data sample covers the period from 
February 1987 to April 2006, due to the fact that style indices used for the purpose of 
this paper only become available in the late 1980‟s.  In particular, as a representation of 
the style indices, we used the FTSE 350 Growth Index and the FTSE 350 Value Index 
as proxies for the growth stocks and the values stocks respectively. These indices cover 
the top 350 largest stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange. In addition, in order to 
represent the size indices, we applied the FTSE 100 Index and the FTSE Small-Cap 
Index as proxies for the large capitalization stocks and the small capitalization stocks 
respectively. The former index covers the top 100 largest, by market capitalization, 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. On the other hand, the FTSE Small-
                                                 
5
 All data used for empirical analysis was gathered from DataStream. 
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Cap Index contains companies with the smallest capitalization of the capital and 
industry segments. In order to develop the monthly returns for each index, the following 
computation was employed6: 
   1 1t ttt P PPR        (1) 
 
Therefore, this supplies our research with a sample size of 231 observations, where all 
the prices are calculated at the first trading day of each month.  
 
3.2. Selecting the Potential Forecasting Variables for the Quantitative Model 
 
For the purpose of effective style timing and ultimately investing in the best performing 
index, it is vital to primarily distinguish and establish the appropriate forecasting 
variables. From previous studies and financial theory it has been proven that events 
which take place in the economy and the business cycle do have an impact on the 
direction and magnitude of the stock index returns. For this study we selected a 
collection of variables based on macroeconomic, market and fundamental factors that 
were used in previous studies.  
 
One of the variables that was included in our analysis is the interest rate. Previous 
studies by Sorensen and Lazzara (1995) and Kao and Schumaker (1999) have shown 
that the predictive power of the interest rate is linked to the performance of the style 
indices, the growth index and the value index. The measures that we employed for the 
calculation of the interest rate were the term structure and the monthly change in the 
three-month UK Treasury Bill. The term structure was calculated as the monthly 
difference between the ten-year UK Benchmark Bond Yield and the three-month UK 
Treasury Bill (middle rate).  
 
Furthermore, we have incorporated the UK monthly exchange rate against the US 
Dollar, due to the fact that the US market is currently one of the most prevailing ones in 
the world. Sterling/dollar exchange rate is likely to help predict performance of size 
indices, as suggested by Levis and Liodakis (1999). Nonetheless, the value of the 
                                                 
6
 As in Arshanapalli et al (2005) the dividends were not taken into account as the difference in the return 
calculation is minimal.  
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exchange rate will have a greater impact on the size indices rather than the style indices. 
In particular, in case of a depreciating UK Pound against the US Dollar, the exports 
would become cheaper than the imports and therefore the domestic large capitalization 
stocks would prosper more than the small capitalization stocks.  
 
Additionally, in our study we have taken into account the monthly change in the UK 
CPI Index as a measure of inflation. Numerous studies have been carried out to 
demonstrate whether inflation plays a role in equity investment. One of them was by 
Anderson (1997) who conveyed that at periods of high levels of inflation, growth stocks 
and large-cap stocks performed poorly and value and small-cap stocks became 
favourable.  
 
Moreover, in order to demonstrate the impact of earnings on stock prices, we included 
the rate of change in the industrial production index. In our study was we have taken 
into account two measures; the monthly change in the UK Production Index and the 
monthly change in the UK Industrial Production of the Manufacturing sector. There are 
two reasons that we have included the industrial production index as a possible 
forecasting variable. First, as Sorenson and Lazzara (1995) have shown, the industrial 
production index is linked with the earnings of a company, which in return may affect 
the performance of the growth and value stocks. Second, the industrial production index 
has the benefit of providing monthly observations whereas company earnings are 
usually reported on a half yearly basis in the UK.    
 
It is also essential to take into account a sort of measure of money supply as a possible 
forecasting factor. The level of money supply is able to affect the economy as a whole, 
primarily prices in the long-run and in essence influence future cash-flow expectations 
within the market. In order to justify for money supply two variables have been 
incorporated in our analysis.  The first variable is M0 which is referred as the “wide 
monetary base” or “narrow money”. The second variable which was included as a 
possible forecasting variable is M4, which is referred as “broad money” or simply “the 
money supply”. 
 
Furthermore, another macroeconomic variable that was incorporated in our research is 
the rate of change in the spot price of Brent Oil. The reasoning behind the inclusion of 
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this variable is the fact that a change in the price of oil may affect the stock market as a 
whole and its volatility. This is of importance to our research, given the political 
situation in the Gulf and Middle East in the 1990s and 2000s, which is our period of 
analysis. 
 
Fama and French (1998) have reported that the market dividend yield has the ability to 
vary according to changes in business conditions and can therefore affect stock returns. 
Therefore, we take account of this variable and include it in our analysis. In particular, 
we included the difference between the dividend yield for the FTSE Small-Cap Index 
and the FTSE 100 Index.  
 
Finally, to enhance the predictive power of our model, we include the one month lagged 
indices for each style and size index respectively. This shows that the past value or 
trend of the indices can be an indicator of the future values or trends, and can potentially 
facilitate in style rotation models.  
 
The set of potential explanatory variables are shown in Table1.27:        
 
Table 1.2: Host of Potential Variables for the Forecasting Model 
Measure Code Description 
Inflation cinfl Monthly change in UK CPI 
Interest Rates c_ts Monthly change in the 10 year UK Benchmark 
Bond Yield minus the UK 3 month T-Bill 
Interest Rates mc3mtb Monthly change in 3 month T-Bill 
Exchange Rate  c_er Monthly change in the GBP/USD exchange rate 
Consumer Confidence c_conf Monthly change in the UK Consumer Confidence 
Indicator 
Liquidity  c_ukindpro Monthly change in the UK Production Index 
Liquidity c_pm Monthly change in the UK Industrial Production 
of the Manufacturing Sector 
Money Supply c_m0ms Monthly change in the M0  UK money supply 
Money Supply c_m4ms Monthly change in the M4 UK money supply 
Commodity per_c_oil Monthly percentage change in the price of Brent 
Oil 
Dividend Yield dysmall_large* FTSE Small-Cap Dividend Yield minus FTSE 100 
Large-Cap Dividend Yield 
Risk Premium C_riskprem Monthly change in the UK Risk Premium 
Lagged Dependent Variable  Small-cap 1 month lagged FTSE Small-Cap Index 
Lagged Dependent Variable Large-cap 1 month lagged FTSE Large-Cap Index 
Lagged Dependent Variable Value 1 month lagged FTSE Value 350 Index 
Lagged Dependent Variable Growth 1 month lagged FTSE Growth 350 Index 
*measure only applicable for the size indices 
 
                                                 
7
 All of the potential forecasting variables were corrected for stationarity.  
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4. METHODOLOGY  
 
4.1. Quantitative Forecasting Model: Evaluating the Forecasting Variables and 
the Model Specification 
 
In order to establish a successful model that will have the potential in forecasting the 
best performing index, the appropriate choice of explanatory variables need to be 
chosen. As a consequence, an investor or a fund manager will be able to enhance the 
performance through various style rotation strategies. In this study, we estimate an in-
sample period of 120 months to determine the potential forecasting variables8. Using 
these results, we then implement a recursive method on the out-of-sample observations 
of 111 months to generate monthly forecasted performance of each index and select the 
index with the highest terminal wealth. Since the goal of our style-timing model is to 
select the best performing index among the four FTSE style indices, a statistical 
technique able to generate a probabilistic forecast of a group membership is most 
suitable. There are various statistical models that have the aptitude to predict the 
direction of stock index returns, such as linear discriminant analysis, probit model, logit 
model and probabilistic neural networks, which were derived from the Bayes Theory.   
Due to the fact that the logistic approach has been used in the style-timing literature and, 
similarly with Arshanapalli, Switzer and Panju (2005) who used the logit model, we 
employ the same methodology. However, our study differs from the existing literature 
of the UK markets in that we use a multinomial ordered logit model as opposed to 
binary model. Levis and Liodakis (1999) implemented the logit model in their literature, 
however, they used a binary model so as to predict style and size spreads. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study that uses this methodology for the style-timing 
analysis for the UK market. The multinomial logit model as specified by Greene (2003) 
is as: 
                  
             Prob ( yt = j | xt ) =    

 Jk iee
ij
1
k'
'
1


       (2)
            
                                                 
8
 The software used throughout the study for the quantitative model is EViews.  
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The estimated equations provide a set of probabilities for the J+ 1 responses or rankings, 
which in the case of this study is the probability that a given index outperforms the 
others.  
 
4.1.1. The Ordered Logit Model 
 
In order to develop a strategy that will forecast the best performing style index in the 
next period, we use the multinomial ordered logit model. The multinomial logit and 
probit models in general have been widely used in many fields, including economics, 
market research and transportation engineering. Examples of such studies include bond 
ratings, opinion surveys, employment status, etc. However, although the outcome is 
discrete, these studies fail to account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. 
On the other hand, the ordered logit model has come to be applied in a framework for 
analysing ordered responses. More specifically, in an ordered logit model, the observed 
dependent variables (yt) represent ordered outcomes or ranks. For instance, the 
responses to an opinion survey can be categorized as 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4. As specified by 
Greene (2003), the model is built around a latent regression, where y* is unobserved 
that depends linearly on the explanatory variables, and has the following 
transformation:  
     
     yt* = xt' β + εt          (3) 
 
The explanatory variables are denoted by xt and εt are independent and identically 
distributed random variables. The random disturbance term in this case has a logistic 
distribution. The observed yt is determined from yt* and follows the following 
conditions: 
 
y = 1   if  yt*  ≤  Ȗ1 
y = 2  if  Ȗ1 <   yt*  ≤  Ȗ2 
y = 3  if  Ȗ2 <  yt*  ≤  Ȗ3 
.   
. 
. 
y = J  if  ȖJ  <  yt* 
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The threshold values gammas, Ȗ, are estimated along with the β coefficients using the 
maximum likelihood estimation. Under very general conditions, the estimators are 
consistent, asymptotically normal and asymptotically efficient. The value of the 
observed variable y depends on whether or not the gamma thresholds have been 
crossed. Therefore, in order to evaluate the logistic probabilities9 of observing each 
value of yt, the following calculations are required: 
 
Pr(yt = 1| xt, β, Ȗ) = F(Ȗ1 - xt'β) 
Pr(yt = 2| xt, β, Ȗ) = F(Ȗ2 - xt'β) - F(Ȗ1 - xt'β) 
Pr(yt = 3| xt, β, Ȗ) = F(Ȗ3 - xt'β) - F(Ȗ2 - xt'β) 
.   
. 
.                        
Pr(yt = J| xt, β, Ȗ) = 1 - F(ȖJ - xt'β) 
 
For all the probabilities to be positive, each gamma needs to smaller in value than the 
previous one. Specifically, it needs to entail the following specification: 
 
   Ȗ1  <  Ȗ2  <  …  <  ȖJ-1. 
 
4.1.2. Determining the Forecasting Variables 
 
Using the variables that have been widely discussed in the literature as potential 
predictors of stock returns, we run the recursive ordered logit model to first determine 
whether potential variables affect the FTSE Small-Cap Index, the FTSE Large-Cap 
Index, the FTSE Value 350 Index and the FTSE Growth 350 Index10. As a first step, we 
rank the four style and size indices, according to their returns, with rank 1 representing 
the index with the highest return and rank 4 representing the index with lowest return. 
We do this procedure over the whole sample data, from February 1987 to April 2006. 
                                                 
9
 Other distributions, particularly the normal distribution using the probit model, could be used just as 
easily. We assume logistic distribution in our analysis, although both distributions generally give similar 
results in practice, because the densities are very similar. That is, the fitted regression plots will be 
virtually indistinguishable and the implied relationships between the explanatory variables and the 
probabilities will also be very similar. This was the case for our study as we also incorporated probit 
probabilities for comparison and the probabilities estimated resulted to be very similar to those of the 
logistic distribution.  
10
 We attempted to use Granger Causality tests, proposed by Arshanapalli, Switzer and Panju (2005), as a 
method of removing insignificant variables. However, the results attained were not reliable and we 
excluded Granger Causality tests as a technique of evaluating significant variables that are able to predict 
the performance of the size and style indices.  
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These rankings are applied as dependent variables in our modelling. In order to 
determine the forecasting variables, we run the ordered logit model using all of the 
potential variables over the first in-sample period. Our first in-sample period contains 
120 monthly observations, starting from February 1987 and ending on January 1997. As 
a result, we determine the statistically significant variables and the optimal lags to 
consider for each variable. Table 1.2 shows the results of the statistically significant 
variables between February 1987 to January 1997 for the FTSE Small-Cap Index, using 
the ordered logit model. Those variables shown in Table 1.3 will then be used in the 
ordered logit model from February 1997 to January 1998 to forecast the probability of 
the Small Cap index to be ranked 1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th11.  
 
Table 1.3: Determinants of FTSE Small-Cap Index  
     
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SMALLRET(-1) -32.17842 6.210421 -5.181359 0.0000** 
CONSCONF(-1) -0.066085 0.037356 -1.769037        0.0769* 
CPI(-1) -1.527482 0.569980 -2.679888 0.0074** 
CPI(-2) 1.292298 0.546335 2.365396 0.0180** 
DYS_L(-1) -1.455415 0.546850 -2.661453 0.0078** 
MONEX(-1) 12.38289 6.311049 1.962097 0.0498** 
TS(-1) -0.516409 0.242673 -2.128005 0.0333** 
     
**Significant at 5% significance level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
 
To obtain the next set of explanatory variables for each style/size index which will be 
used for forecasting the ranking probabilities in the period February 1998 to January 
1999, we extend our in-sample window by one year. The same recursive procedure is 
carried out until the end of the sample, April 2006.  
 
The results in Table 1.3 show information on coefficient estimates, asymptotic standard 
errors, the corresponding z-statistics and significance levels. The sign of the β 
coefficients show the direction of the change in the probability of falling in the endpoint 
                                                 
11
 Note that 1) the variables shown in Tables 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 are only the initial set of variables 
which will be changing through the recursive process (explained on page 48) and 2) only significant 
variables used for further forecasting are shown. The results of all the potential variables (including 
statistically insignificant variables) implemented in the ordered logit model are shown in Tables 1, 2, 3 
and 4 in the Appendix. 
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rankings. From the results and the p-values in particular12, the one-month lagged value 
of FTSE Small-Cap Index return is highly significant. This shows that past trends affect 
the future trends. Furthermore, the inflation is found to be significant at one-month and 
two-month lagged periods. Moreover, the dividend yield of FTSE Small-Cap minus 
FTSE Large-Cap, the monthly exchange rate and the term structure are also found to be 
significant and play a role in forecasting the performance of the FTSE Small-Cap Index. 
 
Tables 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 show the ordered logit model results for the FTSE Large-Cap 
Index, FTSE Growth 350 Index and FTSE Value 350 Index respectively. Each table 
indicates the significant variables between the period of February 1987 to January 1997 
that have a predictive ability in evaluating the performance of the FTSE Large-Cap 
Index, the FTSE Growth 350 Index and the FTSE Value 350 Index in the period 
February 1998 to January 1999. Similarly with the analysis of FTSE Small-Cap Index, 
the results of all the potential variables (including statistically insignificant variables) 
implemented in the ordered logit model for the three remaining indices are shown in 
Appendix 1.  
 
 
Table 1.4: Determinants of FTSE Large-Cap Index 
     
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     CPI(-2) -0.168389 0.086412 -1.948681      0.0513* 
DYS_L(-1) 0.634674 0.361617 1.755100      0.0792* 
RISKPREM(-1) 57.95229 27.27952 2.124388 0.0336** 
     
*Significant at 10% significance level 
**Significant at 5% significance level 
 
From the results of Table 1.4, it is evident that a lower number of variables affect the 
FTSE Large-Cap Index, in comparison to the FTSE Small-Cap Index. The two-month 
lagged value of the inflation and the risk premium are significant at the 10% and 5% 
significance levels respectively. However, we also include the dividend yield of FTSE 
Small-Cap Index minus FTSE Large-Cap Index, which is significant at 10% 
significance level.  
 
                                                 
12
 We applied the same criteria for each variable using the 10% significance level in order to determine 
the significant variables.    
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Table 1.5: Determinants of FTSE Growth 350 Index 
     
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     CONSCONF(-2) -0.064208 0.027658 -2.321478 0.0203** 
CPI(-1) -0.278054 0.086005 -3.232978 0.0012** 
M4(-1) 1.335756 0.469112 2.847412 0.0044** 
MO(-1) -1.075791 0.465056 -2.313251 0.0207** 
MONBO(-1) 3.297721 1.862488 1.770600            0.0766* 
     
**Significant at 5% significance level 
*Significant at 10% significance level 
 
Table 1.5 reports the potential determinants of the FTSE Growth 350 Index. From the 
results, it is evident that the consumer confidence affects the FTSE Growth 350 Index. 
However, it is two-month lagged level that is significant. Furthermore, the inflation, the 
broad money supply and the narrow money supply are highly significant. In addition, 
the monthly change in the price of Brent Oil is found to be significant at 10% 
significance level and affects the FTSE Growth 350 Index.  
 
 
Table 1.6: Determinants of FTSE Value 350 Index 
 
     
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     VALUE_RET(-1) 5.688850 3.359873 1.693174           0.0904* 
CONSCONF(-2) 0.065861 0.026975 2.441524 0.0146** 
M4(-1) -0.963185 0.460886 -2.089857 0.0366** 
MONIPMAN(-1) -35.52409 21.15829 -1.678967           0.0932* 
YLD_SPR(-1) -0.527808 0.192255 -2.745359 0.0060** 
     
*Significant at 10% significance level 
**Significant at 5% significance level 
 
Indeed, when the aim is to increase the profitability of equity indices through style 
timing, the appropriate use of potential forecasting variables is necessary. Therefore, in 
order to create a higher degree of predictability and make our model more robust, we 
implemented the statistically significant forecasting variables that were determined from 
the in-sample period in the ordered logit model to provide the forecasted probabilities 
for the following year only (February 1997 to January 1998). Subsequently, we 
continued to again identify the statistically significant variables for each style index, 
however, this time starting from February 1987 to January 1998 (in-sample period of 
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132 observations). The second group of variables is then implemented in the ordered 
logit model to supply the forecasted probabilities for the following year (February 1998 
to January 1999). The same procedure is carried out until the end of the sample data, 
April 2006. Different factors affect the style indices at different time periods and by 
implementing the proposed method, there is a potential increase in the predictable 
accuracy and an escalation in the profitability. 
 
4.1.3. Example of the Probability Calculations  
 
For each style index for which the ordered logit model is estimated, a set of gamma 
coefficients is also estimated. The gamma coefficients are known as Limit Points or 
thresholds, and are used in evaluating the probabilities of the rankings of each style 
index. Table 1.7 depicts the Limit Points for the ordered logit model of the FTSE Small-
Cap Index, which was shown in Table 1.3.  
 
Table 1.7: Limit Points for Ordered Logit Model of the FTSE Small-Cap 
Index 
     
    Coefficients        Std.Error           z-Statistic     Prob. 
     
LIMIT_2: Ȗβ -0.744902 1.064409 -0.699826 0.4840 
LIMIT_3: Ȗγ -0.084489 1.063915 -0.079413 0.9367 
LIMIT_4: Ȗ4 0.428931 1.066799 0.402073 0.6876 
 
 
The first column in Table 1.7 gives the estimates of the Limit Point or the gamma 
coefficients. The remaining three columns show the corresponding standard errors and 
probability values. For all the probabilities to be positive, as previously discussed, each 
consecutive gamma must be larger than the previous. Our gamma results satisfy this 
criterion and as we have:     
 
  Ȗ1 = -0.745  <  Ȗ2 = -0.084  <  Ȗ3 =  0.429 
 
In order to evaluate the probabilities of which rank the FTSE Small-Cap Index will 
result in for each month, the following calculations need to be carried out:  
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The random disturbance term has a logistic distribution. This reflects that relevant 
variables may be left out of the equation, or variables may not be perfectly measured. 
Therefore, the ordered logit model estimates part of equation (4), which is: 
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Taking the lagged variables that were found to be significant from the ordered logit 
model of FTSE Small-Cap and their corresponding β coefficients, we have the 
following: 
 
Y (Rank) = β1Small Returnst-1 + β2UKConsumerConfidencet-1  +  β3CPIt-1   
+ β4CPIt-2  + β5DY small-larget-1 + β6Exchange Ratet-1  +  β7UKTSt-1      (6)
                            
 
Consequently, we result with the following: 
 
Zi = [(-32.178 * 0.0107) + (-0.066 * -3) + (-1.527 * 2.46) + (1.292 * 2.74) + 
 (-1.456 * -0.75) + (12.38 * -0.026) + (-0.516 * 1.24)] = -0.249   (7) 
 
Subsequently, using the threshold parameters (Ȗs) and the Z value, we can calculate the 
corresponding logistic probabilities for each month for the FTSE Small-Cap Index. The 
following calculations show the probabilities of which rank the FTSE Small-Cap will 
be expected to land in the first month of our out-of-sample, February 1997.  
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Hence, for the FTSE Small-Cap, the highest probability results in 0.378, which is for 
P(Y=1). That is, the FTSE Small-Cap has a probability of 37% of ranking first for the 
month of February 1997. Furthermore, we can also determine the marginal effects that 
each variable, that has been found significant, has on the rankings, as shown by Brooks 
(2008). For this, we need to multiply each β coefficient with the probability of ranking 
first, P(Y =1). Therefore for the FYSE Small-Cap Index, the marginal effects of the 
variables are: 
   
Marginal Effects for FTSE Small-Cap Ordered Logit Model for probability of 
ranking first 
Small Returns
 t-1 -32.178 *     0.378 = -12.1633 
UK Consumer Confidence
 t-1 -0.066 *     0.378 = -0.02495 
CPI
 t-1 -1.527 *     0.378 = -0.57721 
CPI
 t-2 1.292 *     0.378 = 0.488376 
DY small-large
 t-1 -1.456 *     0.378 = -0.55037 
Exchange Rate
 t-1 12.38 *     0.378 = 4.67964 
UKTS
 t-1 -0.516 *     0.378 = -0.19505 
 
 
Thus a 1-unit increase in the one month lagged returns of the FTSE Small-Cap Index 
will cause a decrease in the probability that the outcome corresponding to P(Y =1) will 
occur by -12.16. This same interpretation is carried out for the remaining variables, and 
the results indicate that the one month lagged returns have the highest marginal effect of 
the FTSE Small-Cap Index obtaining a probability of 37% of being ranked first for the 
month of February 1997. The calculations for the remaining three indexes are shown in 
Appendix B, where the risk premium, price of bent oil and industrial production-
manufacturing sector have the highest marginal effect of the FTSE Large-Cap, FTSE 
Growth 350 and FTSE Value 350 respectively, that the outcome of P(Y =1) will occur.  
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The same procedure is carried out for each ordered logit model for all style and size 
indices. Therefore, we estimate a set of models in an in-sample framework using the 
statistically significant publicly available macroeconomic and fundamental variables 
and generate out-of-sample monthly forecasts in a recursive framework for each 
potential model. Our out-of-sample forecasting period is from February 1997 to April 
2006, providing us 111 monthly forecasts. Using the specifications of our best model 
for each style index, the β regression coefficients of the first 120 months of the sample 
(our in-sample period from February 1987 to January 1997) and the corresponding Ȗ 
coefficients are used to obtain the conditional probability estimates of the likelihood 
that one particular index will outperform the others in February 1997. At the end of the 
month of February 1997, the regression coefficients are re-estimated using the data from 
the 121 months preceding the forecasted month to generate, this time, the conditional 
probability estimates of the likelihood that one particular index will outperform the 
others in March 1997. Until the last prediction month of April 2006, the same procedure 
is repeated using the recursive method of adding the data corresponding to the month 
preceding the new prediction month.  
 
The forecasted probability estimates obtained for each individual month in our out-of-
sample forecast ranges from 0 to 1. Specifically, for every month, the probability that 
the specific index will be of rank 1, rank 2, rank 3 and rank 4 is calculated. This is 
carried out for each style index over the whole out-of-sample period.   
 
4.1.4. Implementation Strategies for the Quantitative Approach 
 
One of the most important aims for an investor or a fund manager is to enhance to 
performance of their investment. Specifically, they aspire to generate the highest 
possible return over their investment horizon and some choose to invest in one style or 
size index over their whole investment horizon. In this study we attempt to highlight the 
benefits of rotating between different style and size indices, rather than committing to 
one style index only.  
 
Our trading simulation assumes that at the beginning of each month an investor needs to 
decide in which of the four FTSE indices to invest. At the end of every month, we run 
the ordered logit model and study the conditional probabilities estimated by our model 
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to allocate the funds according to our guidelines. Using those probabilities, we devise a 
set of long-only and long/short trading strategies that we believe are feasible in practice. 
Through the results of these strategies we are able to demonstrate the benefits of style-
timing rotation strategies. In addition, the rotation strategies proposed can be compared 
to find an optimal strategy, taking into account constraints, such as transaction costs. 
The style rotation strategies that we implemented are: 
 
Strategy 1  
The first strategy entails investing 100% of the funds in the index that has the highest 
probability of ranking first. Therefore, the investor will long the style index with the 
highest probability of rank 1. The same strategy is carried out for every out-of-sample 
monthly period.  
 
Strategy 2 
The second strategy is aimed at buying two style indices. Firstly, the investor will place 
50% of the funds in the index with the highest probability of ranking first. Secondly, the 
investor will place the remaining 50% of the funds in the index whose probability was 
the second highest in ranking first.   
 
Strategy 3 
This strategy is concerned with the direction of the probability value forecasted by the 
ordered logit model rather than the magnitude. It follows the same approach as strategy 
1, but in addition to probability of an index being ranked first, it uses empirical cut-off 
rates13. For example, whenever the ordered logit model signals an upcoming FTSE 
Small-Cap month, i.e. probability being larger or equal to 0.4, the investor will switch 
from the position he is currently holding and place 100% in the FTSE Small-Cap. In 
cases where the investor has already placed the funds in the FTSE Small-Cap Index and 
the ordered logit model signals a probability of greater than or equal to 0.4 for the same 
index, then the investor will remain with the current position. On the other hand, if the 
ordered logit model gives a probability of less than 0.4 for all the indices in the 
upcoming month, the investor will again remain with the index s/he is holding. 
Furthermore, in cases where the ordered logit model gives two probabilities of higher 
                                                 
13For each month a cut-off is calculated based on the historical return rankings of each style index, as the 
number of months an index was ranked the first in relation to the total number of months. 
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than 0.4, then the investor will place the funds in the index with a higher probability. 
This applies to all other indices.  
 
There has been much debate between practitioners on the issues of implementing style 
rotation strategies and, in particular, of whether a fund manager is allowed to short-sell. 
However, in our study we have implemented strategies which do involve short-selling 
due to the fact that we use indices in our analysis which are relatively easy to short-sell 
through ETFs and futures. In particular, FTSE 100 and FTSE Small-Cap futures are an 
example of such investable instruments that investors can short-sell. However, futures 
on FTSE Value and Growth are not available to investors, and our strategies may be a 
potential indication to introduce such instruments.    
 
Strategy 4 
The fourth strategy entails short-selling. This strategy aims at investing 100% in the 
index that has the highest probability of being ranked first and short-selling in the index 
that has the lowest probability of being ranked first14.   
 
Strategy 5 
Finally, the last strategy also takes into account and allows short-selling. In this case the 
investor will place 100% of the funds in the two indices for which the ordered logit 
model generated the highest probabilities of being ranked first, i.e. 50% in each index. 
Furthermore, the strategy then entails in short selling the other two indices for which the 
ordered logit model obtained the lowest probabilities of being ranked first.  
 
Perfect Foresight 
Finally, the Perfect Foresight multi-style rotation strategy is a strategy in which we 
assume the investor with 100% forecasting accuracy, i.e. investing every month in the 
winning style index. This strategy is used to reflect the profit potential in multi-style 
rotation. 
 
 
                                                 
14
 For example, if the ordered logit model generated the probability of being ranked first for the FTSE 
Value 350 index, the investor will place 100% of the funds in the FTSE Value 350 Index in the next 
month. For the same ordered logit model, if the FTSE Growth 350 Index had the lowest probability of 
being ranked first, the investor will short-sell the FTSE Growth Index.   
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Buy-and-Hold Strategy 
For comparative performance assessment, the long-only buy-and-hold strategy is 
implemented it requires the investor to invest in one style index only. The investor will 
invest in the style index that gives the highest possible end-of-period wealth according 
to its return and investing £1 million. Therefore, this strategy involves no rotation or 
switching. In this study, we attempt to outperform the buy-and-hold strategy using the 
ordered logit model and the five strategies discussed.  
 
4.2. Methodology of the Momentum Strategies 
 
To assess whether similar results can be obtained without going through subjective and 
complex quantitative process, we implement a number of momentum-based multi-style 
rotation strategies using the same data set and sample period as in the quantitative 
model. Such momentum based rotation strategy are used to predict the best performing 
style index. In particular, we test the momentum strategy on the four style indices, 
FTSE Large-Cap, FTSE Small-Cap, FTSE Value 350 and FTSE Growth 350, which 
were used in our ordered logit model. From the results obtained by the momentum 
strategies, we are able to make comparisons with the results achieved from the ordered 
logit model and conclude which is the more profitable option for an investor.  
 
We compute cumulative compound returns for each of the four style indices as: 
 
   jn nttt rrr 2 1 1))1)....(1((   (8)
  
where j denotes historical compound return period used for portfolio formation, taking 
values  j = -2, -3, -4, -5, -6, -9, -12 months. 
 
Our data sample is identical to the one used in the ordered logit model, starting from 
February 1987 to April 2006, where monthly returns are collected for each style index. 
Subsequently, every month, for each style index we compute the equally-weighted 
compounded returns over the previous one, two, three, four, five, six, nine and twelve 
months. The past compounded returns are denoted by the letter J. In order to make 
appropriate comparisons to the ordered logit model, we start our testing period or in-
54 
sample analysis in February 1997 until April 2006. In the in-sample framework, we 
assign various holding periods ranging from one to six months. These holding periods 
are denoted by the letter K. Therefore, depending on the past compounded return (J), we 
long the best performing index (the index with the highest return) and short the worst 
performing index (the index with the lowest return). We hold this portfolio according to 
the months specified (K). In particular, we create 13 long-only strategies based on the 
idea of investing in the style with highest positive momentum as indicated by the 
compound return in our portfolio formation period. Additionally, we apply equivalent 
13 long-short strategies where we are long in the index with the highest positive 
momentum and short the index with the highest negative momentum.  
 
4.3. Transaction costs 
 
Break-even transaction costs per trade are calculated for all our strategies. This should 
give an indication of practical feasibility of both quantitative and momentum based 
multi-style rotation as both type of strategies are expected to have large number of 
switches across different investment styles. The average level of transaction costs for 
ETFs is 12-20bps, with maximum expense ratio for UK ETFs being 0.5% (50bps)15. We 
will use this level of transaction costs as a benchmark for our feasibility assessment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 www.trustnet.com 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1. Quantitative Multi-Style Rotation Results 
 
Table 1.8 provides the results of the ordered logit forecasting model for all four FTSE 
Indices. In particular, we measure the performance for our long-only and long/short 
multi-style rotation strategies, Strategies 1 to 5 as well as the buy and hold index 
strategies and the perfect foresight strategy over the same sample period. We begin by 
analyzing the average annual returns and Sharpe ratios for the passive buy-and-hold 
strategies and our style rotation strategies. 
 
According to the results in Table 1.8, we examine that the highest average annualized 
returns for the buy-and-hold strategies are for the FTSE Small-Cap Index and the FTSE 
Value 350 Index, at 7.49% and 8.77% respectively. They are followed by FTSE Large-
Cap and the FTSE Growth 350 which yield positive average annualized returns, at 
5.39% and 4.30% respectively. Out of the four buy-and-hold strategies, it is evident that 
FTSE Value 350 generated the highest average annualized returns. In the case of the 
style rotation strategies, only Strategy 1 and Strategy 3 outperform all the buy-and-hold 
strategies, with average annual returns of 9.48% and 9.28% respectively. However, the 
perfect foresight strategy attains average annualized returns of 35.3%, which is 
substantially higher than all of our strategies.   
  
With the intention of emphasizing the potential profits that an investor can gain through 
our style rotation strategy, we consider each buy-and-hold strategy and our style 
rotation strategy by observing the cumulative growth of a £1 million initial investment. 
This is carried out for our out-of-sample period, starting from February 1997 to April 
200616. Table 1.8 reports the results for the end-of-period wealth for each buy-and-hold 
strategy and our style rotation strategies. Out of the four buy-and-hold strategies, the 
FTSE Value 350 Index generated the highest end-of-period wealth of £1,949,434.74, 
making it the superior of the four buy-and-hold strategies.  
                                                 
16
 Cumulative growth is calculated as: Yn = [ Y0 (1+r1) (1+r2) +…+ (1+rn) ], where Y0 is the initial 
investment of £1 million and rt is the forecasted return form our model in each time period for an n period 
investment.  
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Table 1.8: Results of Ordered Logit Forecasting Model for UK FTSE style Indices (1987:02 to 2006:04, with out-of-sample 1997:02 to 2006:04)
  
Buy-and Hold Strategies Style Rotation Strategies 
 
   
Large Cap Small Cap Value350 Growth350 Perfect Foresight Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5 
Average Annual Returns 5.396% 7.494% 8.778% 4.304% 35.3% 9.792% 7.703% 9.287% 5.973% 4.694% 
Standard Deviation 15.11% 18.443% 15.445% 15.635% 15.8% 16.098% 15.516% 16.33% 10.835% 14.738% 
Sharpe Ratio 
 
-0.012 0.103 0.206 -0.082 1.87 0.261 0.136 0.226 -0.471 -0.060 
End of Period Wealth £1,462,736.4 £1,663,214.4 £1,949,434.74 £1,318,756.9 £14,669,652.6 £2,105,518.36 £1,775,593.4 £2,010,907.6 £1,622,108.8 £1,384,481.4 
net of transaction costs (10bps)      £2,002,780.92  £1,990,888.8    
net of transaction costs (20bps)      £1,901,151.12  £1,971,049.5    
net of transaction costs (50bps)      £1,630,557.62  £1,912,595.0    
net of transaction costs (100bps)      £1,261,112.87  £1,818,629.0    
net of transaction costs (200bps)      £751,430.63  £1,643,058.0    
Recommended Switches      50  10    
Profit over Buy-and-Hold Strategies: 
Strategy 1  £642,781.93 £442,303.95 £156,083.62 £786,761.39       
Strategy 2  £312,856.97 £112,378.99 (£173,841.2) £456,836.43 
  
    
Strategy 3  £548,171.17 £347,693.19 £61,472.90 £692,150.63 
  
    
Strategy 4  £159,372.37 (£41,105.61) (£327,325.8) £303,351.83 
  
    
Strategy 5  (£78,255.03) (£278,733.01) (£564,953.3) £65,724.43 
  
    
Break-Even Transaction Costs 
(Benchmark: Value350 Index) 
    
 
 
15 bps 
 
 30bps    
Total Correct Predictions      33%  32%    
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The FTSE Small-Cap Index and the FTSE Large-Cap Index generated end-of-period 
wealth of £1,663,214.41 and £1,462,736.43 respectively.  However, the lowest end-of-
period wealth was for the FTSE Growth 350 Index with £1,318,756.97.  Nevertheless, 
the end-of-period wealth generated by investing in Strategy 1 and Strategy 3 
outperformed all four buy-and-hold strategies with a sum of £2,049,877.379 and 
£2,010,907.64 respectively. On the other hand, the end-of-period wealth for the 
remaining style rotation strategies (Strategy 2, Strategy 4 and Strategy 5) resulted in a 
lower value as a comparison to the FTSE Value 350 (superior buy-and-hold strategy).  
Furthermore, we compute in Table 1.8 the excess profit of investing in all style rotation 
strategies over the four buy-and-hold strategies. However, only Strategy 1 and Strategy 
3 incur excess profits over all buy-and-hold strategies. The end-of-period wealth 
generated by investing in Strategy 1 is higher than investing in FTSE Large-Cap, FTSE 
Small-Cap and FTSE Growth 350 by £642,71.93, £442,303.95 and £786,761.39 
respectively. In particular, Strategy 1 generated a higher end-of-period wealth than the 
superior buy-and-hold strategy, FTSE Value 350 Index, by an amount of £156,083.62.  
 
Furthermore, Strategy 3 generated an end-of-period wealth of £2,010,907.64, which is 
higher than the end-of-period wealth for FTSE Large-Cap, FTSE Small-Cap and FTSE 
Growth 350, by £548,171.17, £347,693.19 and £692,150.63 respectively. In fact the 
end-of-period wealth for Strategy 3 was £61,472.90 higher than the superior buy-and-
hold strategy, FTSE Value 350.   
 
Nevertheless, we have also supplied the results for the end-of-period wealth of a perfect 
foresight strategy, which amount to £14,669,652.60. This is considerably higher than all 
of our strategies, including Strategy 1 and Strategy 3, which were the only strategies 
that incurred profits above the best performing buy-and-hold strategy. Once more, this 
implies that there is a scope for further improvement of the model.  
 
This brings us to evaluate the accuracy of our forecasting model in correctly predicting 
the style and size index. Due to the fact that only Strategy 1 and Strategy 3 outperform 
the buy-and-hold strategies, we report more detailed results solely for these two 
strategies. We find that Strategy 1 results in 33% correct predictions, while Strategy 3 
results in 32% correct predictions. These results are relatively low, implying that there 
is scope for further improvement of our model. Nevertheless, even with the low 
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forecasting accuracy rates, our two strategies mentioned outperform all the buy-and-
hold strategies.  
 
5.1.1. Sharpe Ratios 
 
In order to check for the robustness of the investment recommendations of our model, 
we compute Sharpe ratios (calculated as the average return of the portfolio minus the 
average risk-free rate divided by the portfolio‟s standard deviation) of our style rotation 
strategies and compare it to the Sharpe ratios of the buy-and-hold strategies17. We do 
this in order to assess whether or not the superior performance of our style rotation 
strategy is due to higher risk. Among all the buy-and-hold strategies, the buy-and-hold 
strategy with the highest Sharpe ratio corresponds to the FTSE Value 350 Index. With a 
Sharpe ratio of 0.206, this strategy is followed by the FTSE Small-Cap Index with 
Sharpe ratio of 0.103. Subsequently, the FTSE Large-Cap Index and the FTSE Growth 
Index have a negative Sharpe ratio of -0.012 and -0.082 respectively. Furthermore, it is 
interesting to note that the FTSE Small-Cap buy-and-hold strategy is the riskiest with an 
annualized standard deviation of 18.44%. However, it is closely followed by FTSE 
Growth 350 buy-and-hold strategy, FTSE Value 350 buy-and-hold strategy and FTSE 
Large-Cap buy-and-hold strategy.  
 
If we now consider our style rotation strategies, we note that Strategy 1 possess a 
Sharpe ratio of 0.261, which is higher than that of the FTSE Value 350 Index (0.206)18. 
In addition, Strategy 3 attains a Sharpe ratio of 0.226, which is once again higher than 
the Sharpe ratio of the value buy-and-hold strategy. However, the Sharpe ratios of the 
remaining style rotation strategies are lower than the value buy-and-hold strategy, with 
Strategy 4 and Strategy 5 resulting with a negative Sharpe ratio. Nonetheless, this 
indicates that even when we take into account risk-adjusted measure of performance, 
our two style rotation strategy (Strategy 1and Strategy 3) outperform the buy-and-hold 
strategies. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the standard deviation of Strategy 1 and 
Strategy 3 (16.09% and 16.33% respectively) is lower than that of FTSE Small-Cap 
                                                 
17
 Our study tries to predict the best performing index based on their returns and, thus, the returns were 
initially ranked. The performance of each strategy was evaluated on the basis of which strategy exhibited 
the highest profit. The Sharpe ratio is simply used as a robustness test, which has also been carried out by 
Arshanapalli et al. (2005).  
18
 We use FTSE Value 350 Index as a comparison because it generated the highest Sharpe ratio among all 
four buy-and-hold strategies. 
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buy-and-hold strategy (18.44%), which adds to the notion that the superior return 
performance of our strategies is not due to higher risk. On the other hand, the perfect 
foresight strategy possesses a significantly higher Sharpe ratio of 1.87, with a lower 
standard deviation of 15.8% as a comparison to Strategy 1 and Strategy 3.      
 
 
5.1.2. Transaction Costs 
 
So far, we have analysed the performance of our style rotation strategies without taking 
into account the effect of transaction costs. In fact, in order for our trading strategies be 
a feasible investment option for practitioners, we must take into consideration different 
levels of transaction costs. Most previous studies correct for transaction costs by 
imposing a fixed penalty subsequent to the allocation process, i.e. deducting transaction 
costs after calculating the end-of-period wealth (Levis and Liodakis (1999)). However, 
in this study we explicitly include transaction costs in the selection process and deduct 
these costs from our returns as-and-when funds are switched from one equity index to 
the other. In order to verify that our style rotation strategies are profitable in reality, we 
implement five levels of transaction costs of 10 basis points, 20 bps, 50 bps, 100 bps 
and 200 bps19.  
 
Due to the fact that only Strategy 1 and Strategy 3 incur profits over the buy-and-hold 
strategies, we report the results of the effect of transaction costs on these strategies only. 
Through the implementation of transaction costs, we evaluate that investing in Strategy 
1 generates superior returns than the FTSE Value 350 buy-and-hold strategy at 
transaction costs levels of 10bps. However, losses are made at higher levels of 
transaction costs (20 bps, 50 bps, 100 bps and 200 bps). Furthermore, we also calculate 
the break-even level of transaction costs for Strategy 1. These are the transaction costs 
that give the same end-of-period wealth as the FTSE Value 350 buy-and-hold strategy. 
Given that the number of switches from one style to another in this strategy is 50, only a 
marginal level of transaction costs of 15bps per switch will allow this strategy to 
breakeven with the benchmark buy-and-hold, Value index strategy. However, the 
strategy outperforms consistent Large cap, Small cap and Growth investing at much 
                                                 
19
 We calculate transaction costs as: Yt = [Yt-1 (1+rt) * V, where V denotes the transaction costs. When a 
switch is made, V is equal to (1- α) where α = (bps/10,000). When a switch is not made, V merely takes 
the value of 1. With regards to the buy-and-hold strategies, for comparative purposes it is of convenience 
to simply observe the gross passive returns for their respective end-of-period wealth.  
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more feasible level of transaction costs of 73bps, 47bps and 93bps respectively. In fact, 
trading of ETFs is associated with transaction cost levels ranging between 8 bps to 11 
bps20. Therefore, the transaction cost level of our Strategy 1 is attainable by investors 
and the break-even transaction cost is above the usual transaction costs of ETFs.     
 
In the case of our Strategy 3, an investor is able to generate excess returns over the 
FTSE Value 350 buy-and-hold strategy at transaction cost levels of 20bps. In fact, 
Strategy 3 is beneficial with break-even transaction costs up to 30 bps per switch, which 
is twice as high as for Strategy 1. This is due to the fact that Strategy 3 entails fewer 
switches between the different style and size indices, and therefore, there are less 
transaction costs involved. Although this strategy has only 10 switches, its forecasting 
accuracy is lower than for Strategy 1. 
 
Despite the fact that the transaction costs subtract a fundamental amount our strategy‟s 
value, pursuing a strategy following the signals of our model nonetheless remains a 
more profitable option than pursuing a buy-and-hold strategy. In fact, after accounting 
for transaction costs of up to 10 bps, the end-of-period wealth for our Strategy 1 
amounts to £1,959,633.491. Similarly, the end-of-period wealth for Strategy 3 results in 
£1,971,049.5 when accounting for transaction costs up to 20 bps. In contrast, the 
terminal wealth of the best performing buy-and-hold strategy (FTSE Value 350 Index) 
is £1,949,434.74.   
 
Strategy 2, which represents equally weighted portfolio of the two style indices with the 
highest probability of being ranked first, underperforms the benchmark buy-and-hold 
Value index strategy, but outperforms Large cap, Small cap and Growth buy-and-hold 
at small level of breakeven transaction costs of 33bps, 11bps and 50bps respectively. 
The results for Strategy 4 and Strategy 5 imply that introducing short-selling does not 
improve the performance of quantitative multi-style rotation. The reason for this may be 
in the nature of the model we use: the ordered logit model will indicate to us which 
index has the lowest probability to be the best, but it will not tell us if we should expect 
negative return on that index. If the return of the index to be shorted is simply the 
                                                 
20
 Source: Report Elins/McSherry LLC, May 2005 
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lowest positive return out of the four, then the return of the long/short strategy will be 
lower than the return of the long-only strategy. 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the quantitative multi-style rotation 
analysis: a) long-only multi-style rotation strategies have a profit potential over style-
consistent strategies, particularly over Large Cap and Growth Style at reasonable level 
of transaction costs for institutional investors and b) the introduction of short-selling 
does not add value if we do not assess the magnitude of the expected style return. 
 
As an alternative to this complex quantitative forecasting approach, we apply a variety 
of momentum strategies during the same trading period, to assess if similar results can 
be obtained through a much simpler approach. 
 
5.2. Multi-Style Momentum Rotation Results 
 
5.2.1. Long Only Strategies 
 
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 provide the results of average annual returns, standard deviations 
and Sharpe ratios for the long only momentum strategies for the all the style indices, 
FTSE Large-Cap, FTSE Small-Cap, FTSE Value 350 and FTSE Growth 350. In 
particular, the tables show the results of buying the best performing index only. The 
first to the sixth column in Table 1.9 reports the results of the long only strategies based 
on six months past returns (J=6) only and various holding periods (K=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). 
We examine that the highest average annualized return is for the momentum strategy 
based on past six month returns and holding period of two months, (J=6; K=2) at 
14.57%. Closely following is the momentum strategy (J=6; K=1) with average 
annualized returns of 13.86%. Taking into consideration Strategy 1and Strategy 3 from 
the ordered logit model, their average annualized returns were at 9.79% and 9.28% 
respectively. All of the momentum strategies in Table 1.9, with the exception of (J=6; 
K=5) strategy with average annualized returns of 8.63%, outperform Strategy 1 and 
Strategy 3. In order to check for the robustness of our investment recommendations, we 
compute Sharpe ratios for each momentum strategy and compare it to the best 
performing buy-and-hold strategy and Strategies 1 and 3 from 
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 Table 1.9: Sharpe Ratios for Long only strategies based on 6 months formation and 1-6 months holding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1.10: Sharpe Ratios for Long only strategies based on 1-5, 9 and 12 months formation and 1 month holding 
 
Past Return(J) – Holding Period(K) 
 6m-6m 6m-5m 6m-4m 6m-3m 6m-2m 6m-1m 
Average Annual Returns 12.11% 8.63% 13.11% 12.16% 14.57% 13.86% 
Standard Deviation 15.37% 15.00% 13.36% 12.96% 12.08% 12.15% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.451 0.229 0.593 0.538 0.776 0.713 
 
Past Return(J) – Holding Period(K) 
 
1m-1m 2m-1m 3m-1m 4m-1m 5m-1m 9m-1m 12m-1m 
Average Annual Returns 12.91% 13.50% 7.52% 6.56% 9.02% 7.66% 9.35% 
Standard Deviation 13.30% 12.26% 12.01% 12.35% 12.36% 12.69% 12.28% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.580 0.677 0.193 0.110 0.310 0.195 0.339 
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the ordered logit model. The bottom row in Table 1.9 represents the Sharpe ratios for 
each momentum strategy. Once again, strategies (J=6; K=2) and (J=6; K=1) possess the 
highest Sharpe ratios of 0.778 and 0.713 respectively. With the exception of strategy 
(J=6; K=5), all of the momentum strategies in Table 1.9 incur higher Sharpe ratios than 
the best buy-and-hold strategy (0.206)21, Strategy 1 (0.261) and Strategy 3 (0.226).  
 
Table 1.10 provides the results of the long only strategies based on various monthly past 
returns (J=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 12) and holding periods of only one month (K=1).  In this 
case, only strategies (J=2; K=1) and (J=1; K=1) exhibit higher average annual returns as 
a comparison to Strategies 1 and 3 of the ordered logit model, with the inclusion of 
strategy (J=12; K=1) obtaining higher average annual returns than Strategy 1 only. 
Nevertheless, strategies (J=2; K=1), (J=1; K=1), (J=12; K=1) and (J=5; K=1) have 
Sharpe ratios of 0.677, 0.580, 0.339 and 0.310 respectively, which are all higher than 
the best performing buy-and-hold strategy and Strategies1 and 3. Furthermore, it is 
important to note that all of the momentum strategies mentioned that have higher 
Sharpe ratios than Strategy 1 and Strategy 3, entail lower standard deviations. This 
shows that the superior performance of our momentum strategies is not due to higher 
risk.         
 
Furthermore, in order to highlight the potential profits an investor can incur through our 
momentum strategies, we consider each strategy by observing the cumulative growth of 
£1 million initial investment. The same procedure was carried out with the ordered logit 
model, which will provide us with an appropriate base for making comparisons. Tables 
1.11 and 1.12 report the results of our long only momentum strategies. The tables show 
the end-of-period wealth, the profit over the best buy-and-hold strategy, the break-even 
transaction costs and the recommended switches for each momentum strategy. Taking 
into account all of the results from Tables 1.11 and 1.12, strategy (J=6; K=2) yields the 
highest end-of-period wealth with £3,296,294.90. This amount is well above the best 
buy-and-hold strategy, which yielded £1,949,434.77.
                                                 
21
 FTSE Value 350 
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 Table 1.11: Long only strategies based on 6 months formation and 1-6 months holding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       Table 1.12: Long only strategies based on 1-5, 9 and 12 months formation and 1 month holding 
 
 
Past Return(J) – Holding Period(K) 
 6m-6m 6m-5m 6m-4m 6m-3m 6m-2m 6m-1m 
End of Period Wealth 
 
£2,586,638.4 
 
 
£2,297,952.5 
 
 
£2,881,908.6 
 
 
£2,679,947.9 
 
 
£3,296,294.9 
 
 
£3,108,790.9 
 
Profit/Loss over best Buy-
and-Hold Strategy £637,203.6 
 
£348,517.7 
 
 
£932,473.8 
 
 
£730,513.1 
 
 
£1,346,860.2 
 
 
£1,159,356.2 
 
Break-Even Transaction 
Costs 
(Benchmark: Value350 Index) 
215bps 96bps 257bps 137bps 235bps 113bps 
Recommended Switches 13 17 15 23 22 32 
 
Past Return(J) – Holding Period(K) 
 
1m-1m 2m-1m 3m-1m 4m-1m 5m-1m 9m-1m 12m-1m 
End of Period Wealth  
£2,839,671.8 
 
£3,015,528.4 
 
£1,831,028.9 
 
£1,678,897.1 
 
£2,074,426.1 
 
£1,838,928.3 
 
£2,135,280.4 
Profit/Loss over best Buy-
and-Hold Strategy 
 
£890,236.9 
 
£1,066,093.6 
 
(£118,405.85) 
 
(£270,537.67) 
 
£124,991.4 
 
(£110,506.4) 
 
£185,845.7 
Break-Even Transaction 
Costs 
(Benchmark: Value350 Index) 46bps 73bps -11bps -26bps 13bps -19bps 45bps 
Recommended Switches 81 59 54 57 47 30 20 
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In fact, strategy (J=6; K=2) generated £1,346,860.20 extra profits over the best-buy-
and-hold strategy. Furthermore, the end-of period wealth is substantially higher than 
that of Strategy 1 and Strategy 3 which generated profits of £2,105,518.38 and 
£2,010,907.6 respectively. Out of all the long only momentum strategies, only three 
incurred lower profits as a comparison to the best performing buy-and-hold strategy22. 
On the other hand, when comparing to the quantitative Strategies 1 and 3, four 
momentum strategies underperformed23. The rest of the momentum strategies generated 
significantly higher end-of-period wealth.  
 
With the intention of making our momentum strategies realistic for investors, we take 
into account different levels of transaction costs. Similarly to the ordered logit model 
analysis, we report the results of the break-even transactions costs for each momentum 
strategy. The highest level of break-even transaction costs is for strategy (J=6; K=4) at 
levels up to 257 basis points. This is closely followed by strategy (J=6; K=2) at break-
even transaction costs up to 235 basis points. All but four strategies24 incur higher levels 
of break-even transaction costs in relation to Strategy 1 and 3, which incurred break-
even transaction costs up to 15 and 30 basis points respectively. It is worth noting that 
the momentum strategies with past six months compounded returns showed higher end-
of-period wealth and higher levels of break-even transaction costs, which is consisted 
with the literature of Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). Therefore, from the total of thirteen 
long only momentum strategies, ten of these simple long-only momentum strategies are 
exhibiting better overall performance than more complex quantitative multi-style 
rotation strategies. 
  
5.2.2. Long/Short Momentum Strategies 
 
If equity style cycles truly exist, then it is highly profitable for an investor to buy 
winning stocks and sell the losing stocks. Therefore, it is important to know when each 
style is outperforming in order to be able to take advantage of positive alphas. We 
examine different momentum style rotation strategies that require an investor to long 
and short stocks according to their past performance or return. In particular, we study 
                                                 
22
 The strategies that generated lower profits in relation to the best buy-and-hold strategy were (J=9; 
K=1), (J=3; K=1) and (J=4; K=1).  
23
 The strategies that generated lower profits in relation to the Strategies 1 and 3 were (J=9; K=1), (J=3; 
K=1), (J=4; K=1) and (J=5; K=1).  
24
 (J=9; K=1), (J=3; K=1), (J=4; K=1) and (J=5; K=1). 
66 
the same momentum strategies that were used for the long only scenarios, however, we 
also short the style index with the lowest past compounded return and hold this portfolio 
for different time periods.  
  
Tables 1.13 and 1.14 provide the results for the average annual returns, standard 
deviations and the Sharpe ratios for each momentum strategy. Table 1.13 focuses solely 
on the results for the past six month compounded returns and various holding periods. It 
can be concluded that strategies (J=6; K=1) and (J=6; K=2) provide an investor with 
higher average annual returns than Strategies 1 and 3 from the ordered logit model. The 
two momentum strategies exhibit average annual returns of 11.24% and 10.57% 
respectively. Furthermore, the Sharpe ratios of the two strategies are significantly higher 
in relation to the best buy-and-hold strategy and Strategies 1 and 3, with strategy (J=6; 
K=1) having a Sharpe ratio of 0.369 and strategy (J=6; K=2) having a Sharpe ratio of 
0.349. Evidently, as a comparison to the long only strategies, the average annual returns 
and the Sharpe ratios do decrease when shorting is introduced into the portfolio. 
However, the two momentum based strategies continue to exhibit higher average annual 
returns and Sharpe ratios in relation to Strategy 1 and 3 even when shorting is 
introduced. 
 
Table 1.14 displays results for the past one, two, three, four, five, nine and twelve past 
month compounded returns and only month one holding period. Out of all the 
momentum strategies, strategies (J=1; K=1) and (J=5; K=1) have the highest average 
annual returns of 11.73% and 10.39% respectively. Furthermore, their Sharpe ratios 
amount to 0.409 and 0.355 respectively. The two strategies both outperform the best 
buy-and-hold strategy and Strategies 1 and 3 in terms of the average annual returns and 
Sharpe ratios. Moreover, their standard deviations amount to 15.97% and 15.53% 
respectively, which is lower than for Strategy 1 and 3, implying that the higher annual 
return is not due to higher risk. It is also interesting to note that the average annual 
returns and the Sharpe ratio for strategy (J=5; K=1) increased in relation to the long 
only scenario once short-selling is introduced. Evidently, as a comparison to the long-
only positive momentum strategies in general, the average annual returns and the 
Sharpe ratios decrease when shorting is introduced into the portfolio.  
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 Table 1.13: Sharpe Ratios for Long/Short strategies based on 6 month formation and 1-6 month holding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1.14: Sharpe Ratios for Long/Short strategies based on 1-5, 9 and 12 month formation and 1 month holding
 
Past Return(J) – Holding Period(K) 
 6m-6m 6m-5m 6m-4m 6m-3m 6m-2m 6m-1m 
Average Annual Returns 8.13% 4.57% 5.60% 6.96% 10.57% 11.24% 
Standard Deviation 15.40% 13.31% 14.09% 14.89% 15.41% 16.39% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.191 -0.047 0.029 0.118 0.349 0.369 
 
Past Return(J) – Holding Period(K) 
 
1m-1m 2m-1m 3m-1m 4m-1m 5m-1m 9m-1m 12m-1m 
Average Annual Returns 11.73% 8.79% 5.75% 7.49% 10.39% 6.45% 7.26% 
Standard Deviation 15.97% 16.68% 17.92% 17.40% 15.53% 17.53% 16.29% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.409 0.216 0.031 0.132 0.335 0.071 0.127 
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In the same manner as for the long only strategies, we consider each long/short strategy 
by observing the cumulative growth of £1 million initial investment. The results for the 
end-of-period wealth, the profits over the best buy-and-hold strategy, the break-even 
transaction costs and the recommended switches are shown in Tables 1.15 and 1.16. 
Taking into consideration Table 1.15, the strategies (J=6; K=1) and (J=6; K=2) generate 
substantially higher end-of-period wealth than the best buy-and-hold strategy with 
amounts of £2,373,552.30 and £2,271,763.60 respectively. Even more, the two 
momentum strategies earn higher profits than Strategy 1 and Strategy 3 from the 
ordered logit model.  
 
Taking into account strategies with various past month compounded returns and one 
month holding period, Table 1.16 shows the results for these strategies. The highest 
end-of-period wealth is for strategy (J=1; K=1) with the amount of £2,488,023.90. This 
strategy yields the highest wealth for an investor out of all the long/short strategies 
considered.  Furthermore, strategy (J=5; K=1) generates an end-of-period wealth of 
£2,239,221.90. Both strategies (J=1; K=1) and (J=5; K=1) produce higher profits than 
the best buy-and-hold strategy with excess amounts of £538,589.20 and £289,787.20 
respectively. Moreover, the two strategies prove to be even more profitable than 
Strategies 1 and 3. Therefore, the four long/short momentum-based strategies that 
generate higher end-of-period wealth in relation to the best buy-and-hold strategy and 
Strategies 1 and 3 have shown higher potential and increased profits for an investor.  
 
Tables 1.15 and 1.16 also provide the break-even transaction costs, in relation to the 
best buy-and-hold strategy, and the recommended switches for each long/short strategy. 
Strategies (J=6; K=1) and (J=6; K=2) remain beneficial with break-even transaction 
costs up to 23 basis points and 25 basis points respectively. However, strategies (J=1; 
K=1) and (J=5; K=1) incur lower break-even transaction costs at levels of up to 14 basis 
points and 13 basis points respectively. This is due to the fact that the latter two 
strategies require additional switches between the different style and size indices, and, 
therefore, there are less transaction costs. Even so, the transaction cost levels of the four 
momentum-based strategies are attainable by investors due to the fact that  
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 Table 1.15: Long/Short strategies based on 6 months formation and 1-6 months holding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1.16: Long/Short strategies based on 1-5, 9 and 12 month formation and 1 month holding
 
Past Return – Holding Period 
 6m-6m 6m-5m 6m-4m 6m-3m 6m-2m 6m-1m 
End of Period Wealth £1,850,473.9 £1,392,872.9 
 
£1,510,200.2 
 
 
£1,682,224.5 
 
 
£2,271,763.6 
 
£2,373,552.3 
Profit/Loss over best Buy-
and-Hold Strategy (£98,960.7) 
 
(£556,561.8) 
 
 
(£439,234.5) 
 
 
(£1,949,434.7) 
 
 
£322,328.9 
 
£424,117.6 
Break-Even Transaction 
Costs 
(Benchmark: Value350 Index) 
-12bps -71bps -59bps -22bps 25bps 23bps 
Recommended Switches 39 45 41 63 58 83 
 
Past Return – Holding Period 
 
1m-1m 2m-1m 3m-1m 4m-1m 5m-1m 9m-1m 12m-1m 
End of Period Wealth £2,488,023.9 
 
 
£1,925,709.7 
 
£1,453,574.8 
 
£1,703,115.6 
 
£2,239,221.9 
 
£1,549,740.9 
£1,693,336.6 
Profit/Loss over best Buy-
and-Hold Strategy 
 
£538,589.2 
 
(£23,724.9) 
 
(£495,859.9) 
 
(£246,319.1) 
 
£289,787.2 
 
(£399,693.8) 
 
(£256,098.1) 
Break-Even Transaction 
Costs 
(Benchmark: Value350 Index) 14bps -0.9bps -25bps -11bps 13bps -30bps -22bps 
Recommended Switches 172 113 114 115 97 74 62 
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trading of ETFs is associated with transaction cost levels ranging between 8 and 11 
basis points. 
 
Overall, we can conclude that negative momentum is not persistent and that adding a 
short position does not improve the profitability of the momentum strategies.  This is 
consistent with the results from quantitative rotation which finds that construction of 
long/short portfolios based on quantitative multi-style rotation signals generated through 
ordered logit model is not profitable either. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research that uses a multinomial logit 
model for this type of study of the UK equity market, in order to investigate the benefits 
of style rotation strategies. Previous studies have engaged in utilising binary the logit 
models in style-timing arena, however, in this study we model four different market 
segments simultaneously.  
 
In particular, this research employs the ordered logit model, which has not been 
introduced in the equity style-timing arena in previous studies. Through this model, we 
demonstrate ways in which an investor can enhance the performance of the portfolio 
using style rotation strategies.   
 
This study compares the profitability of quantitative and momentum multi-style rotation 
where we alternated the investment between four different style segments, Value, 
Growth, Small cap and Large cap, as suggested by the quantitative or the momentum 
trading signal. We attempt to answer our research question concerning which method is 
more profitable in providing trading signals. This is, is it more profitable to employ a 
complex, quantitative model or a simple momentum-based model? The various 
variables included in our quantitative model perform differently during different 
periods, and will therefore have a change in impact on our indexes at different points in 
time and to a different extent. Our quantitative model is able to capture these effects and 
successfully forecast the next period‟s best performing index. On the other hand, our 
simpler method of forecasting the best performing index, the momentum strategy, relies 
solely on the past returns of each corresponding index. Short-term past performance of 
each index has proven to be a strong predictor of future performance with different 
holding periods for each corresponding index. This is particularly pronounced from the 
results in Table 1.1 and Figures 1.1 and 1.2, where it clearly shows that the rankings of 
the four indexes change throughout our anaylsis. 
 
Using data from February 1987 to April 2006, we found that investors can add 
substantial value to their portfolio by timing the FTSE Small-Cap, FTSE Large-Cap, 
FTSE Value 350 and FTSE Growth 350 Indices by using our model. By using 
appropriate macroeconomic, market and fundamental variables and implementing them 
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in our ordered logit model, we demonstrate that the size and style indices are reasonably 
predictable. The results from our out-of-sample forecasts (February 1997 to April 2006) 
indicate that forecasting the best performing index with accuracy of 33%, was found to 
be sufficient to outperform the buy-and-hold strategies. As a result, our Strategy 1 and 
Strategy 3 outperformed the buy-and-hold FTSE Value 350 strategy by £156,083.62 
and £61,472.90 respectively for an initial £1m investment (excluding transaction costs).  
 
However, a key determinant that is able to affect the performance of our strategy is the 
actual level of transaction costs. Our results indicate that our trading strategies are 
profitable at transaction cost levels up to 15 bps and 30bps. Even though the level of 
transaction costs deduct a vital amount of our strategy‟s profitability, it is nevertheless 
more profitable for the investor to follow our strategies rather than the best buy-and-
hold strategy.  
 
As an alternative approach to predicting the best performing index, we employ 
momentum-based style rotation strategies in order to enhance the performance of our 
portfolios. Our results suggest that trading rules based on short-term momentum 
strategies incur higher Sharpe ratios and even higher end-of-period wealth than the 
strategies based on the ordered logit model. We demonstrate that several of our 
strategies outperform the best buy-and-hold strategy and all the strategies based on the 
ordered logit model. In particular, the highest end-of-period wealth for our momentum-
based strategies amounted to £2,488,023.90 for an initial £1 million investment 
(excluding transaction costs). This is clearly above Strategies 1 and 3 of the ordered 
logit model and the best buy-and-hold strategy.   
 
Indeed, our results substantiate that the momentum strategies based on long only trading 
rules achieve even higher end-of-period wealth and Sharpe ratios. The highest end-of-
period wealth results to £3,296,294.90, which is substantially higher than any of the 
strategies based on our quantitative approach. Furthermore, the momentum-based 
strategies remain beneficial at transaction cost levels ranging from 257 basis points to 
13 basis points. The profitability of the momentum strategies is better for shorter 
holding periods and for medium term (6 months) formation periods at a very realistic 
level of transaction costs. This implies that a better and more robust performance can be 
obtained through a much simpler approach. Multi-style rotation is more successful 
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when following a long only, rather than a long/short investment approach regardless of 
whether momentum or quantitative trading rules are implemented. Despite this 
reduction in profitability when shorting is introduced, momentum multi-style rotation 
still has an edge over the quantitative one.   
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Appendix A 
 
Figure 1.1: Twelve-Month Moving Average of FTSE Small-Cap and FTSE Large-
Cap Indices  
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Figure 1.2: Twelve-Month Moving Average of FTSE Growth 350 and FTSE 
Value350 Indices  
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Table 1: Results of Ordered Logit Model with all potential forecasting 
variables of FTSE Small-Cap Index 
 
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
CONSCONF(-1) -0.065837 0.069738 -0.944057 0.3451 
CONSCONF(-2) 0.022768 0.070114 0.324727 0.7454 
CPI(-1) -1.434563 0.645855 -2.221183 0.0263 
CPI(-2) 1.158288 0.620591 1.866427 0.0620 
DYS_L(-1) -1.760122 0.677435 -2.598216 0.0094 
M4(-1) -0.199557 0.601596 -0.331713 0.7401 
M4(-2) -0.360415 0.592345 -0.608454 0.5429 
MO(-1) -0.057931 0.563126 -0.102875 0.9181 
MO(-2) -0.203241 0.582241 -0.349066 0.7270 
MONBO(-1) 1.586331 2.524721 0.628319 0.5298 
MONEX(-1) 12.36954 6.965582 1.775808 0.0758 
MONIP(-1) 16.70001 34.45735 0.484657 0.6279 
MONIP(-2) 15.19422 36.91041 0.411651 0.6806 
MONIPMAN(-1) -22.67974 38.39672 -0.590669 0.5547 
MONIPMAN(-2) -32.96526 41.81407 -0.788377 0.4305 
RISKPREM(-1) -7.908972 9.782087 -0.808516 0.4188 
TS(-1) -0.606410 0.281711 -2.152593 0.0314 
SMALLRET(-1) -28.13471 9.443183 -2.979367 0.0029 
UKTBILL3M(-1) -6.582526 4.414011 -1.491280 0.1359 
YLD_SPR(-1) -0.096806 0.350864 -0.275907 0.7826 
     
     
 Limit Points   
     
     LIMIT_β:Ȗβ -1.186523 1.661684 -0.714048 0.4752 
LIMIT_γ: Ȗ4 -0.482579 1.658308 -0.291007 0.7710 
LIMIT_4: Ȗ4 0.053396 1.659841 0.032169 0.9743 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
Table 2: Results of Ordered Logit Model with all potential forecasting 
variables of FTSE Large-Cap Index 
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
CONSCONF(-1) 0.005570 0.057312 0.097195 0.9226 
CONSCONF(-2) 0.009933 0.061357 0.161882 0.8714 
CPI(-1) 0.755370 0.533684 1.415388 0.1570 
CPI(-2) -0.659463 0.525367 -1.255242 0.2094 
DYS_L(-1) 1.227387 0.553604 2.217085 0.0266 
M4(-1) 0.051029 0.529522 0.096368 0.9232 
M4(-2) 0.268075 0.550564 0.486910 0.6263 
MO(-1) 0.258767 0.481452 0.537472 0.5909 
MO(-2) 0.112256 0.515240 0.217872 0.8275 
MONBO(-1) -2.669971 2.201905 -1.212573 0.2253 
MONEX(-1) -8.475957 5.364262 -1.580079 0.1141 
MONIP(-1) -25.06452 31.10666 -0.805761 0.4204 
MONIP(-2) 3.021340 31.14236 0.097017 0.9227 
MONIPMAN(-1) 63.77924 35.46944 1.798146 0.0722 
MONIPMAN(-2) 10.86145 33.52278 0.324002 0.7459 
RISKPREM(-1) 59.59850 29.76786 2.002109 0.0453 
TS(-1) 0.309610 0.237098 1.305833 0.1916 
LAR_RET(-1) -41.53504 29.80060 -1.393765 0.1634 
UKTBILL3M(-1) 5.034008 3.669481 1.371858 0.1701 
YLD_SPR(-1) 0.190373 0.304019 0.626189 0.5312 
     
     
 Limit Points   
     
     LIMIT_β:Ȗβ -3.101859 1.450696 -2.138186 0.0325 
LIMIT_γ: Ȗγ -1.069085 1.425263 -0.750097 0.4532 
LIMIT_4: Ȗ4 1.031506 1.425885 0.723415 0.4694 
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Table 3: Results of Ordered Logit Model with all potential forecasting 
variables of FTSE Growth 350 Index 
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
CONSCONF(-1) 0.053729 0.059094 0.909208 0.3632 
CONSCONF(-2) -0.133249 0.060136 -2.215784 0.0267 
CPI(-1) -0.197249 0.496974 -0.396900 0.6914 
CPI(-2) -0.046993 0.499413 -0.094097 0.9250 
M4(-1) 1.275526 0.520072 2.452597 0.0142 
M4(-2) 0.568493 0.533195 1.066200 0.2863 
MO(-1) -0.988795 0.514410 -1.922192 0.0546 
MO(-2) 0.040656 0.494398 0.082234 0.9345 
MONBO(-1) 3.482029 2.160423 1.611735 0.1070 
MONEX(-1) -0.776399 5.500397 -0.141153 0.8877 
MONIP(-1) -26.24577 31.10626 -0.843746 0.3988 
MONIP(-2) -12.83405 31.67860 -0.405133 0.6854 
MONIPMAN(-1) 39.73356 33.47476 1.186971 0.2352 
MONIPMAN(-2) 31.63463 34.74780 0.910407 0.3626 
RISKPREM(-1) 2.510546 20.03778 0.125291 0.9003 
TS(-1) -0.057739 0.193727 -0.298045 0.7657 
GRWTH_RET(-1) -0.030030 20.26553 -0.001482 0.9988 
UKTBILL3M(-1) -1.185071 3.332008 -0.355663 0.7221 
YLD_SPR(-1) 0.303056 0.302917 1.000457 0.3171 
     
     
 Limit Points   
     
     LIMIT_β:Ȗβ -1.879822 1.385452 -1.356830 0.1748 
LIMIT_γ: Ȗγ -0.390087 1.368117 -0.285127 0.7755 
LIMIT_4: Ȗ4 1.086183 1.377003 0.788802 0.4302 
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Table 4: Results of Ordered Logit Model with all potential forecasting 
variables of FTSE Value 350 Index 
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
CONSCONF(-1) 0.035322 0.057668 0.612508 0.5402 
CONSCONF(-2) 0.059221 0.060783 0.974300 0.3299 
CPI(-1) 0.377872 0.482350 0.783398 0.4334 
CPI(-2) -0.082593 0.475193 -0.173810 0.8620 
DYS_L(-1) 0.373251 0.530323 0.703818 0.4815 
M4(-1) -1.087225 0.549587 -1.978258 0.0479 
M4(-2) -0.002677 0.538061 -0.004975 0.9960 
MO(-1) 0.085219 0.477833 0.178344 0.8585 
MO(-2) 0.058891 0.483878 0.121706 0.9031 
MONBO(-1) -2.448083 2.297856 -1.065377 0.2867 
MONEX(-1) -2.282456 5.607537 -0.407034 0.6840 
MONIP(-1) 21.47987 29.55745 0.726716 0.4674 
MONIP(-2) -7.237776 29.53882 -0.245026 0.8064 
MONIPMAN(-1) -43.81426 32.97569 -1.328683 0.1840 
MONIPMAN(-2) 12.55646 32.93288 0.381274 0.7030 
RISKPREM(-1) -2.665089 25.03468 -0.106456 0.9152 
TS(-1) 0.275217 0.225485 1.220555 0.2223 
VALUE_RET(-1) 8.697936 24.58344 0.353813 0.7235 
UKTBILL3M(-1) 2.308706 3.438159 0.671495 0.5019 
YLD_SPR(-1) -0.352932 0.288733 -1.222347 0.2216 
     
     
 Limit Points   
     
     LIMIT_β:Ȗβ -0.340942 1.380171 -0.247029 0.8049 
LIMIT_γ: Ȗγ 1.018451 1.380260 0.737869 0.4606 
LIMIT_4: Ȗ4 2.571007 1.392213 1.846704 0.0648 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Marginal Effects for FTSE Large-Cap Ordered Logit Model for probability of 
ranking first 
CPIt-2 -0.168 *     0.194 = -0.03259 
DY small-large
 t-1 0.634 *     0.194 = 0.122996 
Risk Premium
 t-1 57.952 *     0.194 = 11.24269 
 
 
Marginal Effects for FTSE Growth 350 Ordered Logit Model for probability of 
ranking first 
UK Consumer Confidence
 t-2 -0.064 *     0.594 = -0.03802 
CPI
 t-1 -0.278 *     0.594 = -0.16513 
M4
 t-1 1.335 *     0.594 = 0.79299 
M0
 t-1 t-1 -1.075 *     0.594 = -0.63855 
Brent Oil 3.297 *     0.594 = 1.958418 
 
 
Marginal Effects for FTSE Value 350 Ordered Logit Model for probability of 
ranking first 
Value Returns
 t-1 5.688 *     0.116 = 0.659808 
UK Consumer Confidence
 t-2 0.065 *     0.116 = 0.00754 
M4
 t-1 -0.963 *     0.116 = -0.11171 
Industrial Production Manufacturing
 t-1 -35.52 *     0.116 = -4.12032 
Yield Spread
 t-1 -0.527 *     0.116 = -0.06113 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Impact of Manager Changes on Mutual Fund 
Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Using our unique database of UK fund manager changes and event study methodology, 
we examine the impact of such changes to establish whether this impact varies 
depending upon whether the fund manager is male or female; whether the fund is a 
developed or emerging market; and depending upon the fund‟s style, that is, growth, 
value or small cap. Our results show clearly across different categories of funds that a 
change in fund manager can have a significant impact on fund performance, at least in 
the first year following the event.  We document that funds improve their performance 
after a female fund manager has been replaced. Finally, we find persistence in 
performance of the bottom performing funds compared with the top performing funds 
pre-and post management change.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
How persistent is a fund‟s performance? Is it dependent on the skill of the manager who 
is managing a fund? Can a trading strategy be created based on the positive alpha 
portfolios that consistently outperform the market? It is great to achieve a high alpha, 
but is it plausible to rely on the fund manager to produce that alpha year after year and 
do poor performing funds demonstrate performance persistence? These are some of the 
questions that previous literature has attempted to answer.  
 
In recent years, studies on investment styles and fund manager performance have 
become wide-spread. In particular, studies by Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and 
Wermers and Ding (2005) focused on the characteristics of fund managers, such as 
experience and education, and found evidence that fund performance is positively 
correlated with manager education and experience.  However, there has been little 
evidence devoted to the influence of gender on fund management. One of the studies 
that focused on this area was by Niessen and Ruenzi (2006). They undertook a study on 
the different styles of fund management between male and female fund managers in the 
US market, and found significant differences between them: while men are more 
aggressive, women appear to be more methodological and risk averse in their 
investment choices.  However, most of the studies on gender of fund managers tend to 
assess the behavioural issues rather than look at the manger performance which is if 
essence to investors. There has been little attention devoted to the fund manager tenure 
and its relationship to performance of a fund and additionally, most of the research in 
this area has been focusing on the US market. 
 
In this chapter we assess how the performance of a fund is affected when a fund 
managers leaves. In particular, we attempt to answer whether it is in fact the fund 
manager that influences the performance of the funds s/he runs. With unique, hand-
constructed database, which focuses on the UK fund manager changes in recent history 
(2002-2005), we examine whether the impact of a change is more pronounced among 
bond or equity funds, emerging or developed market funds for example. Further, we 
assess the impact of the gender of the manager on the performance of a managed fund. 
This study attempts to fill the gap in the literature by offering a comprehensive study of 
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fund manager changes and gender influences in different types of funds in the UK 
managed fund industry. Specifically, we intend to highlight the effect a fund manager 
change (replacement) has on the performance of a fund. Hence, we examine the 
performance of those funds whose manager had been replaced three years before and 
after the replacement. Finally, we will assess the persistence of performance of our top 
and bottom performing funds pre-and post management change.   
 
 
1.1 Advantages of Mutual Funds 
 
Professional Management  
One of the main advantages of mutual funds is the professional management of the 
investor‟s money. Due to lack of time and expertise, investors purchase funds in order 
to manage their portfolios.   
 
Diversification 
If an investor owns shares in a mutual fund rather than individual stocks or bonds, s/he 
is able to lower the risk incurred. Typically, large mutual funds own hundreds of 
different stocks in different industries and in this way it allows investors to diversify 
their risk.  
 
Economies of Scale  
Economies of scale can be defined as the decrease of cost as output increases. In case of 
mutual funds, large amount of securities are traded which implies that the transaction 
costs are lower in relation to an individual buying and selling securities.  
 
Liquidity    
Furthermore, through mutual funds an investor can request for shares to be converted 
into cash at any point in time. 
 
Simplicity and Choice 
Finally, owning a mutual fund does not entail expertise and difficulty. It is a fairly 
simple procedure as there is an abundance of mutual funds in almost any bank. 
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Furthermore, mutual funds come in wide variety types, with some investing exclusively 
in a particular sector while others may target growth opportunities in general.  
 
 
1.2 Disadvantages of Mutual Funds 
 
Costs 
One of the disadvantages of mutual funds is the association of high costs. Due to the 
fact that professional management works for the investor, the investor is entitled to pay 
a management fee or a management expense ratio. Furthermore, mutual funds also 
entail distribution fees, which are paid to the broker or advisor that sells the fund or 
manages the account. Usually, the distribution fees are part of the management fees that 
the investor pays. On the whole, the average mutual fund charges from 1.3% to 1.5% 
for the expense ratios. 
 
Dilution  
Although diversification is one of the advantages of mutual funds, it can also become a 
burden. Due to the fact that many mutual funds have small holdings in various 
companies in different industries, implies that even high returns in a few investments do 
not make a big difference in the portfolio.  
 
Taxes 
Even though the return of investing in a mutual fund can be very satisfying, the investor 
is still liable to pay a capital-gain tax. Therefore, the return from the fund will be lower 
than anticipated.  
 
1.3 Objectives and Significance of the Research 
 
The objective of this study is to examine the performance of mutual funds and to assess 
whether fund managers are an important determinant in this process. In recent years, 
studies on investment styles employed by fund manager have become wide-spread. 
However, little evidence has been devoted to the performance of the fund managers and 
whether gender has an influence on the performance of the funds. 
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Firstly, we intend to distinguish fund manager changes that have taken place. Second, 
we intend to measure the performance of the specific fund before manager replacement 
and after manager replacement. In this way, there will be a possibility to compare the 
performance of a fund, whether it experiences persistence and to what extent the 
manager had on the performance.  
 
Our study focuses on the gender of the fund manager and whether there is a difference 
in male and female fund manager performance. In particular, we aim to report whether 
performance of female fund managers is more persistent or stable as a comparison to 
male fund managers. Furthermore, we also concentrate on the performance of different 
groups of funds to examine whether the fund manager change is pronounced in some 
groups more than others.    
 
Using our unique, hand-constructed database of UK fund manager changes in recent 
history (2002-2005), we examine whether the impact of a change is more pronounced 
among male or female managed funds, emerging or developed market funds, bond or 
equity funds and whether the persistence of performance depends on fund‟s style, i.e. 
growth, value or small cap. We also examine the persistence of the top performing 
funds compared with the bottom performing funds pre-and post management change. 
This study attempts to fill the gap in the literature by offering a comprehensive study of 
fund manager changes and gender influences in different types of funds in the UK 
managed fund industry and to highlight the effect a fund manager change (replacement) 
has on the performance of a fund.  
   
The structure of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two comprises of the 
literature review, which discusses the earlier findings related to this study. Section three 
explains the data and methodology description utilized in this chapter. Section four is 
devoted to the results of our findings.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Past studies on performance persistence have shown mixed evidence that performance 
actually persists. During the past fifteen years, the topic of mutual fund performance has 
attracted considerable attention which has been primarily focused on US data sets. Only 
a handful of studies have been devoted to non-US data. Even more so, only a few 
studies on manager impact on mutual fund performance have been undertaken. This 
review of the literature is intended to cover most indicative and influential studies that 
have been carried out so far in the US and the UK.  
 
2.1 The Impact of Fund Managers on Performance of Mutual Funds 
 
There have been many studies that have examined the performance of mutual funds 
over time and the relative performance based upon investment objective. Although 
mutual funds have stated investment objectives, the fund manager normally has a 
significant impact on the selection of the individual securities in a fund‟s portfolio and, 
therefore, the risk and return characteristics of the portfolio. It would be logical to 
assume that there is a direct correlation between fund performance and portfolio 
manager experience, age, education and even gender. If a fund has experienced 
continued positive performance, one would expect that positive performance to continue 
as long as the same manager is associated with a particular fund.  
 
One of the studies that examine a manager‟s affect on fund performance is by Chevalier 
and Ellison (1999).  Their attempt is to uncover whether some managers are better than 
others. They examine whether mutual fund performance is related to the characteristics 
of the fund managers that may designate ability, knowledge or effort. Specifically, they 
inspect the relationship between the fund performance and the manager‟s age, the 
average SAT score, and whether the manager has an MBA or not.  In their study they 
used a sample of 492 managers from 1988-1994, and used a cross-sectional analysis to 
evaluate how performance is related to the different characteristics of the fund manager. 
From their results they found that younger managers outperform the older managers by 
460 basis points per year. It is important to note that the out-performance of younger 
managers is due to the lower expense ratios and survivorship bias. By taking into 
account the survivorship bias, the found that fund survival is more performance 
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sensitive for funds managed by younger managers. Therefore, the negative relationship 
between age and return suggests that survivorship bias would make younger managers 
appear to outperform the older managers. 
 
Furthermore, managers that hold an MBA outperformed the managers that do not by 63 
basis points per year. Such a result is accountable by the higher systematic risk that the 
MBA managers hold, which in result provides them with higher returns. In addition, 
managers that hold higher than average SAT scores significantly outperformed the 
managers with lower SAT scores. A logical explanation given was that managers from 
higher SAT schools have greater abilities and knowledge to produce positive alphas and 
possibly have a better network of connections with other members of financial 
institutions. Once again, this is attributable to the differences in expenses, levels of risk 
and survivorship. They showed that managers with higher SAT scores or MBA degrees 
managed higher beta funds. Furthermore, these managers dealt with larger funds that 
had smaller or unreported expense ratios. Taking into account survivorship, these 
managers could possibly be working for more aggressive firms which fire fund 
managers that under-perform. Also, the true, positive relationship between high SAT 
score managers and return may be understated by the possibility that fund executives 
give these managers a second chance following a poor performance. 
 
Chevalier and Ellison continued their study by examining the relationship between 
management characteristics and different investment styles. They used a four factor 
model by regressing the monthly return of the mutual fund on the monthly return of the 
RMRF (return minus risk-free rate) portfolio, the HML (high book-to-market minus low 
book-to-market) portfolio, SML (small firm shares minus large firm shares) portfolio 
and PR1YR (last year‟s winners bought and last year‟s losers sold) portfolio. They 
found a positive relationship between age and PR1YR, which shows that the older 
managers use momentum strategies. However, in the beginning of their study they 
found that older managers are out performed by the younger managers and this finding 
is somewhat contrary to the findings of Carhart (1997) and Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman 
and Wermers (1997), who showed that momentum strategies are the main reason for 
performance persistence. Subsequently, the MBA managers showed a statistically 
significant tendency to purchase „glamour‟ stocks (stocks with lower book-to-market 
ratios). The result showed that these managers were earning roughly average returns 
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even though they purchased glamour stocks. As for the managers with high SAT scores, 
they found that the overperformance of these managers remains the same even with the 
inclusion of the four factor residuals as the performance measure.  
 
From this study it can be concluded that a manager‟s characteristics do have an impact 
on the performance of the mutual fund. Chevalier and Ellison showed that managers 
that held an MBA degree or a high SAT score exhibited higher performance than those 
that did not. In addition, younger managers outperformed the older managers. Several 
factors need to be taken into account that may be responsible for such a result. These 
factors are the level of risk used, the amount of expense ratio and the survivorship bias. 
It is also important to note that managers with MBAs and high SATs are more educated, 
have a better network of connections and possibly higher access to information. All of 
these factors contribute to these managers having a better stock picking ability. Also, 
younger managers are usually striving for a successful career and are therefore more 
motivated to work harder so as to prove themselves.  
 
Other literature on mutual fund managers compares the performance of single-managed 
and team-managed funds. Prather and Middleton (2002) used a sample of 162 U.S. 
mutual funds for the period 1981 -1994, consisting of 147 funds managed by 
individuals and 15 that are team managed. Their results indicate that there are no 
appreciable differences between the performance of team-managed and individual-
managed funds. Another study by Bar, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2005) finds team-managed 
funds exhibit marginally lower risk, more persistent returns, and experience greater 
inflows over time. 
 
Furthermore, Gaspar et al. (2006) investigate whether mutual fund families strategically 
allocate performance across their member funds favoring those more likely to generate 
higher fee income or future inflows. They further document how this family strategy 
takes place by looking at preferential allocation of IPO deals and at the amount of 
opposite trades among different valued funds. 
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2.2 Does Gender Matter? 
 
From previous studies it has been shown that performance can persist. But how much of 
this performance persistence is accountable by female managers? Do women who are 
fund managers perform any differently than their male counterparts? It is a known fact 
that women and men behave differently and this may affect fund manager performance. 
However, there are numerous factors that have an impact on fund performance, 
including the fund‟s size, structure and expenses, the age tenure, educational level and 
compensation of the manager and the turnover and risk profile of the fund. This is a key 
issue as there is significant evidence that women view money, risk and investing 
differently to men. There is also evidence suggesting that women may actually be better 
investors than men. This may not have been a major issue in previous times as the funds 
management industry has traditionally been male dominated, however, times are 
changing and there are more women managing money on behalf of others. 
 
Differences in risk aversion between men and women show up in a variety of situations. 
For example, in the US it has been found that women tend to smoke less, wear seatbelts 
more and are less likely to use illegal drugs. In the labour market, women tend to work 
in safer industries and have safer jobs within industries. Furthermore, with women 
being more risk averse would imply that they prefer lower levels of portfolio volatility, 
individual stock volatility, beta and size.  
 
Atkinson et al. (2003) examine the performance and investment behaviour of female 
fixed-income mutual fund managers compared with male fixed-income mutual fund 
managers. They find that male and female managed funds do not differ significantly in 
terms of performance, risk, and other fund characteristics. Their results suggest that 
differences in investment behaviour often attributed to gender may be related to 
investment knowledge and wealth constraints. In addition, despite the similarities 
between male and female managers, there is evidence that gender influences the 
decision-making of mutual fund investors. They also find that the net asset flows into 
funds managed by females are lower than for males, especially for the manager's initial 
year managing the fund. 
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A study by Niessen et al. (2006) investigated gender differences between US equity 
mutual fund managers. Specifically, their data covers US open-end mutual funds for the 
time period between January 1994 and December 2003. They hypothesized that female 
fund managers take less risk than male fund managers, that female fund managers are 
expected to follow less extreme investment styles that are more consistent over time, 
that female fund managers trade less due to their lack of confidence, that female fund 
managers experience lower inflows than the male fund managers and that their 
performance is more persistent. They measured the performance of the funds using the 
Jensen‟s Alpha, Fama-French three-factor model and Carhart four-factor model, in 
order to evaluate the risk-adjusted abnormal returns. Their results indicate that women 
seen to take moderately less unsystematic risk and less small firm risk, while the overall 
return risk does not differ. Due to the fact that male fund managers seem to take higher 
idiosyncratic risk translates into them trading more actively as a comparison to the 
female fund managers. Furthermore, Niessen et al. evaluated that female fund managers 
follow less extreme investment styles due to lower factor loadings and that their styles 
are more stable over time. However, they conclude that although the differences in 
behaviour between female and male fund managers are apparent, the differences in 
abnormal returns between the two are not significantly high.   
 
Single women have also been reported as more risk averse in financial decision making 
than single men and this difference is essentially influenced by factors like age, race and 
the number of children that they have (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998). Bliss and 
Potter (2002) add the information that women that manage funds hold less risky 
positions than men. In particular, Bliss and Potter (2002) explore whether gender affects 
fund manager performance and/or behavior, in particular whether female fund managers 
are more risk-averse and less confident. Their exploration of whether equity mutual 
funds managed by women differed systematically in performance or operationally from 
those managed by men produced negative findings. 
 
2.3 Studies of Performance Persistence of UK Mutual Funds 
 
Blake and Timmerman (1998) formed portfolios of high and low alpha funds and 
evaluated that performance did persist for a holding period of up to two years. Their 
study included complete return histories of 2,300 UK open-ended mutual funds over the 
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period from 1972 to 1995. They find some evidence of performance persistence and the 
existence of survivorship bias. Furthermore, they reported that there is evidence that 
mutual fund performance varies across different asset categories. Moreover, they find 
that underperformance increases as fund termination date approaches and it (weakly) 
outperforms during their first year of existence. On the other hand, Quigley and 
Sinquefield (1998) employed a similar strategy over the period of 1978 to 1997, and 
found that underperforming funds continue to underperform, while outperforming funds 
do not continue to outperform.  
 
Furthermore, Allen and Tan (1999) used various tests including the contingency tables 
methodology, employed by Blake and Timmerman (1998), on a UK sample of 131 
funds between the periods 1989 to 1995. Their results verified that performance 
persisted even after adjusting for risk and for holding periods of up to two years.   
 
There have been numerous studies that have analyzed the occurrence and the detection 
of performance persistence, however, only a few are on the determinants of persistence 
per se. One of the recent research studies that aim at answering the latter was carried out 
by Keswani and Stolin (2004). They undertook a study of net annual returns on all UK 
unit trusts over the period of 1991 to 2001. Specifically, Keswani and Stolin analyzed 
whether performance persistence differs between sectors, by also examining sectors 
where funds are not restricted to UK equities. They find significant differences in the 
level of persistence across different sectors. However, they conclude that it is not the 
sector characteristics that explain the different levels of persistence, but the differences 
in securities invested. Furthermore, Keswani and Stolin (2006) extended the study they 
undertook in 2004 and they concentrated on peer groups of competing mutual funds to 
evaluate whether this determinant affects performance persistence. Through their results 
they find that performance persistence is more vivid in sectors where concentration of 
assets under management is higher.            
 
2.4 Studies of Performance Persistence of US Mutual Funds 
 
Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) performed a study on 165 no entry fee growth-
oriented US funds over the period 1974 to 1988 and obtain similar results. They find 
stronger evidence that funds that do well in the past do well in the short-term future. In 
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their study, the funds in the top octile of past performers over the previous year 
outperformed the lowest octile of past performers in the following year. In addition, 
they reported profits from a strategy of buying past winners and selling the past losers. 
Conclusively, they report positive persistence for four quarters and then a reversal. They 
conclude these results as a „hot hands‟ phenomenon.  
 
Subsequently, Elton et al. (1996), using a sample free of survivor bias of 188 US equity 
funds, reconfirm the „hot hands‟ phenomenon of Hendricks et al. (1993).  Nevertheless, 
using risk-adjusted returns to rank the funds, they report that past „winner‟ funds 
outperform past „loser‟ funds also for longer periods of three years. Furthermore, they 
excluded the funds with high expense ratios from their analysis; however the results 
were very similar, suggesting that fees and expenses account for only part of the 
differences in performance across funds.  
 
In a study of 728 US mutual fund returns over the period 1976 to 1988, Goetzmann and 
Ibbotson (1994) find that two-year performance is predictive of performance over the 
successive two years. They report evidence of relative performance persistence, 
particularly for underperforming funds. 
 
Volkman and Wohar (1995) extend this analysis in order to examine factors that impact 
performance persistence. Their US data consists of 322 funds over the period 1980 to 
1989, and shows performance persistence is negatively related to size and negatively 
related to levels of management fees. Specifically, they find negative persistence in 
performance for both small and large funds, suggesting that small funds can be risky 
when they first enter the market and that large funds have possibilities of becoming 
inefficient.  
 
Furthermore, Brown and Goetzmann (1995) implemented the analysis, between the 
years 1976-1988, of surviving and non-surviving US funds from a sample data that is 
free of survivorship bias. They use a regression analysis that past performance is the 
major determinant of fund disappearance and find that size and age are negatively 
related to disappearance, while the expense ratio is positively related to it. Their result 
confirms that there is persistence in performance especially for the underperforming 
funds.  
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Moreover, Malkiel (1995) used a sample data of surviving and non-surviving funds 
between the periods 1971 to 1991 in the US. It is interesting to note that they found that 
performance persists in the 1970s but does not continue in the 1980s. This shows the 
sensitivity of the survivorship bias throughout the sample period studied.  
 
Studies of performance persistence in mutual funds are not without contrary evidence. 
Carhart (1997) dismisses the „hot hand‟ phenomenon suggested by Hendricks et al. and 
shows that expenses and common factors in stock returns such as beta, market 
capitalization, one-year return momentum, and whether the portfolio is value or growth 
oriented "almost completely" explain short term persistence in risk-adjusted returns. He 
finds that the „hot hand‟ result is due to the momentum strategies used. Therefore, he 
added a factor representing momentum strategies and found that the performance 
persistence disappears. He concludes that his evidence does not "support the existence 
of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio managers" (Carhart, 1997, p. 57). This was 
agreed by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997), who applied a portfolio-based 
measurement model and confirmed that the momentum strategies were indeed the main 
reason for performance persistence in mutual funds. Carhart (1997) and Daniel et al. 
(1997) focused more on the determinants of performance persistence rather than 
detecting performance persistence per se.   
 
The issue of performance persistence has also been thoroughly reconsidered by 
Wermers (2001) on a basis of a methodology introduced by Daniel et al. (1997). He 
finds that prior-year winning funds outperform prior-year losers in the following year, 
by almost 5 per cent per year at the net return level, as well as beating market indices 2 
per cent per year. Moreover, Wermers (2001) also finds that persistence in growth-
oriented funds is positively correlated with portfolio turnover.  
 
Grinblatt and Titman (1992) analyze performance of 279 US funds over the period of 
1975 to 1984 using a benchmark technique. The benchmark that they use consists of 
passive portfolio funds which take into account size, past returns and dividend yields. 
Subsequently, they use a regression analysis to evaluate the positive alphas for reach 
fund which depicts the excess return. They then divide the sample period into two sub-
periods; 1975-1979 and 1980-1984, and assess whether the performance for the first 
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sub-period is indicative for the performance for the second sub-period. Their results 
show that better than average performance persists over time. 
 
An earlier study by Brown et al. (1992) identified performance persistence due to 
survivorship bias of mutual funds. Their evaluation was to choose high-risk strategies 
which will survive in the first sub-period and thus encounter above average returns. If 
these funds continue the same strategy and survive in the second sub-period, they will 
continue to achieve above average returns. Furthermore, they document strong 
persistence for the periods 1976-81 and 1982-87 whereas for the interval period 1979-
84 no persistence was found.  
 
Given the evidence from prior literature which suggests that there is performance 
persistence in the short run and that investment strategies of a fund depend largely on 
managers themselves and their characteristics, this paper will examine how the change 
of a fund manager in a fund impacts its performance and whether different conclusions 
apply to different types of funds. How is our research different to other studies on the 
performance of fund managers? To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that 
examines the performance of funds whose manager has been replaced. Furthermore, it is 
the first study that examines the performance of fund managers in the UK. Our study 
adds to the existing literature on fund managers by providing a comprehensive event 
study analysis on the relationship between the performance of the funds and the fund 
manager, before and after the fund manager is replaced.   
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1 Data 
 
We use a unique, hand-constructed database of manager changes. Our primary data 
sources are Citywire25, Standard and Poor‟s database and the Financial Express 
Database. Both Citywire and the Financial Express databases cover UK open-ended 
mutual funds and provide information on fund returns, fund management structures, 
investment objectives, fund managers‟ characteristics and other fund characteristics. 
The Standard & Poor‟s data source provides us with information of manager 
replacements from April 2002 to December 2005. The price data for the funds and their 
respective benchmarks is obtained from Datastream. 
 
To construct our unique database, we first determine the fund manager replacements, 
from the Standard & Poor‟s data source, for all 45 months of our analysis period (April 
2002 to December 2005). This provides us with a total of 258 fund manager changes. 
Our next step was to ascertain the name of the funds that the replaced managers were 
running. We were able to uncover this information through Citywire, Financial Express 
database and fund factsheets. Further, from our unique database we distinguish the 
gender of the replaced fund managers and the characteristics of the specific funds.  In 
the Citywire and Financial Express databases there is no field indicating the gender of 
the fund manager. However, the first name of the fund manager is usually given, which 
assists in distinguishing the gender. Moreover, Citywire, the Financial Express database 
and the Standard and Poor‟s data source indicate the sector that each fund belongs to 
which enables us to allocate our funds according to different investment strategies. We 
concentrate our analysis on single-managed funds and exclude all team-managed funds. 
In a way, this will assist us to distinguish the differences in fund behaviour due to 
management structure (team- vs. single-managed) from differences that can be 
attributed to gender or investment strategy (value or growth, developed or emerging 
markets etc.) for example.  
 
                                                 
25
 Source: Citywire is a UK data source providing information on UK fund managers and tracks their 
performance. 
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Indeed, in order to measure the performance of the 258 funds, specific benchmarks are 
assigned to each fund, which is explained in detail in the next section of the chapter. 
Through Citywire and the Standard and Poor‟s fund factsheets we were able to find the 
pre-defined benchmarks according to each funds‟ objectives. Furthermore, we also 
measure the performance of each fund in relation to their peers. The Investment 
Management Association (IMA) provides data on peer group benchmarks, which 
enables us to match each one of our funds to the appropriate peer group and the evaluate 
their performance accordingly.  
 
To generalise our results across different groups of funds we group our funds according 
to the following categories: (1) male managed, (2) female managed, (3) UK funds 
(equity and bond), (4) international funds (equity and bond), (5) emerging markets 
funds, (6) developed markets funds, (7) equity only funds, (8) bonds only funds, (9) 
equity value funds, (10) equity growth funds, (11) equity small cap funds, (12) top 10 
percent performing funds before the management change, (13) bottom 10 percent 
performing funds before the management change, (14) top 10 percent performing funds 
after the management change and (15) bottom 10 percent performing funds after 
management change. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
Our research uses an event study methodology to examine the relationship between 
mutual fund performance in the pre and post managerial turnover periods. Managerial 
turnover is defined as the event that occurs when a fund manager is replaced and the 
event date is the exact year and month of the management turnover. Standard event 
studies use daily data, however, we believe that 1) using a month of managers‟ change 
as an event date is sufficient to capture the effect of the change and 2) the data on 
managers‟ changes is only available on month-to-month basis. We measure the 
performance of the fund three years before and after the event date26. The time line for 
our event study is as follows:  
 
 
                                                 
26
 Where the manager has not managed the fund three years prior to the event, we apply a minimum data 
requirement of one year prior to the event date.  
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estimation period   estimation period 
 
 
         t-36        t= 0     t+ 36 
 
     pre-change       manager change       post-change 
 
We require this pre-event time period because Khorana (2001) advocates that funds 
which experience a management turnover have at least two years of performance history 
before the management replacement month. Furthermore, Hendricks et al. (1993), 
Goetzann and Ibbotson (1994) and Brown and Goetzmann (1995) all find evidence of 
performance persistence in mutual funds over a horizon of one to three years. In 
addition, to a certain extent, this will also enable us to determine the reason for 
replacement. Some of the reasons for which fund manager changes occur are retirement, 
poor performance of the fund manager or good performance. In the latter case, good 
performance can give rise of opportunities to the fund manager where s/he moves to a 
better job position or is simply taken by another fund management company. 
 
 
We use an event study methodology to examine the relationship between mutual fund 
performance in the pre and post managerial turnover. We apply steps suggested by 
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997). We measure the performance of the funds pre- 
and post- event date in three ways. The first method is using the benchmark-adjusted 
model, where we use fund objective pre-defined benchmarks and peer-group 
benchmarks. The second and third methods used to measure the performance of the 
funds are the mean-adjusted model and the information ratio respectively. More 
specifically, we use these methods to calculate the abnormal returns for each fund. 
These methods provide us with a detailed and thorough analysis to distinguish whether 
a fund manager plays a role in the outperformance or underperformance of a fund. 
Furthermore, we will be able to study how different categories of funds are affected by 
the change of the fund manager and whether outperforming funds continue to 
outperform and underperforming funds continue to underperform.  
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3.2.1. Performance using Benchmark-Adjusted Model: 
 
The traditional event study methodology is using Market model, which is a statistical 
model, estimated through OLS regression, it relates fund i return to the market return 
and estimates parameters it  and it  that are used for calculation of abnormal returns. 
This implies that the estimation period for alphas and betas is needed. Since most of our 
funds have quite a short history prior to management change, we find that this method is 
not appropriate for our analysis. The alternative to use in such circumstances is the 
Market-adjusted model or the benchmark-adjusted model. Since the funds for which we 
analyse the impact of fund managers‟ changes are benchmarking their performance 
against benchmarks pre-defined in their investment objectives, we feel that it is more 
appropriate to calculate abnormal returns adjusted for benchmark returns, rather than the 
market (i.e. FTSE All Share Index) itself. Therefore, the benchmark adjusted return 
model we use can be treated as restricted Market model in which it is equal to zero 
and it is equal to one. According to Campbell et. al. (1997), since coefficients alpha 
and beta are pre-specified, an estimation period is not required and abnormal returns can 
be calculated as:  
 
btitit RRAR          (1) 
 
Where itAR is abnormal return of fund i in period t, Rit is the return of fund i in period t 
and Rbt is the return of fund i’s benchmark. As a benchmark we use i) benchmark index 
defined by the investment objectives of a fund and ii) peer group benchmark. The 
information on the appropriate peer group benchmarks for each fund was obtained 
through the Investment Management Association. 
 
Further, we calculate Average Abnormal Returns for each of the 12 groups of funds: 
  ni itt ARnAR 11         (2) 
 
Where n is the number of funds in which the change of a fund manager occurred. 
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Additionally, typical event study methodology will assess the impact of the event by 
testing weather there is a difference between cumulative abnormal returns for fund i 
before and after the event, in our case the change of fund manager: 
  3636t tit ARiCAR        (3) 
 
itCAR  gives us returns from investing in fund i from the start of the event horizon till 
the 12 months post event date.  
 
For each of our group of funds we calculate Average Cumulative abnormal returns: 
  3636t tit iARCAR        (4) 
 
3.2.2. Performance using Mean-Adjusted Model: 
 
iitit RRAR          (5) 
 
Where iR  is the mean return of fund i for which the management change has occurred 
over the estimation period (in our case 36 months prior to the change of fund manager) 
as suggested by Campell et al. (1997). Although this model appears to be the simplest 
out of the three, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) state that it often gives similar results 
as the other more complex models. 
 
In the same manner as for the Benchmark-Adjusted Model, we calculate Average 
Abnormal Returns, Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Average Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns for this Mean-Adjusted Model using equations (2), (3) and (4).   
 
3.2.3. Tests for Significance 
 
To test for significance of Average abnormal returns and Average cumulative abnormal 
returns for the Market-Adjusted, Mean-Adjusted and Peer Group-Adjusted Models, we 
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need to calculate the aggregate pre-event standard deviation of abnormal returns for 
each of the funds within each of the 12 sample groups (Brown and Warner (1985)):   
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Where eventprei ,  is the standard deviation of abnormal returns of fund i estimated from 
pre-event period, eventpreAR   is the average abnormal return of fund i in the pre-event 
period and n is the number of months in the pre-event period (in our case 36). 
 
The aggregate standard deviations across all funds in each of the 12 sample groups are 
calculated as: 
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Where N is the number of funds in the sample. 
 
Using these standard deviations, we calculate T-test for ARs and CARs as: 
  
eventpreN
t
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tAR   ,           (8)
          
 and       
    
112,   ttCARtCAR eventpreN ttestT      (9) 
 
Where 1t is the first day and 2t is the last day in the period over which we calculate 
cumulative returns. 
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3.2.4. Performance using Information Ratio: 
 
)(. 00
00
0 
  tt ttt RbRiDeviationSt bRiRIRi   and  )(. 00000   tt ttt RbRiDeviationSt bRiRIRi  (10)
        
Where 0tIRi  ( 0tIRi ) is the information ratio obtained by fund i before (after) the 
management change; 0tiR  ( 0tiR ) is the average return of fund i before (after) the 
event;  0tRb  ( 0tRb ) is the average return of the benchmark for the pre-event (post-
event) period; and Standard deviation of 00   tt RbRi ( 00   tt RbRi ) is taken as measure 
of total risk over the pre-event (post-event) period. The information on appropriate 
benchmarks for each fund is obtained from Citywire, S&P database or fund fact 
sheets27. 
 
Further, to avoid any fund-specific bias in our results, we calculate the average 
Information Ratio for each of our 12 groups of funds as: 
    ni tt IRiIR 1 00  and     ni tt IRiIR 1 00  (11)
            
Where 0tIR ( 0tIR ) is the average information ratio of n funds for each of our groups in 
period prior to (after) event.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 Note that we do not use peer-group performance as a benchmark for calculation of Information ratios 
but the benchmark, which is defined by fund objectives. 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Analysis that follows shows that three alternative methods of measuring abnormal 
performance generate to some extent similar results. We report the results both for the 
overall sample of funds and by fund categories. Note that 104 out of 258 manager 
changes in this study occur in 2004 and 2005, so the 36 months post-event period 
includes the severe market downturn of 2007 and 2008. Therefore, we will analyse our 
results having the worsening market conditions in mind for those last two years in our 
sample. 
 
4.1. Performance and manager change: All funds 
 
For the benchmark-adjusted method, we compare the return of each fund with the return 
of its corresponding benchmark, defined by the funds‟ objectives. We do this procedure 
for the entire period of our data sample in the event study. In this way, we are able to 
evaluate whether the funds yield higher returns than their corresponding benchmark or 
whether they underperform as a comparison to their benchmarks. More importantly, we 
are able to observe the performance of the funds before the change of the manager and 
after the change of the manager. From these results we are able to construe the strength 
of the fund manager‟s role in the performance of a particular fund.   
 
We first report the results of the entire sample data followed by the results for each 
category of funds. Appendix 1 depicts the average abnormal returns and the cumulative 
abnormal returns for the entire event period and full sample in our estimation. The 
period t-36 to t-1 corresponds to the pre-event period. The period t= 0 is the event date, 
which corresponds to the month that the fund manager has stopped running the 
particular fund. The period t+ 1 to t+ 36 correspond to the post-event period, where the 
previous manager has been replaced.  From the results it can be seen that the average 
abnormal returns increase after the event date. However, only months 33, 23 and 20 
before the event date and month 30 after the event date are significant. This can also be 
seen in Figure 2.1. Twenty-four months or two years prior to the event date, the average 
abnormal returns are at their lowest and are more volatile during the pre-event period. 
Subsequently, the average abnormal returns for all the funds increase and continue to do 
so after the event date. After the event date, or change in fund manager, the average 
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abnormal returns become less volatile. As a result, the sum of the average abnormal 
returns before the event date (-0.0531) is lower than the sum of the average abnormal 
returns after the event date (-0.0403), which is shown in Panel A of Table 1 in 
Appendix 2.  
 
 
This overall verifies that the change in managers has increased the performance of the 
funds, who are achieving higher abnormal returns, albeit lower than the corresponding 
benchmarks. Furthermore, Appendix 1 gives results for the cumulative average 
abnormal returns for all of the 258 funds in our data sample and their corresponding 
tests for significance. The cumulative abnormal returns show a decrease in value during 
the pre-event period and from period t-12 to t+ 36 they are statistically significant. 
However, from the event date until t+ 10, the cumulative average abnormal returns 
continue to decrease in value, but at a substantially lower rate. This can be seen in 
Figure 2.2, which depicts this trend. This is not surprising as the cumulative average 
abnormal returns of each month are affected by the previous months‟ values. 
Nevertheless, our results also indicate one year after the event date the average 
abnormal returns show a large increase in value, which is shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.   
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However, the performance of the funds deteriorates in the next two years after the event 
date, which we believe is largely influenced by the overall market downturn in 2007 and 
2008.  
 
The second method that we apply to evaluate the performance of the funds is the peer 
group benchmark-adjusted method. Rather than measuring the performance against a 
specific benchmark and/or the average performance, most fund managers tend to be 
compared to their own peers. Therefore, a fund manager is able to compare the 
performance of his fund in relation to the average performance of the sector in which 
his fund is grouped. For this reason we also use this method to show how the funds are 
performing according to their peers, and more importantly, whether the change in fund 
managers affects their performance. 
 
In order to compute the peer group-adjusted return, we use the IMA (Investment 
Management Association) sector classifications, which allocate each fund with one of 
its styles based on the fund‟s portfolio holdings. A fund‟s peer group-adjusted return in 
month t is the fund‟s return in month t minus the return of the corresponding peer group 
benchmark for the same month. Very similar pattern of average and cumulative 
abnormal returns is observed in the peer group adjusted performance, as seen in Figures 
2.3 and 2.4. 
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Similar to the benchmark-adjusted method, our results show that the average abnormal 
returns for the peer group-adjusted method are more volatile and more negative during 
the pre-event period. This can be seen in Figure 2.3 and Appendix 9. However, the post-
event period shows the average abnormal returns of the funds as more stable and 
increasing in value. Therefore, once a new fund manager takes over the fund, the 
performance of that fund becomes more constant and our results confirm a steady rise in 
the returns. According to the table in Appendix 10 the sum of the peer group adjusted 
average abnormal returns before the event date (-0.0823) is lower than the sum of the 
average abnormal returns after the event date (-0.0367) and it can be seen in Appendix 9 
that peer-adjusted average abnormal returns becoming positive after about a year of 
post-event performance. However, similarly to the benchmark adjusted method the 
average abnormal return with the peer group adjusted method deteriorates about 
eighteen months after the event date, implying underperformance of the funds.  
 
Indeed, these results are verified when taking into account the cumulative average 
abnormal returns, which is shown in Figure 2.4 and Appendix 9. It seems that the fund 
managers exhibit a poor performance two years leading to their replacement, implying 
that the reason of actual change is their underperformance in comparison to their peers. 
Therefore, a change in the new fund manager  serves a more a favourable outcome, as 
the performance of the funds is stabilized and gradually rizing. Although, our results 
indicate that the performance of the funds deteriorates about eighteen months after the 
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new fund manager takes over, the perfromance of the new fund manager in comparison 
to the previous manager still remains favourable. 
 
 
 
Overall, the funds in our sample are exhibiting a persistent decrease in returns before 
the change in manager. Once a manager has been replaced, the returns and the overall 
performance of the funds show an improving trend but then decrease again due to 
deteriorating market conditions that are part of our sample period. This can lead us to 
conclude that the performance of the fund managers from our sample was unsatisfactory 
leading to a replacement, but the replacement manager has around 10 months of the 
„adjustment period‟ before the performance starts to improve. During the first 10 
months of the post-event period, the new fund manager may have taken a more cautious 
outlook, taking on less risk and leading to higher returns. Although our results indicate 
that the performance of the funds deteriorates about twelve to eighteen months after the 
new fund manager takes over, the perfromance of the new fund manager in comparison 
to the previous manager still remains favourable. 
 
The third method that we employed in our study to measure the performance and 
compute the abnormal returns of the funds throughout the event analysis is the mean-
adjusted method.  Specifically, for each fund we calculate the average return before the 
event date (from t-36 to t-1) and subtract it from each month‟s return in the pre-event 
period. In this way we are able to evaluate whether a fund is experiencing abnormal 
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returns over its average performance before the fund manager is replaced. Subsequently, 
we calculate the average return after the event date (from t+ 1 to t+ 36) and subtract it 
from each month‟s return in the post-event period. The result will convey whether the 
new fund manager exhibits higher abnormal returns. We repeat this procedure for each 
fund for every year in our study. The average abnormal returns for the mean adjusted 
method are statistically significant at periods t-34, t-23, t-18 and t= 0, and have a less 
mean-reverting trend as a comparison to the benchmark-adjusted average abnormal 
returns (Appendix 6). Nevertheless, the results are leading to the same conclusion as for 
benchmark adjusted returns. This can be seen in Figure 2.5 which shows the mean-
adjusted average abnormal returns.  
 
 
The funds exhibits positive average abnormal returns sixteen months before the event 
date and continue to do so until the event, with only a few negative values in between. 
However, during the event date and two months after the fund manager leaves the 
average abnormal returns decrease to negative values before they start increasing again. 
This implies that a new fund manager will take up to a few months before adjusting to a 
new position of running the fund. After one year, the new fund manager‟s performance 
deteriorates as the average abnormal returns of the funds decline from t+ 12 to t+ 36.  
 
Mean adjusted cumulative average abnormal returns exhibit a similar pattern to the 
benchmark-adjusted ones: returns are at their lowest one year before the event while 
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eight months after the change in fund manager the funds exhibit increase in cumulative 
abnormal returns, which continues in the succeeding months up to t+ 18. From here on, 
the funds depict a decline in cumulative average abnormal returns. Appendix 6 shows 
that the cumulative abnormal returns are statistically significant during months t-23 to t-
11, t-8 and t-7. This leads us to deduce that the funds experience an improvement in 
performance before the fund manager is changed, followed by a few months of 
adjustment for the new fund manager. In general, as Figure 2.6 shows, eight months 
after the change in fund manager the funds exhibit abnormal returns which seems to 
continue in the succeeding ten months. Subsequently, the average abnormal returns 
decrease and continue to do so until the end of our estimation period. Mean adjusted 
cumulative average abnormal returns are shown in Figure 2.6. 
 
 
 
To conclude, according to mean-adjusted method of performance, a change in fund 
manager does improve the funds‟ performance based on average abnormal returns and 
cumulative average abnormal returns after the event date. However, this outperformance 
does not persist in the long-run as the funds exhibit a decrease in return after a year and 
a half of the new fund manager taking over, which we believe is the result of the falling 
markets in 2007 and 2008.     
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Finally, we would expect to draw similar conclusions from the analysis of information 
ratios and the benchmark adjusted method, as they are both benchmark-based 
performance measures. Specifically, the information ratio determines the excess return 
of the fund manager relative to the appropriate benchmark divided by the risk the 
manager takes. The risk is computed by the standard deviation of the funds before and 
after the event date, implying that the ratio provides a risk-adjusted method of 
calculating the abnormal returns. We calculate the information ratio before and after the 
fund manager leaves enabling us to compare the performance of the funds before the 
event date and after the event date. Therefore, a higher information ratio insinuates 
higher abnormal returns, given the level of risk, and better performance from the fund 
manager. We initially compute the information ratio for the entire data sample before 
the event date and after the event date. Subsequently, we also calculate the information 
ratio for each of the categories of funds in order to avoid any fund-specific bias that may 
occur. Table 1, Panel A (Appendix 2) presents Information ratios (based on fund 
objectives benchmark), tracking errors, benchmark adjusted average abnormal returns 
and the sum of the benchmark adjusted average abnormal returns for the full sample 
period 36 months prior and 36 months after the event date, for total sample of funds and 
each of the fund groups separately. Panel B of Table 1 is the same as Panel A except 
that is covers only the first 12 months of the post event period to eliminate the effect of 
severe and prolonged equity market deterioration in 2007 and 2008. Table 1, Panel A, 
suggest that for the total sample of funds, the information ratio is lower for the post-
event period (-0.092) in comparison to the pre-event period (-0.067). The same 
conclusion can be drawn from the information ratio in Panel B, Table 1. This implies 
that given the decrease in tracking error post event, the funds overall do not exhibit 
higher average abnormal returns relative to their corresponding benchmarks in the post-
event period as a comparison to the pre-event period. Once a new fund manager takes 
over the fund, s/he is more cautious which may explain the fall in the average standard 
deviation and decline in the risk preference taken. Overall, this risk-adjusted measure of 
performance shows that there is no improvement in performance after the new manager 
has taken over. Information ratios by fund category from Table 1 will be discussed in 
the sections that follow. 
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4.2 Categories of Funds 
 
In order to emphasize the effect of change of the fund manager on the performance of 
the funds, we divide the 258 funds into different groups. Consequently, we carry out the 
analysis of the performance of the funds in the same manner as for the entire sample set. 
This will aid us into distinguishing whether certain groups of funds are affected by the 
change of the fund manager to a greater extent and whether they exhibit higher 
abnormal returns28.  
 
4.2.1 Performance and manager change: Male vs. Female Managed Funds 
 
The first category of funds studied is the previously male managed funds. Specifically, a 
male fund manager was in charge of these funds prior to being replaced. It is not known 
whether a male or a female fund manager succeeded the male manager replaced. Even 
so, the measure of the fund performance before and after the replacement date is able to 
show whether male fund managers exhibit higher abnormal returns than their female 
counterparts do before the event date and vice versa.  
 
Due to the fact that more than half of the funds in our data are previously male 
managed, the average abnormal and the cumulative average abnormal returns for the 
previously male managed funds demonstrate similar trends as the total sample set. Panel 
A of Table 1 (Appendix 2) shows that the sum of the average abnormal returns for the 
male managed funds is lower for the pre-event period (-0.0488) than for the post-event 
period (-0.0451). Figure A3.1 (Appendix 3) also indicates that the benchmark-adjusted 
average abnormal returns are more volatile before the event date as opposed to after the 
event date. From the 258 funds in our data sample only one third of the funds are 
previously female managed. However, our results indicate that their performance is 
more pronounced than that of the previously male fund managers. The sum of the 
benchmark adjusted average abnormal a return for the previously female managed funds 
during the pre-event period is -0.0805, whereas the post-event period entails an 
improved negative sum of -0.0159. This indicates that both previously male and female 
managed funds improve performance after the manager change but female managed 
                                                 
28
 We also carried out a significance test of the difference between the paired categories as shown in 
Appendix A14. All the paired categories show that there is a difference between their corresponding 
abnormal returns. For the style category, we paired the growth and small-cap funds and excluded the 
value funds as there wee only five funds in our sample.  
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funds improve more. From Figure 2.7 it can be seen that the cumulative average 
abnormal returns for the previously male managed funds show abnormal returns three 
years before the replacement, followed by a sharp decrease leading to the event date. 
However, once the male fund manager is replaced, the cumulative average abnormal 
returns continue to decline until t+ 10, followed by an advance in performance until 
t+ 12. Indeed, during these two months of our estimation, the previously male managed 
funds are generating abnormal returns above their benchmarks. Nonetheless, in the last 
two years of our estimation, the performance of the previously male managed funds 
deteriorates once again. 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 2.7, the performance of the previously female managed 
funds is substantially more volatile than that of the previously male fund managers. This 
is different to prior literature which advocates that female managers are more cautious 
and risk averse thus generally leading to a relatively steady performance. According to 
our results, we argue that in order to compete with their male counterparts, the female 
fund managers need to be more aggressive thus leading to the relatively volatile trend in 
performance.  
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Similar to the male fund managers, the previously female managed funds yield 
abnormal returns three years before the event date followed by a decrease in returns 
leading to the event date. However, the difference between the previously female 
managed funds and the male managed funds is their performance after the managers 
have been replaced as we see an improvement in the performance once the female fund 
manager leaves. Furthermore, the cumulative average abnormal returns for the 
previously male and female fund managers converge three years after the event date. 
This movement is depicted in Figure 2.7.  
 
Similar results can be drawn from the peer group-adjusted method. Figure 2.8 shows the 
cumulative average abnormal returns for the previously male managed and female 
managed funds. In the case of the male managed funds, the cumulative average 
abnormal returns show an almost identical trend as to the results of the entire sample. 
The performance of these funds deteriorates two years before the male fund manager is 
replaced and continues to do so until the event date. This can also be seen in Figure 
A11.1 (Appendix 11) and Table A12.1 (Appendix 12), which illustrate the male 
managed average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns. 
During the period a new fund manager takes over, the performance of the previously 
male managed fund improves, according to our results of the average abnormal returns 
in Appendix 11. In particular, according to peer group-adjusted return criteria, once the 
male fund manager is replaced, the cumulative average abnormal returns continue to 
decline until t+ 10, followed by an advance in performance until t+ 12. Indeed, one year 
after the new fund manager takes over, the previously male managed funds are 
generating abnormal returns above their benchmarks. However, the funds then exhibit a 
decline in performance lasting for about a year when they start to improve.   
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When considering the previously female managed funds, the reults of their performance 
are roughly similar to the male managed funds. However, it is interesting to observe that 
although the trend is simlar to the male managed funds, the female managed funds are 
noticeably more volatile. This can be clearly seen when examining the average 
abnormal returns (Appendix 11: Figure A11.2 and Appendix 12: Table A12.2). In 
Figure 2.8, the cumulative average abnormal returns are decreasing throughout the 
entire pre-event period and then become constant after the event date. However, the 
degree of the diminishing returns is much higher for the female managed funds in 
relation to the male managed funds. For female managed funds the peer group-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns show an improvement in months t+ 5 to t+ 12 after the 
replacement of female fund managers. 
 
Indeed, we can conclude that the poor performance of both the male and female 
managed funds had led to the replacement of their managers. In particular, both 
categories of funds show an underperformance in relation to their peers at least two 
years prior to their replacemnet of fund manager. Once the change is made, both groups 
of funds show an improvement in performance lasting for about a year. However, for 
both periods, pre-event and post-event, the female managed funds depict a more volatile 
trend. For this reason, our results indicate that a change in fund manager will have a 
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positive effect on the performance of the funds, with a greater degree for the previously 
female managed funds. These results coincide with those of the benchmark-adjusted 
method.  
 
In terms of the mean-adjusted method, the average abnormal returns for the previously 
male managed funds exhibit sharp increases and decrease throughout the pre-event 
period with months t-34, t-23, t-18, and t= 0 being statistically significant (Table A8.2 in 
Appendix 8). However, the average abnormal returns continue to be volatile seven 
months after the event date followed by a steady, positive growth generating positive 
abnormal returns. In addition, month t+ 11 after the event date is statistically significant. 
Similarly to the results of the total sample, the average abnormal returns for the male 
managed funds decline one year after the male manager change and continue to 
underperform the average performance up to three years post manager change.  
 
In the case of the cumulative average abnormal returns, Figure 2.9 shows a very similar 
movement for the previously male managed funds as for the total sample. The 
cumulative average abnormal returns are on large positive two years before the event 
date followed by negative values until the event date. For the one year before the male 
fund managers are replaced, their funds‟ performance improves until they are replaced. 
Nevertheless, the following months show a decrease in the cumulative average 
abnormal returns, which corresponds to the „adjustment period‟, followed by an 
immense improvement in the performance of the previously male managed funds, 
generating abnormal returns and lasting for a period of one and a half years.     
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The previously female managed funds show a similar trend to the male managed funds 
before the event date, however, the consequence of replacing the female fund manager 
is very different as opposed to a male. Two years before the event date, the female fund 
managers also experience positive average abnormal returns just as the male fund 
managers. Nevertheless, the female managed funds seem show a more pronounced 
performance due to the fact that they exhibit higher negative and positive returns in 
comparison to the male managed funds. This can also be seen in Figure 2.9, which 
shows the cumulative average abnormal returns for the female managed funds. It is 
interesting to note that at the lowest values form t-22 to t-16, the cumulative average 
abnormal returns are statistically significant. Moreover, a few months before the change 
of the female fund manager the cumulative average abnormal returns increase and, in 
contrast to the male managed funds, continue to do so eight months after the change of 
the female fund manager. However, our results indicate that eight months after the 
replacement of the female fund managers the funds show a decrease in the average 
abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns, which is in contrast to 
the previously male managed funds.  Although the male and female fund performance 
trend is similar prior to manager change, we see that replacement of female managers 
leads to positive mean-adjusted cumulative returns. 
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According to all estimation methods, the average abnormal returns increase after the 
change in fund manager, generating abnormal returns. However, the improvement in 
performance is higher for the previously female managed funds for all three estimation 
methods.  Looking at benchmark-adjusted, peer group-adjusted and mean-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns in Figure 2.7, Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9 respectively, one 
can conclude that i) the performance of those funds managed by women is more volatile 
during the pre and post event period ii) the returns of both male and female managed 
funds are following a decreasing trend pre-event, and iii) after the event that the 
performance of funds actually improves after a period of time, up to approximately 
t+ 12 months (depending on the method used to measure abnormal returns).   
   
In terms of information ratios, the information ratio for previously male managed funds 
is lower in the post-event (-0.0889) compared to the pre-event (-0.0594) period, as 
shown in Panel A of Table 1 in Appendix 2 (Panel B leads to the same conclusion). On 
the other hand, previously female managed funds‟ average abnormal return, tracking 
error and information ratio all slightly improve in the post-event period, signalling 
better fund performance after the female fund manager has left. These information 
ratios are based on the benchmarks set and determined by funds‟ objectives and the 
findings are consistent with the ones we obtain using the benchmark adjusted method. 
 
Therefore, our results indicate that the performance of the male and female fund 
managers is unsatisfactory leading to their replacement. This is because the funds of the 
male and female fund managers show a substantial decrease in returns in comparison 
the corresponding benchmarks three years prior to the change. In both cases, the returns 
increase after the change in fund manager, generating abnormal returns, with a longer 
and significantly higher period of improvement for the previously female managed 
funds.   
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4.2.2 Performance and manager change: UK Managed Funds vs. International 
Managed Funds 
 
From the 258 funds in our entire sample, 107 are UK funds while the remaining are 
international funds. It is interesting to note that only nine of the UK managed funds are 
managed by female managers and the rest are male managed. In addition, the majority 
are classed as equity funds. On the other hand, the remaining female managed funds are 
international funds. Furthermore, the international funds in our data sample belong to 
both developed markets and emerging markets and are a combination of equity funds 
and bond funds.  
 
According to the benchmark-adjusted method, the average abnormal returns for the UK 
funds are on the whole negative before the event date and only during months t-33, t-23, 
t-18, t-12 and t-9 are they statistically significant (Table A4.3 in Appendix 4). However, 
the average abnormal returns for the UK funds become positive for some of the months 
after the event date. As a result, the sum of the UK funds during the pre-event period is 
lower than the post-event period with values of -0.0874 and -0.0358 respectively 
(Appendix 2). Furthermore, as seen in Figure A3.4 in Appendix 3, the average abnormal 
returns for the international funds before the event date follow a similar trend as for the 
UK funds, generating a sum of -0.0305 and -0.0436 before and after the event date 
respectively (Appendix 2).  However, after the event date the average abnormal returns 
remain on majority negative. Indeed, this trend is more evident for both the UK funds 
and the international funds when cumulative average abnormal returns are computed. 
From the results in Table A4.4 in Appendix 4 it can be seen that the cumulative average 
abnormal returns are statistically significant fourteen and eight months before the event 
date for the UK and international categories respectively. Figure 2.10 illustrates the 
cumulative average abnormal returns for the UK and international funds of the entire 
estimation period and it can be concluded that the UK funds show a worse performance 
than the international funds. Before the event date both groups of funds exhibit negative 
cumulative average abnormal returns but the magnitude is higher for the UK funds. 
Subsequently, the international funds demonstrate higher values of cumulative average 
abnormal returns at periods after the event date. Our results also indicate that the 
performance of both groups of funds improves one year after the fund manager is 
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replaced. In addition, the performance of the UK funds advances substantially in the 
second year of the post-event period, followed by a worsening in the third year.   
 
 
 
The results of the UK and the inernational funds for the peer-group-adjusted method are 
very much analogous to the findings of the benchmark-adjusted method. We find that 
both categories of funds show an underpeformance during the pre-event period in 
relation to their peers. When comapring the two, the UK funds demonstrate a worse 
performance which can be clearly seen Figure 2.11. Furthermore, the UK funds entail a 
more volatile trend in terms of the average abnormal returns throught the entire pre-
event and post-event period (Appendix11: Figures A11.3 and A11.4). On the other 
hand, the international funds demonstrate a more stable performance in the post-event 
period in relation to the pre-event period. Nevertheless, the UK and the international 
funds show a steady upturn in performance according to their average and cumulative 
abnormal returns (Tables A12.3 and A12.4 in Appendix 12) after the fund manager is 
replaced.   
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According to the mean-adjusted method, both funds exhibit postive average abnormal 
returns at the start of the pre-event period (Figures A7.3 and A7.4 in Appendix 7 and 
Tables A8.3 and A8.4 in Appendix 8). Furthermore, from period t-8 to t-2, the 
international funds generate postitive abnormal returns, followed by a short-term 
decline in returns one month after the change in fund manager. However, they start to 
increase and continue for a period of one year post-event before they start to deteriorate 
until the end of our estimation. On the other hand the UK managed funds show a better 
performance in the pre-event period in comparison to the international funds. Similarly 
to the international managed funds, we see a sharp decrease in returns one month after 
the manager change for the UK managed funds. This trend becomes more evident when 
the cumulative average abnormal returns are computed for both classes of funds, which 
is depicted in Figure 2.12. At periods t-36 to t-19 the cumulative average abnormal 
returns are positive for the UK funds. However, both classes of funds experience a 
decrease in cumulative average abnormal returns, where international funds depicted a 
somewhat sharper decline. In addition, the cumulative returns for the international 
managed funds are statistically significant at their lowest values (from t-23 to t-14). 
Indeed, our results show that the UK managed funds and the international funds follow 
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similar directional trends pre-event and post-event, however, the values for the 
international managed funds are greater in magnitude.       
 
 
Therefore, from these results we can coclude that the performance in general improves 
for the UK and international funds in relation to their benchmarks, peers and mean 
performance once a new fund manager has taken over. Nevertheless, the 
outperformance does not persist as the cumulative average return for both the UK and 
international funds decreases almost two years after the new fund manager has taken 
over, which we believe is a result from the market downturn in 2007 and 2008.     
 
As is the case for the entire sample of funds, the information ratio for the UK managed 
funds and international managed funds (Table 1 in Appendix 2) is lower after the event 
date in relation to before the event date. 
 
4.2.3 Performance and manager change:  Emerging Markets vs. Developed 
Markets Funds 
 
The emerging market funds in our sample focus on the Asian, Pacific and Latin 
American markets. Although the majority of the funds in our data sample are developed 
markets funds, we identify 17 emerging markets funds.  Nevertheless, the differences in 
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the performance of the two markets show results that are worth demonstrating.  
Analysing the benchmark adjusted method, average abnormal returns for the emerging 
market funds and the developed market funds (Table A4.5 in Appendix 4) are positive 
at the start of our estimation analysis, three years prior to the event date, and then 
decrease to negative values. However, two years before the event date the performance 
of the two groups of funds move into opposite directions. The average abnormal returns 
for the emerging markets funds rise to positive values two years before the event date 
and continue to exhibit on majority positive values until the event date, with a few 
exceptional negative values. However, the sum of the average abnormal returns for the 
emerging market funds before the event date (0.0032) is lower than after the event date 
(0.0176), as shown in Appendix 2. Nonetheless, from the results of the cumulative 
average abnormal returns we can see that the change in fund manager had initiated 
deterioration in the performance of the emerging market funds. This can also be seen in 
Figure 2.13, which shows the cumulative average abnormal returns for the emerging 
markets funds and the developed markets funds. The cumulative average abnormal 
returns for the emerging markets funds exhibit positive values during the pre-event 
period, with the highest performance in months t-17 to t-14. However, six months prior 
to the change in fund manager the performance starts to deteriorate leading to the event 
date. After the fund manager change, the emerging market funds continue to 
outperform, albeit not to the same extent as before the event date, showing greater 
improvement in performance and an upward trend from t+ 8 onwards. Our results also 
indicate a short deterioration in performance during t+ 12, followed by an increase in 
performance until the end of our estimation. Developed markets funds on the other hand 
continue to underperform their benchmarks before and after manager change, but they 
do show some improvement in performance. Specifically, Panel A and Panel B of Table 
1 (Appendix 2) show that both average abnormal return and the sum of average 
abnormal return for developed markets slightly improve in the post event period, while 
the corresponding values more substantially improve for emerging market funds.  The 
cumulative average abnormal returns for the developed market funds continue to remain 
negative form t-31 to the event date and are statistically significant form periods t-14 to 
t+ 36. Indeed, the performance of the developed market funds improves only for one 
year after the change in manager before it commences to deteriorate.  
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From our results and Figure 2.13, it is evident that the performance of the two classes of 
funds is reverse eighteen months before the event date. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that emerging markets funds show positive performance before the change in manager. 
This is also in line with practical cases due to the fact that emerging market funds are 
more volatile and more risky than the developed funds and the managers that are in 
charge of them take greater risk exposures. Furthermore, developed market funds offer 
more liquidity as a comparison to the emerging market funds. As a result, the reward of 
investing in emerging market funds is much higher at favourable times. From this, we 
can deduce that another institution due to their reputable performance may have hired 
the fund managers. The new fund managers that had taken over the emerging market 
funds may have adopted a more cautious outlook, bearing less risk and thus lower 
returns as shown in our results. Developed markets funds on the other hand continue to 
underperform their benchmarks before and after manager change. This leads us to 
conclude that the developed market funds exhibit persistence in performance before and 
after manager change. 
 
Out of all different categories of funds we analyse, the results of the emerging market 
funds for the peer group-adjusted method show the most noticable difference to the 
results of the benchmark-adjusted method, while developed market funds show similar 
performance pattern based on both benchmark adjusted and peer adjusted methods, as 
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seen in Figure 2.14. The results of the peer group-adjusted average abnormal returns 
(Appendix 11: Figures A11.5 and A11.6 and Appendix 12: Tables A12.5 and A12.6) 
show that the emerging market funds exhibit more positive values and a more volatile 
movement throughout the entire estimation period as a comparison to the developed 
market funds. In addition, the average abnormal returns in the post-event period depict 
an increasing trend for the emerging market funds in relation to the pre-event period. 
Therefore, according to the peer group-adjusted method, a change in fund manager had 
lead to an increase in performance for the emerging market funds, which is also shown 
in Figure 2.14.  
 
 
The developed market funds also confirm an improvement in performance once a new 
fund manager takes over. Although the average abnormal returns exibit negative values, 
they display an upward trend (Appendix 11: Figure A11.6). However, our results in 
Figure 2.14 indicate that the magnitude of the underperfomance during the pre-event 
period is greater for the developed market funds. There is an obvious downward trend in 
peer-adjusted performance for both group of funds particularly in the pre-event period. 
One should note that, although the trend continues to be negative after the event date, 
there is a slight improvement in performance for both emerging and developed markets 
funds in that they both generate less negative peer adjusted cumulative average 
abnormal returns after the management change. This is particularly pronounced among 
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emerging market funds, where we can identify an increasing cumulative abnormal 
returns pattern in the months immediately following manager change and towards the 
end of our sample period as well. 
 
When the mean-adjusted performance is taken into account, as in Figure 2.15, it can be 
seen that i) both types of funds have decreasing or negative returns trend prior to 
manager change, ii) both types of funds improve performance and start generating 
positive cumulative mean-adjusted returns after the manager change and iii) the 
cumulative mean-adjusted abnormal returns revert to a decreasing pattern around a year 
after the manager change in emerging market funds and after about 18 months in 
developed market funds. Figure 2.15 indicates that although emerging market funds 
outperform their benchmarks, they do not manage to persistently outperform their mean, 
although they do exhibit periods of outperformance around ten months before and after 
management change for a period of few months. In addition, it can clearly be seen that 
mean adjusted performance of emerging market funds is decreasing just before the 
manager change and increasing soon after, indicating a positive effect that a change has 
had on the performance. However, a year after a new fund manager has taken over the 
performance deteriorates. Developed market funds on the other hand, do not outperform 
their mean or their benchmarks before or after the management change. Some 
improvement in mean-adjusted performance of developed funds occurs in months t+ 5 
to t+ 12, which enables to generate cumulative outperformance up to t+ 30, before 
continuing to decrease. In additon, the emerging market funds depict a signifiicant 
decrease in average abnormal returns during the three months after the event date 
followed by a steady increase in abnormal returns above the mean return (Appendix 7: 
Figure 5). When a new fund manager takes control of a fund, the first few months are 
perceived as an adjustment period which depicts the decline in returns. This aslo the 
case for the developed market funds, where the average abnormal returns show a 
superior performance above the mean returns from t+ 5 to t+ 17 (Appendix 7: Figure 6) . 
Overall, this is indicating a positive effect that a change has had on the mean-adjusted 
performance.  
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The information ratio analysis for the full sample period suggests somewhat different 
conclusions. Particularly, after the event, the information ratio in Panel A of Table 1 
(Appendix 2) for emerging markets funds worsens from -0.0052 to -0.0153. We believe 
that this is heavily influenced by extreme negative returns of many emerging market 
funds around time period t+ 12 and that is not a true reflection of performance of these 
funds in the post event period. Therefore, analysing information ratios in the post event 
period up to t+ 12 only, shown in Panel B of Table 1, we find that the information ratio 
for emerging market funds takes a positive value of 0.0205. However, for developed 
market funds, the information ratio worsens and remains negative regardless of whether 
we measure performance over 12 months or 36 months post event. This is leading us to 
conclude once again that there is a short-lived improvement in performance after the 
change of a fund manager for emerging market funds according to this indicator, but the 
same cannot be stated for developed market funds. 
 
4.2.4 Performance and manager change: Equity Funds vs. Bond Funds 
 
The majority of the funds in our data sample are equity funds, with female fund 
managers being proportionate in both classes of funds according to each class‟s total 
sample. According to the benchmark-adjusted method, the equity funds have positive 
average abnormal returns three years prior to the event date whilst the bond funds 
exhibit underperfomance in relation to their benchmarks from the start of the pre-event 
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period (Appendix 4: Tables A4.7 and A4.8). Analyzing the charts of the average 
abnormal retuns for both categories (Appendix 3: Figures A3.7 and A3.8), it is evident 
that the bond funds exhibit a more volatile trend throughout the entire period. The sum 
of the average abnormal returns for both the equity and bond funds is lower in the pre-
event period, -0.0503 and -0.0666 respectively, than for the post-event period, -0.0375 
and -0.0503 respectively (Appendix 2). However, the trend for the bond funds is more 
prominent as can be seen in Figure 2.16, which portrays the cumulative average 
abnormal returns for the equity and bond funds. Up to two years before the change in 
manager, the equity funds exhibit postive cumulative average abnormal returns whereas 
the bond funds are more volatile, showing negative cumulative average abnormal 
returns from  the start of the three year pre-event period. Furthermore, our results shown 
in Appendix 4 verify that the cumulative average abnormal returns for the bond funds 
are statistically significant twenty-seven months prior to the event date. On the other 
hand, the equity funds show a more steady decline in cumulative average abnormal 
retruns. After the change in manager, both classes of funds see a rize in average 
abnormal returns and a steady climb in the cumulative average abnormal returns which 
persists for one year after the event.  However, two years after the change of fund 
manager, the cumulative average abnormal returns of both groups of funds declines and 
continues to do so up to the end of our post-event period.  
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Similar conclusions can be drawn from the peer group-adjusted method. The average 
abnormal returns for the bond funds exhibit a more volatile movement in relation to the 
equity funds. During the pre-event period the bond funds yield positive average 
abnormal returns at various times whereas the equity funds only show postive returns in 
months t-36 to t-34 (Appendix 12: Tables A12.7 and A12.8). Nevertheless, both sets of 
funds bare an underperformance in relation to their peers before the event date, which is 
clearly shown in Figure 2.17. However, our results confirm that the peformance of the 
equity funds improves when the fund manager is changed whereas the bond funds 
continue to demonstrate persistant deterioration in performance even when the new fund 
manager takes charge. Once again, after month t+ 21 the performance of the equity 
funds worsens.  
 
 
In terms of the mean-adjusted method, the results of the two categories of funds is 
distinctively different from that of the benchmark (peer group)-adjusted models.  Under 
the mean-adjusted model, both sets of funds exhibit postive average abnormal returns at 
the start of the pre-event period (Appendix 7: Figures A7.7 and A7.8). Furthermore, our 
results indicate a sharp decrease of average abnormal returns for the equity funds two 
years before the event date and a generally more volatile trend throughout the pre-event 
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period as a comparison to the bond funds. This movement is more pronounced when 
taking into account the cumulative average abnormal returns as seen in Figure 2.18. 
 
 
About twelve months before the change in fund manager, the equity funds and the bond 
funds show an increase in cumulative abnormal returns, with preceding 
underperformance of the funds in relation to their mean return. Furthermore, as a new 
fund manager takes over, the performance of the equity funds weakens for a short 
period of time, implying a possible adjustement period and a more cautious outlook by 
the new fund manager. In contrast, the bond funds show an increase in cumulative 
average abnormal returns six months before the change in fund manager, which 
continues five months after the change. Nevertheless, from months t+ 8 to t+ 12 the 
equity funds and the bond funds show abnormal returns over the mean return. However, 
the increase above their corresponding mean returns is higher for the equity funds. 
Similarly to rest of the categories of funds, wee see a decrease in the abnormal returns 
for the the equity and bond funds about eighteen months after the new fund manager has 
taken over, which in cosequence deteriorates the cumulative performance. From these 
results we can conclude that the change in fund manager has played a positive role in 
the performance of both group of funds, but with a larger extent on the equity funds. 
Nevertheless, the oupteperformance does not persist.  
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In terms of information ratios, values in Panel A of Table 1 (Appendix 2) show that the 
bond funds and equity funds exhibit a decrease in information ratios after the change in 
fund manager (the same results are found in Panel B of Table 1). As a result we can 
conclude that according to the benchmark-, peer group- and mean-adjusted methods the 
change in fund manager has had an affect on the performance of the equity funds. In 
this case, a fund manager plays a significant role in determining the performance of the 
fund. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that this argument can not be applied to 
the bond funds, although we result in a higher information ratio in the post-event period. 
Even when the fund manager is replaced, the underperformance of the bond funds in 
relation to their peers continues to decline, and we only see a short-term  improvement 
in the performance of both the bond the funds according to the benchmark- and mean-
adjusted methods.  
 
4.2.5 Performance and manager change: Growth Funds, Value Funds and Small 
Capitalization Funds 
 
We divide the equity funds into style categories, specifically growth funds, value funds 
and small capitalization funds. Out of the entire sample of funds, 76 of them are equity 
growth, 27 are small cap and five funds follow value style. Due to the fact that there are 
only five value funds, we admit that the results may not be indicative and representative 
due to a small sample bias29. Analyzing the benchmark-adjusted method, the average 
abnormal returns for the all three fund classes are positive at the start of our analysis, 
three years before the change in manager (Appendix 4: Tables A4.9, A4.10 and A4.11). 
From Appendix 2 one can see that the value funds display positive benchmark-adjusted 
average abnormal returns before and after the event date, growth funds have positive 
average benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns after the event date and small cap funds 
are underperforming the benchmark on the average before and after the manager 
change. More specifically, the sum of the average abnormal returns for the small 
capitalization and growth funds increases in the post-event period, generating a value of 
-0.0742 and -0.0041 respectively, whereas the value funds decrease to -0.0024 (Panel A 
of Table 1 in Appendix 2). This can also be seen in Figure 2.19, which demonstrates the 
                                                 
29
 The sample of the value funds could not have been increased as these were the only value funds in our 
sample of manager changes. 
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cumulative average abnormal returns for the growth funds, value funds and small 
capitalization funds.  
 
 
 
Tables A4.9, A4.10 and A4.11 (Appendix 4) also gives detail that the cumulative 
average abnormal returns during our entire estimation period are statistically significant 
for the growth funds (t-18 to t+ 36), value funds (t-33 to t+ 36) and small capitalization 
funds (t-15 to t+ 36). Value funds are the only ones that outperform throughout the 
period based on their cumulative average abnormal returns. It can be noted that all three 
group of funds show a decline in performance before the manager change, which is 
consistent to the conclusions related to other group of funds analysed. After the 
manager change there is no extreme improvement in benchmark-adjusted performance 
for any of the three groups of funds over the 36-month period. In particular, the figures 
in Panel A of Table 1 show that the value funds display positive benchmark-adjusted 
average abnormal returns before the event date, and that those fall just below zero after 
the event date as a stream of negative average abnormal returns after the manager 
change is generated. On the other hand, growth and small cap funds show improvement 
in average abnormal returns after the event, even though they are still negative in 
cumulative terms before and after the event date.  In addition, the sum of the average 
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abnormal returns for all three funds is negative after the event period for all funds, but 
small cap and growth funds exhibit improvement in those returns during the post-event 
period. However, if we take only the first 12 months after the manager change into 
account, as in Panel B of Table 1, the sum of average abnormal returns and average 
abnormal returns not only improve after the event for all three groups of funds, but are 
in fact positive for value funds and growth funds. This improvement in performance 
over the shorter period after manager change followed by deterioration in returns is 
consistent to what we have observed in other fund groups that we analyse.  
 
The results of the three equity styles of funds for the peer group-adjusted method are 
somewhat different to the results generated by the benchmark-adjusted method. 
According to the peer group-adjusted results in Appendix 12: Tables A12.9, A12.10 and 
A12.11, only the growth funds and the small capitalization funds demonstrate positive 
returns above their peer benchmarks three years prior to the event date. In addition, the 
value funds and the growth funds are more volatile during the entire estimation period 
whereas the small capitalization funds depict a considerably steady trend in the post-
event period (Appendix 11: Figures A11.9, A11.10 and A11.11). Peer group adjusted 
performance of all three styles of equity funds improves slightly in the first 12 months 
of the post-event period, with the growth funds and small capitalisation funds showing 
more improvement right after the manager change, as seen in Figure 2.20. Nevertheless, 
although cumulative returns are still negative for all three styles of equity funds, they all 
yield positive average returns above their peer benchmarks at the end of the post-event 
period. A change in fund manager had led to a more favourable outcome in the 
performance of the value, growth and small capitalization funds. The underperformance 
of the funds in relation to their peers proved to be the main force behind the change in 
fund manager. As a result to the replacement, the funds appear to demonstrate superior 
performance, adding to the belief that the fund manager plays a vital part in determining 
the performance of the funds in question.    
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The first glance of mean adjusted cumulative abnormal returns suggests more striking 
findings to benchmark-adjusted and peer-adjusted methods. Particularly, as seen in 
Figure 2.21, in the several months leading to manager change all three groups of funds 
perform below their means. After the manager change, their performance increases 
significantly above their respective means, showing a great degree of improvement for 
all three groups of funds. The cumulative abnormal returns remain above the mean until 
approximately t+ 30, showing a decreasing trend from around t+ 20 onwards for all three 
groups of funds. 
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In terms of information ratios, values in Panel B of Table 1 (Appendix 2) show that in 
the first 12 months of post change period, all three fund categories exhibit increase in 
the information ratio, with value and growth funds having positive post-event 
information ratios of 0.1134 and 0.0337 respectively. However, if we take into account 
the full 36 months post event period, the information ratio in Panel A of Table 1 of 
value funds decreases from 0.0622 in the pre event period to 0.0307 in the post event 
period, while growth funds and small cap funds‟ information ratios improve post event, 
however still remaining in the negative range taking values of -0.0272 and -0.0133 for 
growth and small cap funds respectively. The three groups of funds generate lower 
average tracking error in the post-event period. From this, one can conclude that the 
new fund manager is more vigilant with lower deviations from the benchmark‟s return.  
 
Overall, regardless of the method used to assess the performance, all three groups of 
funds show improvement in performance after the manager change, with the greatest 
degree of improvement being for small cap and growth stocks. This holds particularly in 
the first year after the manager change, at the time when the severe market downturn of 
2007 and 2008 did not yet start influencing the performance of funds. 
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Indeed, it is important to note that all of the eleven categories of funds in our study 
show a lower value in the average standard deviation for the post-event period in 
relation to the pre-event period. The pre-event managers were taking higher risks 
(higher average standard deviation in pre-event period) while striving for higher returns 
in order to keep hold of their jobs. On the other hand, we can also conclude that the new 
fund manager is more vigilant with lower deviations from the fund‟s average return. As 
is the case for the entire sample of funds, the information ratio for the male managed, 
UK managed funds, international managed funds, developed market funds, emerging 
market funds, equity funds, bond funds and equity value is lower after the event date in 
relation to before the event date. However, only the female managed funds, equity 
growth funds and equity small capitalization funds obtain higher information ratios in 
the post-event period in comparison to the pre-event period. The three groups of funds 
generate lower average standard deviations in the post-event period, which increases 
each corresponding information ratio after the event date. Out of all the categories of 
funds in our study, only the equity value funds exhibit positive information ratios in the 
post-event period (0.0307). Furthermore, they are the only category of funds in our 
analysis that generate positive information ratios during the pre-event period and the 
post-event period.  
 
Furthermore, in order to provide robust results, we also compute the information ratios 
for the total sample of funds and for each category based on the peer group-adjusted 
returns. Table A10.1 in Appendix 10 shows the average tracking error, average 
abnormal return and information ratio for each category. Table A10.1 suggests that for 
the total sample of funds, the information ratio is higher for the post-event period (-
0.0750) in comparison to the pre-event period (-0.1258). Information ratio for male 
managed funds is substantially higher in the post-event (-0.0674) compared to the pre-
event (-0.1154) period. Similarly, female managed funds‟ average abnormal return, 
tracking error and information ratio all slightly improve in the post-event period. In 
terms of the UK funds and the inetrnational funds, the tracking error, average abnormal 
return and information ratio improve in the post-event period as a comparison to the 
pre-event period. Therefore, from these results we can coclude that the performance in 
general improves for the UK and international funds in relation to their peers once a 
new fund manager has taken over. Further, the information ratio for emerging markets 
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funds and developed market funds increases from -0.0873 to -0.0507 and from -0.1286 
to -0.0767 respectively after the event leading us to conclude once again that 
improvement in performance is more prominent after the change of a fund manager in 
an emerging market fund. In the case of the equity funds, the tracking error, average 
abnormal return and information ratio all improve in the post-event period in relation to 
the pre-event period The same scenario is consistent with the bond funds. Value, growth 
and small cap funds exhibit increase in the information ratio after the event from -
0.1289 to -0.1061 for value funds, -0.1287 to -0.0276 for growth funds and -0.1910 to -
0.1099 for small cap funds. We also see that the tracking errors and average abnormal 
returns improve in the post-event period for the growth funds and the small cap funds, 
with a slight increase in tracking error for the value funds.  
 
4.3 Persistence of Performance and Manager Change: Best Ten Percent vs. Worst 
Ten Percent Performing Funds 
 
In this section, we attempt to answer whether the performance of the funds in our total 
sample persists. In particular, we examine whether the top performing funds, or the 
„winners‟, continue to outperform, and whether the bottom performing funds, or the 
„losers‟, persist on underperforming after the change in fund manager. In order to rank 
the performance of the funds, we employ the information ratio. More specifically, we 
rank the individual funds according to their corresponding information ratios before the 
event date and identify the top ten percent. Subsequently, this also allows us to identify 
the bottom ten percent funds according to the pre-event information ratio. In this way, 
we are able to examine performance of those two groups of funds, winner and loser 
funds, after the event to assess if there is any persistence in performance among the top 
or the bottom performers.  
 
In this section, we first report benchmark adjusted cumulative average abnormal returns 
for top 10% and bottom 10% of the funds, followed by results of peer group-adjusted 
cumulative average abnormal returns. According to our benchmark-adjusted results in 
Appendix 5 (Chart A5.1), the average abnormal returns for the top 10% of the funds in 
our entire data sample on majority generate positive alphas above the corresponding 
benchmarks. During months t-24 and t-8 the funds depict a short-term decrease but only 
for a duration of one month for both periods. However, two months before the event 
141 
date, the top 10% funds of the pre-event period generate lower returns resulting in a 
decline in average abnormal returns. The deterioration of returns continues into the 
post-event period, resulting in lower returns in comparison to the corresponding 
benchmark and the pre-event period. We can also observe this movement when taking 
into account the cumulative average abnormal returns. This benchmark adjusted 
cumulative performance for top 10% of funds is presented in Figure 2.22.   
 
 
 
The rise in the cumulative average abnormal returns can be observed almost from the 
start of our analysis, from t-36, up to the event date, t= 0.  However, after the event date 
the cumulative average abnormal returns gradually start to decline until the end of first 
year post event, t+ 12. From t+ 12 up to the end of our analysis, t+ 36, the funds once 
again exhibit an increase in the cumulative average abnormal returns, but at a lower 
rising rate.  From these results, we can conclude that the prior, or pre-event, winner 
funds do not exhibit the same performance in the post-event period due to the fact that 
their returns are relatively lower in the post-event period. In particular, once a new fund 
manager takes over the outperformance of the winner funds ceases to persist for a 
period of one year before it improves but at a relatively lower rate. On observing 
individual funds within the 10% of top performers, we find that some of the funds after 
the change in fund manager continue to outperform, but only for a very short period (a 
month or two to three months) until performance starts to decline.  This indicates that 
the manager‟s portfolio decisions continue to have a positive impact after they have left, 
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but eventually this positive influence wanes and is generally not replicated by the new 
management. The new management tends to pick up the increase in performance 
usually after a year after they start managing the fund. This leads us to conclude that the 
performance of the past winners does not persist immidiatelly after the manager change 
but tends to improve after a period of time.   
 
When taking into account the bottom 10% of the funds according to their information 
ratio, the trend and consequences of change in fund manager is different as a 
comparison to the top 10%. In particular, as these are the pre-event „loser‟ funds, their 
returns naturally decline prior to the event date. On average, the abnormal returns for 
the bottom 10% of funds are negative during the pre-event period, though showing a 
gradual increase from month t-5 onwards (Appendix 5: Figure A5.2). However, the the 
previously bottom 10% of the funds still generate negative values over their 
corresponding benchamrks in the post-event period. This can aslo be seen Figure 2.23, 
which depicts the cumulative average abnormal returns for the bottom 10% of the funds 
based on the pre-event period. 
 
 
In particular, as these are the pre-event „loser‟ funds, their returns naturally decline prior 
to the event date. From the start of our analysis, the funds experience a significant 
decline in cumulative average abnormal returns leading to the event date. As a the fund 
a manager is replaced, cumulative average abnormal returns of the previously bottom 
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10% funds persist to decline but at a lower diminishing rate. Therefore, the performance 
of the loser funds does continue to persist in the post-event period as in the pre-event 
period, even if a new fund manager has taken over the funds. Consequently, the poor 
performance of the fund managers of the bottom ten percent performing funds may have 
led to their replacement. In other words, investors in these funds should not pin their 
hopes on a rapid turnaround in performance when their poorly performing manager 
leaves.      
 
In order to employ robust results for the degree of persistence in the performance of the 
funds, we examine the past performance of the post-event winner and loser funds. 
Specifically, we rank the top 10% and bottom 10% of funds during the post-event 
period according to the funds‟ corresponding information ratios.  
 
Appendix 5 (Figure A5.3) depicts the results of the average abnormal returns for the top 
10% of funds in the post-event period. Naturally, the funds exhibit higher returns in 
relation to their benchmarks in post-event period, resulting in positive average abnormal 
returns during the majority of that period. However, when taking into account the pre-
event period, the average abnormal returns demonstrate a volatile movement 
throughout. As shown in Figure 2.24, the cumulative average abnormal returns in the 
post-event period are substantially higher and increasing at a considerably higher rate 
than that of the pre-event period. From these results we can deduce that the funds which 
demonstrate a superior performance in the post-event period have not shown the same 
performance in the pre-event period. Therefore, the superior performance of these funds 
has not continued from the pre-event period, indicating that a change in fund manager 
has had a positive effect on their performance generating higher abnormal returns.     
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Furthermore, we aslo study the past performance of the bottom 10% of the funds in the 
post-event period in order to determine whether their performance had persisted from 
the pre-event period. According to the results of the funds‟ average abnormal returns, 
only during months t-36, t-32, t-30 and t-22, had the the funds generated positive 
average abnormal returns, (Appendix 5: Figure A5.4). However, on average the funds 
displayed lower returns during the pre-event period in comparison to their benchmarks, 
resulting in negative average abnormal returns. This can aslo be seen in Figure 2.25, 
which shows the cumulative average abnormal returns for the bottom 10% of the funds 
in the post-event period. The cumulative average abnormal returns decline at t-30 and 
continue to do so up to the end of our analysis, t+ 36. 
 
145 
 
 
Even after a change in fund manager the performance of the funds has not improved. As 
a result, we can conclude that the loser funds in the post-event period have persisted in 
their performance from the pre-event period, which supports our finding on 
performance persistence among underperforming funds. On the other hand, our results 
indicate that the past outperforming funds do not continue to outperform immediately 
when a new manager takes over. After the first year of the new manager taking over the 
fund, the performance of these past winner funds tends to improve.  
 
Similar results can be drawn from the peer group-adjusted cumulative average abnormal 
returns for top 10% and bottom 10% of the funds. Figures A13.1 and A13.2 in 
Appendix 13 show the results for the average abnormal returns for top 10% and bottom 
10% funds respectively. For the top 10% of the funds, our results indicate that the funds 
outperformed their peers in the entire pre-event period, with the only exception of 
month t-23. However, three months before the event date the average abnormal returns 
begin to decline. This trend persists in the post-event period and it is evident from 
Figure A13.1 that performance of the funds in the post-event period is significantly 
poorer as a comparison to the pre-event period and the peer group benchmark. The 
performance of the top 10% funds can also be observed when taking into account the 
cumulative average abnormal returns, Figure 2.26. 
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During the pre-event period, the funds depict an apparent rise in the cumulative avarege 
abnormal returns. Once the event date takes place the performance of the funds becomes 
constant and shows a significant decline in relation to the peer group benchmarks. 
Therefore, we see that these funds show a superior performance during the pre-event 
period and as soon as the fund manager is replaced their performance deteriorates. This 
leads us to conclude that the performance of the past winners does not persist and the 
impact of the fund manager being replaced played a significant role in the deterioration.  
 
Indeed, a possible reason behind the replacement of the fund managers whose funds 
were ranked in the top 10%  is that they had been poached by some other institution. A 
new fund manager that had taken control of these funds may have taken a more cautious 
position, which is evident from the results in the post-event period. These results concur 
with the results of the benchmark-adjusted method. 
 
When taking into account the bottom 10%  performing funds according to their 
Information Ratio, we see an almost reverse scenario. During the pre-event period, the 
average abnormal returns for these funds was negative throughout the three years 
(Appendix 13: Figure A13.2). Therefore, these funds were underperforming in relation 
to their peers. In this case, three months before the event date, the funds‟ performance 
begins to improve rising to postive returns in t+ 7. The improvement in the performance 
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of the bottom ten percent funds during the pre-event period is apparent in the post-event 
period. However, the past underperforming funds still continue to underperform their 
peers in the post-event period.This can aslo be seen in Figure 2.27, which shows the 
cumulative average abnormal returns.  
 
 
Three years prior to the event date the funds demonstrate a falling trend in the 
cumulative average abnormal returns up to the event date. Following the event date, the 
performance of the funds slightly improves as the returns of the funds in relation to their 
peers become more stabilized. Nonetheless, the funds still continue to generate negative 
returns in respect to their peer benchmarks even after the change in fund manager. 
Consequently, the poor performance of the fund managers of the bottom 10% 
performing funds may have led to their replacement. The new fund managers that had 
taken over may need more time to show a better performance than their preceding 
managers, which provides a possible reasoning to the negative average abnormal returns 
in the post-event period.      
 
Furthermore, we also ranked funds according to their Information Ratios in the post-
event period30. This will provide us with an indication of whether the performance of 
the funds in the post-event period had persisted from the pre-event period. More 
                                                 
30
 The same analysis was carried out as for the benchmark-adjusted method.  
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specifically we want to see whether the post-event winner funds (loser funds) were pre-
event winner funds (loser funds). According to the results in Appendix 13 (Figure 
A13.3), the top 10% performing funds in the post-event period generated returns above 
their peers in the period after the event date. However, the pre-event period for these 
funds depicts a very different scenario. Our results indicate that these funds were 
underperfoming during the pre-event period, which had consequently led to a 
replacement in fund manager. As soon as a new fund manager takes over, the average 
abnormal returns for these funds significantly increases. This trend is even more 
pronounced when taking into account the cumulative average abnormal returns shown 
in Figure 2.28. Our results indicate that the outperformnace of the funds in the post-
event period did not take plae in the pre-event period. This leads us to conlude that the 
fund managers that were underperforming in the pre-event period had been replaced due 
to their poor performance. In fact, the new fund managers that had taken over 
demonstate a significant imrovement in the fund performance. Through these results we 
can conclude that a change in fund manager entailed favourable outcomes.     
 
 
 
In terms of the bottom 10% of funds during the post-event period, our results show that 
their performance had persisted from the pre-event period. Only during months t-36,  t-
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32, t-29, t-24 and t-16 had the funds generated returns above their peer benchmarks. For 
the remaining months the funds underperformed in relation to their peers (Appendix 13: 
Figure A13.4). This trend can aslo be seen in Figure 2.29, which takes into account the 
cumulative average abnormal returns for the bottom 10% peforming funds in the post-
event period. The cumulative average abnormal returns decline at t-24 and continue to 
do so up to the end of our analysis, t+ 36, implying a persistence in the 
underperformance of the funds.  In this case, the change of fund manager had no impact 
on the performance of funds as they continued to deteriorate in the post-event period.     
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
The study examines how the performance of UK funds is affected when a fund manager 
leaves by examining the performance of those funds three years before and after the 
manager replacement. This provides us with an answer to whether it is in fact the 
manager that has an impact on the performance of the funds. In particular, we assess 
whether there is an impact of a manager change and whether this impact varies 
depending upon whether the fund manager is male or female; whether the fund is a 
developed or emerging markets fund; UK or international fund, bond or equity fund and 
depending upon the fund‟s style, that is, growth, value or small cap. In addition, we 
examine if there is persistence in performance across top and bottom performing funds 
after the manager change. 
 
We construct a unique database for UK manager changes in the period April 2002 to 
December 2005 and use an event study methodology to assess performance before and 
after management change. Specifically, we measure the performance using 1) 
benchmark adjusted returns, both in terms of i) benchmarks set by the objectives of a 
fund and ii) peer-group benchmarks; 2) mean-adjusted returns and 3) information ratios. 
Performance is measured three years prior to the change in fund manager and three 
years after that change.  
 
Our findings suggest that the performance of the funds in our sample broadly improves 
up to a year following a change in manager regardless of which method for assessing 
performance is used.  Two years prior to the manager change the average abnormal 
returns are at their lowest and are generally more volatile during the pre-event period 
compared with the post-event period. However, in the second and the third year 
following managers‟ change, the performance starts descending largely, we believe, due 
to exceptionally bad conditions in financial markets during 2007 and 2008, which are 
the last two years of our data sample. We document evidence that suggests that the 
performance of those funds managed by women is more volatile during the pre-event 
period, and that the performance of the fund actually improves more on average after 
the female fund manager has been replaced rather than male. We find greater 
persistence in out-performance across emerging market funds, particularly up to 12 
months after the change of manager.  Further, small cap and growth equity funds 
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improve their performance following the manager change. We also find that for the 
majority of the categories of funds the improvement of the performance in the post 
event period lasts for duration of about eighteen months after a new fund manager takes 
over.  In addition, focussing on the prior performance of the funds in our sample, our 
results indicate that the ten percent of top performing funds before the change in fund 
manager continue to outperform in the longer run, but there is evidence that their 
performance slightly declines in the year following the change. This implies that there is 
no immediate persistence in performance in funds classified as „winners‟ before the 
event date. We find however that the bottom ten percent of performers prior to the 
manager change makes little difference to their subsequent performance, so that 
underperformance persists at least for the following three years. This paper presents the 
first evidence of such phenomena in the UK‟s fund management industry.  
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APPENDIX 1  
 
Table A1.1 Benchmark-Adjusted AARs and CAARs (* indicates 5% significance 
level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.004314302 1.62 0.004314302 0.228 
t-35 0.00053391 0.20 0.004848212 0.256 
t-34 -0.001483869 -0.56 0.003364344 0.178 
t-33 -0.006397176 -2.40* -0.003032833 -0.160 
t-32 0.003498183 1.31 0.000465351 0.025 
t-31 -0.000740737 -0.28 -0.000275387 -0.015 
t-30 -0.001028939 -0.39 -0.001304326 -0.069 
t-29 -0.000729925 -0.27 -0.002034251 -0.108 
t-28 0.000804434 0.30 -0.001229817 -0.065 
t-27 -0.003782734 -1.42 -0.005012551 -0.265 
t-26 0.001612215 0.61 -0.003400336 -0.180 
t-25 0.000307357 0.12 -0.003092979 -0.164 
t-24 -0.003227322 -1.21 -0.006320301 -0.334 
t-23 -0.00940271 -3.53* -0.015723012 -0.832 
t-22 0.000872481 0.33 -0.014850531 -0.785 
t-21 -0.001113567 -0.42 -0.015964098 -0.844 
t-20 -0.006184065 -2.32* -0.022148163 -1.171 
t-19 -0.001508671 -0.57 -0.023656834 -1.251 
t-18 -0.000617128 -0.23 -0.024273962 -1.284 
t-17 -0.001059697 -0.40 -0.025333659 -1.340 
t-16 -0.000662308 -0.25 -0.025995967 -1.375 
t-15 0.000226 0.08 -0.025769966 -1.363 
t-14 -0.004162014 -1.56 -0.02993198 -1.583 
t-13 0.00058912 0.22 -0.02934286 -1.552 
t-12 -0.002976535 -1.12 -0.032319395 -1.709* 
t-11 -0.000976182 -0.37 -0.033295577 -1.761* 
t-10 -0.001596914 -0.60 -0.034892491 -1.846* 
t-9 -0.003816025 -1.43 -0.038708516 -2.047* 
t-8 -0.004110115 -1.54 -0.042818631 -2.265* 
t-7 -0.002069901 -0.78 -0.044888532 -2.374* 
t-6 -0.00184448 -0.69 -0.046733012 -2.472* 
t-5 -0.000287807 -0.11 -0.047020819 -2.487* 
t-4 -0.002677181 -1.01 -0.049698 -2.629* 
t-3 0.000226273 0.09 -0.049471727 -2.617* 
t-2 -0.003541863 -1.33 -0.05301359 -2.804* 
t-1 -0.000133914 -0.05 -0.053147504 -2.811* 
t=0 0.000331215 0.12 
-0.052816 -2.793* 
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t+1 -0.002278706 -0.86 
-0.055095 -2.914* 
t+2 0.000361195 0.14 
-0.054734 -2.895* 
t+3 -0.001062844 -0.40 
-0.055797 -2.951* 
t+4 0.00032502 0.12 
-0.055472 -2.934* 
t+5 -0.002018345 -0.76 
-0.05749 -3.040* 
t+6 0.0006675 0.25 
-0.056822 -3.005* 
t+7 -0.00087749 -0.33 
-0.0577 -3.051* 
t+8 0.00066233 0.25 
-0.057038 -3.016* 
t+9 -0.001452885 -0.55 
-0.058491 -3.093* 
t+10 -0.002025754 -0.76 
-0.060516 -3.200* 
t+11 0.000237361 0.09 
-0.060279 -3.188* 
t+12 0.002889389 1.09 
-0.05739 -3.035* 
t+13 -0.001644719 -0.640 -0.059186011 -3.152* 
t+14 0.000749212 0.292 -0.0584368 -3.112* 
t+15 -0.000228327 -0.089 -0.058665127 -3.124* 
t+16 -0.000643316 -0.250 -0.059308443 -3.158* 
t+17 -0.000801394 -0.312 -0.060109837 -3.201* 
t+18 -0.001513557 -0.589 -0.061623394 -3.281* 
t+19 -0.001348605 -0.525 -0.062971999 -3.353* 
t+20 0.000249672 0.097 -0.062722327 -3.340* 
t+21 -0.003013023 -1.173 -0.06573535 -3.500* 
t+22 -0.002243593 -0.873 -0.067978944 -3.620* 
t+23 -0.001782029 -0.694 -0.069760973 -3.715* 
t+24 0.000889805 0.346 -0.068871168 -3.667* 
t+25 -0.00217972 -0.849 -0.071050887 -3.783* 
t+26 -0.001771217 -0.690 -0.072822104 -3.878* 
t+27 -0.00176026 -0.685 -0.074582364 -3.971* 
t+28 -0.001955399 -0.761 -0.076537763 -4.076* 
t+29 0.000569326 0.222 -0.075968438 -4.045* 
t+30 -0.006310127 -2.457* -0.082278565 -4.381* 
t+31 -0.001172913 -0.457 -0.083451477 -4.444* 
t+32 -0.00293104 -1.141 -0.086382518 -4.600* 
t+33 -0.00272091 -1.059 -0.089103427 -4.745* 
t+34 -0.002459054 -0.957 -0.091562481 -4.876* 
t+35 -0.00106135 -0.413 -0.092623831 -4.932* 
t+36 -0.001577722 -0.614 -0.094201552 -5.016* 
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Table A2.1 Information Ratio and Summary of Benchmark-Adjusted AARs and 
CAARs pre- and post-event 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PANEL A: Information Ratio, Benchmark-Adjusted AARs and CAARs  36 
months pre- and post-event 
  
Average 
Tracking Error 
 
Information Ratio 
 
 
 
Average 
Abnormal 
Returns 
Sum Average 
Abnormal Return 
  
Pre-
event 
Post-
event 
Pre-
event 
Post-
event 
Pre-
event 
Post-
event 
Pre-
event 
Post-
event 
Total Sample 0.0248 0.0174 -0.0670 -0.0920 
 
-0.0014 
 
 
-0.0012 
 
-0.0538 -0.0403 
Male 0.0241 0.0175 -0.0594 -0.0889 
 
-0.0014 
 
 
-0.0012 
 
-0.0487 -0.0450 
Female 0.0279 0.0172 -0.1269 -0.1086 
 
-0.0025 
 
 
-0.0001 
 
-0.0805 -0.0159 
UK Funds 0.0237 0.0165 -0.0928 -0.0845 
 
-0.0025 
 
 
-0.0008 
 
-0.0874 -0.0358 
International 
Funds 0.0255 0.0182 
-
0.04911 
-
0.09737 
 
-0.0009 
 
 
-0.0012 
 
-0.0306 -0.0437 
Emerging 
Markets 0.0271 0.0224 -0.0052 -0.0153 
 
0.000 
 
 
0.0003 
 
0.0032 0.0177 
Developed 
Markets 0.0246 0.0171 -0.0715 -0.0975 
 
-0.0017 
 
 
-0.0012 
 
-0.0588 -0.0451 
Equity 0.0263 0.0186 -0.0466 -0.0626 -0.0504 -0.0375 -0.6413 -2.3245 
Bonds 0.0189 0.0131 -0.1472 -0.2074 
 
-0.0017 
 
 
-0.0012 
 
-0.0667 -0.0503 
Value 0.0313 0.0190 0.0622 0.0307 0.0033 -0.0005 0.1782 -0.0024 
Growth 0.0273 0.0182 -0.0602 -0.0272 -0.0023 -0.0003 -0.0842 -0.0041 
Small 0.0355 0.0263 -0.1239 -0.0133 -0.0067 -0.0024 -0.2105 -0.0743 
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PANEL B: Information Ratio, Benchmark-Adjusted AARs and CAARs  36 
months pre- and 12 months post-event 
  
Average 
Tracking Error 
 
Information Ratio 
 
 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
Sum Average 
Abnormal Return 
  
Pre-
event 
Post-
event 
Pre-
event 
Post-
event Pre-event 
Post-
event 
Pre-
event 
Post-
event 
Total 
Sample 0.0248 0.0174 -0.0670 -.0853 
 
-0.0014 
 
-0.0004 -0.0538 -0.0042 
Male 0.0241 0.0175 -0.0594 -0.0789 
 
-0.0014 
 
-0.0004 -0.0487 -0.0054 
Female 0.0279 0.0172 -0.1269 -0.1239 
 
-0.0025 
 
-0.0001 -0.0805 0.0013 
UK Funds 0.0237 0.0170 -0.0925 -0.0984 -0.0025 -0.0001 -0.0872 -0.0021 
International 
Funds 0.0256 0.0178 -0.0467 -0.0800 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0295 -0.0058 
Emerging 
Markets 0.0271 0.0177 -0.0052 0.0205 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0005 0.0032 0.114 
Developed 
Markets 0.0246 0.0175 -0.0715 -0.0927 
 
-0.0017 
 
-0.0004 -0.0588 -0.0054 
Equity 0.0264 0.0184 -0.0454 -0.0493 -0.0016 -0.0003 -0.0502 -0.0038 
Bonds 0.0189 0.0141 -0.1442 -0.2272 -0.0016 -0.0006 -0.0641 -0.0060 
Value 0.0313 0.0158 0.0622 0.1134 0.0033 0.0009 0.1782 0.0254 
Growth 0.0273 0.0189 -0.0602 0.0227 -0.0023 0.0013 -0.0842 0.0192 
Small 0.0355 0.0239 -0.1239 -0.0789 -0.0067 -0.0013 -0.2105 -0.0181 
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APPENDIX 3: Benchmark-Adjusted Average Abnormal Returns for all 
Categories 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
Table A4.1 Benchmark-Adjusted Male Managed Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0040464 1.51 0.0040464 0.22 
t-35 0.0006333 0.24 0.0046798 0.26 
t-34 
-0.0029521 -1.10 0.0017277 0.10 
t-33 
-0.0049635 -1.85* -0.0032358 -0.18 
t-32 0.0038658 1.44 0.00063 0.03 
t-31 0.0018654 0.70 0.0024954 0.14 
t-30 
-0.0016359 -0.61 0.0008595 0.05 
t-29 
-0.0015812 -0.59 -0.0007217 -0.04 
t-28 0.0029692 1.11 0.0022475 0.12 
t-27 
-0.003454 -1.29 -0.0012065 -0.07 
t-26 0.0012833 0.48 7.687E-05 0.00 
t-25 0.0006515 0.24 0.0007283 0.04 
t-24 
-0.0028418 -1.06 -0.0021135 -0.12 
t-23 
-0.0094467 -3.53* -0.0115601 -0.64 
t-22 
-0.0019513 -0.73 -0.0135114 -0.74 
t-21 
-0.0012973 -0.48 -0.0148087 -0.82 
t-20 
-0.0039479 -1.48 -0.0187565 -1.03 
t-19 
-0.0010748 -0.40 -0.0198314 -1.09 
t-18 
-0.0020944 -0.78 -0.0219258 -1.21 
t-17 
-0.0023802 -0.89 -0.024306 -1.34 
t-16 
-0.0016765 -0.63 -0.0259825 -1.43 
t-15 0.0001535 0.06 -0.025829 -1.42 
t-14 
-0.0034352 -1.28 -0.0292643 -1.61 
t-13 0.0016163 0.60 -0.027648 -1.52 
t-12 
-0.0037292 -1.39 -0.0313772 -1.73* 
t-11 
-0.0012534 -0.47 -0.0326306 -1.80* 
t-10 
-0.0007659 -0.29 -0.0333965 -1.84* 
t-9 
-0.004335 -1.62 -0.0377314 -2.08* 
t-8 
-0.0023445 -0.88 -0.0400759 -2.21* 
t-7 
-0.001898 -0.71 -0.0419739 -2.31* 
t-6 
-0.0007217 -0.27 -0.0426957 -2.35* 
t-5 0.0011568 0.43 -0.0415388 -2.29* 
t-4 
-0.0028245 -1.06 -0.0443634 -2.44* 
t-3 
-0.0007712 -0.29 -0.0451345 -2.48* 
t-2 
-0.0039283 -1.47 -0.0490628 -2.70* 
t-1 0.0011152 0.42 -0.0479476 -2.64* 
t=0 
-6.62E-05 -0.02 -0.0480138 -2.64* 
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t+1 
-0.0024547 -0.92 -0.0504685 -2.78* 
t+2 0.000421 0.16 -0.0500475 -2.75* 
t+3 
-0.000994 -0.37 -0.0510415 -2.81* 
t+4 0.0011689 0.44 -0.0498726 -2.74* 
t+5 
-0.0022412 -0.84 -0.0521138 -2.87* 
t+6 0.0002748 0.10 -0.0518389 -2.85* 
t+7 
-0.0022553 -0.84 -0.0540942 -2.98* 
t+8 0.0001455 0.05 -0.0539487 -2.97* 
t+9 
-0.0022519 -0.84 -0.0562006 -3.09* 
t+10 
-0.0013167 -0.49 -0.0575173 -3.17* 
t+11 0.0009927 0.37 -0.0565246 -3.11* 
t+12 0.0032735 1.22 -0.0532512 -2.93* 
t+13 
-0.0019376 -0.74 -0.055325 -3.07* 
t+14 0.0007323 0.28 -0.0545927 -3.03* 
t+15 0.0001411 0.05 -0.0544516 -3.02* 
t+16 
-0.0010165 -0.39 -0.0554681 -3.08* 
t+17 
-0.000774 -0.30 -0.0562421 -3.12* 
t+18 
-0.0013804 -0.53 -0.0576224 -3.20* 
t+19 
-0.0018853 -0.72 -0.0595078 -3.30* 
t+20 
-0.0001014 -0.04 -0.0596092 -3.31* 
t+21 
-0.0029066 -1.11 -0.0625158 -3.47* 
t+22 
-0.0021371 -0.82 -0.0646529 -3.59* 
t+23 
-0.0014531 -0.56 -0.066106 -3.67* 
t+24 8.893E-05 0.03 -0.0660171 -3.67* 
t+25 
-0.0022156 -0.85 -0.0682327 -3.79* 
t+26 
-0.0013183 -0.50 -0.069551 -3.86* 
t+27 
-0.0020682 -0.79 -0.0716192 -3.98* 
t+28 
-0.0008836 -0.34 -0.0725028 -4.03* 
t+29 0.0007244 0.28 -0.0717784 -3.99* 
t+30 
-0.0078212 -2.99* -0.0795995 -4.42* 
t+31 
-0.0023868 -0.91 -0.0819864 -4.55* 
t+32 
-0.0030256 -1.16 -0.085012 -4.72* 
t+33 
-0.0028041 -1.07 -0.087816 -4.88* 
t+34 
-0.0030344 -1.16 -0.0908504 -5.05* 
t+35 
-0.0019465 -0.74 -0.0927969 -5.15* 
t+36 
-0.0010741 -0.41 -0.093871 -5.21* 
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Table A4.2 Benchmark-Adjusted Female Managed Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.005581198 0.791 0.005581198 0.227 
t-35 
-9.45424E-06 -0.001 0.005571744 0.227 
t-34 0.006591268 0.934 0.012163012 0.495 
t-33 
-0.013724137 -1.944* -0.001561125 -0.063 
t-32 0.001568265 0.222 7.13983E-06 0.0002 
t-31 
-0.014586056 -2.066* -0.014578916 -0.594 
t-30 0.002233664 0.316 -0.012345252 -0.503 
t-29 0.003669393 0.520 -0.008675859 -0.353 
t-28 
-0.010165992 -1.440 -0.018841851 -0.768 
t-27 
-0.005464191 -0.774 -0.024306042 -0.990 
t-26 0.00324838 0.460 -0.021057662 -0.858 
t-25 
-0.001460939 -0.207 -0.022518602 -0.917 
t-24 
-0.005109446 -0.724 -0.027628048 -1.126 
t-23 
-0.00917586 -1.300 -0.036803908 -1.500 
t-22 0.015525418 2.200* -0.02127849 -0.867 
t-21 
-0.000155179 -0.022 -0.021433669 -0.873 
t-20 
-0.017437702 -2.470* -0.038871371 -1.584 
t-19 
-0.003650391 -0.517 -0.042521761 -1.733* 
t-18 0.006845157 0.970 -0.035676604 -1.454 
t-17 0.0057122 0.809 -0.029964353 -1.221 
t-16 0.004564562 0.647 -0.025399791 -1.035 
t-15 0.000605438 0.086 -0.024794353 -1.010 
t-14 
-0.00798225 -1.131 -0.032776603 -1.336 
t-13 
-0.004715621 -0.668 -0.037492225 -1.528 
t-12 0.000937312 0.133 -0.036554912 -1.490 
t-11 0.000467738 0.066 -0.036087175 -1.417 
t-10 
-0.005873813 -0.832 -0.041960988 -1.710* 
t-9 
-0.001145386 -0.162 -0.043106373 -1.757* 
t-8 
-0.013239552 -1.876* -0.056345926 -2.296* 
t-7 
-0.002967192 -0.420 -0.059313117 -2.417* 
t-6 
-0.007704586 -1.092 -0.067017704 -2.738* 
t-5 
-0.007828139 -1.109 -0.074845842 -3.050* 
t-4 
-0.001908226 -0.270 -0.076754068 -3.128* 
t-3 0.005432381 0.770 -0.071321687 -2.907* 
t-2 
-0.001525006 -0.216 -0.072846693 -2.969* 
t-1 
-0.00665369 -0.943 -0.079500383 -3.240* 
t=0 0.002405556 0.341 -0.077094827 -3.142* 
t+1 
-0.001360073 -0.193 -0.0784549 -3.198* 
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t+2 4.9231E-05 0.007 -0.078405669 -3.19* 
t+3 
-0.001422256 -0.201 -0.079827925 -3.253* 
t+4 
-0.004079783 -0.578 -0.083907708 -3.420* 
t+5 
-0.000855144 -0.121 -0.084762852 -3.455* 
t+6 0.002716997 0.385 -0.082045855 -3.344* 
t+7 0.006313791 0.895 -0.075732064 -3.087* 
t+8 0.003359723 0.476 -0.072372341 -2.950* 
t+9 0.002717655 0.385 -0.069654687 -2.839* 
t+10 
-0.00572656 -0.811 -0.075381247 -3.072* 
t+11 
-0.003705032 -0.525 -0.079086279 -3.223* 
t+12 0.000884716 0.125 -0.078201562 -3.187* 
t+13 
-5.715E-05 -0.01 -0.0793043 -3.19* 
t+14 0.0008406 0.12 -0.0784637 -3.15* 
t+15 
-0.0022115 -0.31 -0.0806752 -3.24* 
t+16 0.00136 0.19 -0.0793152 -3.19* 
t+17 
-0.0009485 -0.13 -0.0802637 -3.22* 
t+18 
-0.002248 -0.32 -0.0825117 -3.31* 
t+19 0.0015526 0.22 -0.0809591 -3.25* 
t+20 0.0021378 0.30 -0.0788212 -3.17* 
t+21 
-0.0035795 -0.50 -0.0824007 -3.31* 
t+22 
-0.0028104 -0.39 -0.0852111 -3.42* 
t+23 
-0.0035245 -0.49 -0.0887355 -3.56* 
t+24 0.005089 0.71 -0.0836466 -3.36* 
t+25 
-0.0019937 -0.28 -0.0856402 -3.44* 
t+26 
-0.0041092 -0.58 -0.0897494 -3.60* 
t+27 
-0.0001705 -0.02 -0.0899199 -3.61* 
t+28 
-0.0074883 -1.05 -0.0974082 -3.91* 
t+29 
-0.000227 -0.03 -0.0976352 -3.92* 
t+30 0.001245 0.17 -0.0963903 -3.87* 
t+31 0.0048292 0.68 -0.0915611 -3.68* 
t+32 
-0.0024266 -0.34 -0.0939877 -3.78* 
t+33 
-0.002285 -0.32 -0.0962727 -3.87* 
t+34 0.0004873 0.07 -0.0957854 -3.85* 
t+35 0.0034448 0.48 -0.0923406 -3.71* 
t+36 
-0.0041271 -0.58 -0.0964677 -3.87* 
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Table A4.3 Benchmark-Adjusted UK Funds AARs and CAARs (* indicates 5% 
significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0042094 1.19 0.0042094 0.14 
t-35 0.0041316 1.16 0.008341 0.27 
t-34 -0.004929 -1.39 0.003412 0.11 
t-33 -0.0111094 -3.13* -0.0076974 -0.25 
t-32 0.0036879 1.04 -0.0040094 -0.13 
t-31 0.0006148 0.17 -0.0033946 -0.11 
t-30 -0.0047433 -1.34 -0.0081379 -0.26 
t-29 -0.0006944 -0.20 -0.0088323 -0.28 
t-28 -5.25E-05 -0.01 -0.0088848 -0.29 
t-27 -0.0035222 -0.99 -0.012407 -0.40 
t-26 0.0006607 0.19 -0.0117463 -0.38 
t-25 -0.0008521 -0.24 -0.0125984 -0.41 
t-24 0.0005435 0.15 -0.0120549 -0.39 
t-23 -0.010557 -2.97* -0.0226119 -0.73 
t-22 -0.0019635 -0.55 -0.0245754 -0.79 
t-21 -0.0043224 -1.22 -0.0288978 -0.93 
t-20 -0.0023906 -0.67 -0.0312884 -1.01 
t-19 -0.0031787 -0.90 -0.0344672 -1.11 
t-18 -0.0064962 -1.83* -0.0409634 -1.32 
t-17 -0.0051265 -1.44 -0.0460899 -1.49 
t-16 0.0006323 0.18 -0.0454576 -1.46 
t-15 -0.0025393 -0.72 -0.0479969 -1.55 
t-14 -0.0057253 -1.61 -0.0537222 -1.73* 
t-13 -0.0013936 -0.39 -0.0551158 -1.78* 
t-12 -0.007185 -2.02* -0.0623008 -2.01* 
t-11 -0.0019267 -0.54 -0.0642275 -2.07* 
t-10 -0.0019498 -0.55 -0.0661773 -2.13* 
t-9 -0.006446 -1.82* -0.0726232 -2.34* 
t-8 -0.0020918 -0.59 -0.0747151 -2.41* 
t-7 -0.0034427 -0.97 -0.0781577 -2.52* 
t-6 -0.0015442 -0.43 -0.0797019 -2.57* 
t-5 0.0003337 0.09 -0.0793682 -2.56* 
t-4 -0.003161 -0.89 -0.0825292 -2.66* 
t-3 0.0013859 0.39 -0.0811433 -2.61* 
t-2 -0.0052408 -1.48 -0.0863841 -2.78* 
t-1 -0.000824 -0.23 -0.0872081 -2.81* 
t=0 -0.0008821 -0.25 -0.0880902 -2.84* 
t+1 
-0.003598 -1.01 -0.0916882 -2.95* 
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t+2 
-0.0004686 -0.13 -0.0921569 -2.97* 
t+3 0.0025261 0.71 -0.0896308 -2.89* 
t+4 0.0018414 0.52 -0.0877893 -2.83* 
t+5 
-0.0025659 -0.72 -0.0903553 -2.91* 
t+6 0.00156 0.44 -0.0887952 -2.86* 
t+7 
-0.001529 -0.43 -0.0903242 -2.91* 
t+8 
-0.0001316 -0.04 -0.0904558 -2.91* 
t+9 
-0.0030546 -0.86 -0.0935104 -3.01* 
t+10 
-0.0024806 -0.70 -0.095991 -3.09* 
t+11 0.0018715 0.53 -0.0941195 -3.03* 
t+12 0.0048607 1.37 -0.0892588 -2.88* 
t+13 
-0.0004651 -0.13 -0.0894433 -2.89* 
t+14 0.0030647 0.87 -0.0863786 -2.79* 
t+15 0.0003794 0.11 -0.0859991 -2.77* 
t+16 0.0017092 0.49 -0.0842899 -2.72* 
t+17 
-0.0015601 -0.44 -0.08585 -2.77* 
t+18 
-0.0018358 -0.52 -0.0876859 -2.83* 
t+19 
-0.0005534 -0.16 -0.0882393 -2.85* 
t+20 0.0011046 0.31 -0.0871347 -2.81* 
t+21 
-0.0024808 -0.70 -0.0896155 -2.89* 
t+22 
-0.0035777 -1.02 -0.0931932 -3.01* 
t+23 
-0.0023308 -0.66 -0.095524 -3.08* 
t+24 0.0031325 0.89 -0.0923914 -2.98* 
t+25 
-0.0023036 -0.65 -0.094695 -3.06* 
t+26 
-0.0018175 -0.52 -0.0965125 -3.11* 
t+27 0.0008243 0.23 -0.0956882 -3.09* 
t+28 
-0.0016619 -0.47 -0.0973501 -3.14* 
t+29 
-0.0021868 -0.62 -0.0995369 -3.21* 
t+30 
-0.0087868 -2.49* -0.1083237 -3.50* 
t+31 
-0.0021808 -0.62 -0.1105046 -3.57* 
t+32 
-0.0038152 -1.08 -0.1143198 -3.69* 
t+33 
-0.0049398 -1.40 -0.1192596 -3.85* 
t+34 
-0.0021554 -0.61 -0.1214149 -3.92* 
t+35 
-5.232E-06 0.00 -0.1214202 -3.92* 
t+36 
-0.0019077 -0.54 -0.1233279 -3.98* 
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Table A4.4 Benchmark-Adjusted International Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0043861 1.42 0.0043861 0.40 
t-35 
-0.0019908 -0.65 0.0023953 0.22 
t-34 0.000964 0.31 0.0033593 0.31 
t-33 
-0.0030946 -1.00 0.0002647 0.02 
t-32 0.0033663 1.09 0.003631 0.33 
t-31 
-0.0016862 -0.55 0.0019448 0.18 
t-30 0.0015711 0.51 0.0035159 0.32 
t-29 
-0.0007554 -0.24 0.0027605 0.25 
t-28 0.001394 0.45 0.0041546 0.38 
t-27 
-0.0039612 -1.28 0.0001934 0.02 
t-26 0.0022637 0.73 0.002457 0.22 
t-25 0.0011039 0.36 0.0035609 0.32 
t-24 
-0.0057881 -1.88* -0.0022272 -0.20 
t-23 
-0.0086219 -2.79* -0.0108491 -0.99 
t-22 0.0028118 0.91 -0.0080373 -0.73 
t-21 0.0011043 0.36 -0.006933 -0.63 
t-20 
-0.0087869 -2.85* -0.0157198 -1.43 
t-19 
-0.0003673 -0.12 -0.0160871 -1.47 
t-18 0.0033439 1.08 -0.0127431 -1.16 
t-17 0.0017184 0.56 -0.0110248 -1.00 
t-16 
-0.0015405 -0.50 -0.0125653 -1.15 
t-15 0.0021598 0.70 -0.0104055 -0.95 
t-14 
-0.0030764 -1.00 -0.0134819 -1.23 
t-13 0.0019798 0.64 -0.0115021 -1.05 
t-12 
-8.501E-05 -0.03 -0.0115871 -1.06 
t-11 
-0.0003102 -0.10 -0.0118973 -1.08 
t-10 
-0.001349 -0.44 -0.0132462 -1.21 
t-9 
-0.001968 -0.64 -0.0152142 -1.39 
t-8 
-0.0055188 -1.79* -0.020733 -1.89* 
t-7 
-0.001109 -0.36 -0.021842 -1.99* 
t-6 
-0.0020547 -0.67 -0.0238967 -2.18* 
t-5 
-0.0007229 -0.23 -0.0246196 -2.24* 
t-4 
-0.0023385 -0.76 -0.0269581 -2.46* 
t-3 
-0.0005854 -0.19 -0.0275435 -2.51* 
t-2 
-0.0023526 -0.76 -0.0298962 -2.72* 
t-1 0.0003492 0.11 -0.029547 -2.69* 
t=0 0.0011806 0.38 -0.0283665 -2.59* 
t+1 
-0.0013552 -0.44 -0.0297217 -2.71* 
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t+2 0.0009421 0.31 -0.0287796 -2.62* 
t+3 
-0.0035751 -1.16 -0.0323547 -2.95* 
t+4 
-0.0007365 -0.24 -0.0330911 -3.02* 
t+5 
-0.001635 -0.53 -0.0347262 -3.16* 
t+6 4.274E-05 0.01 -0.0346834 -3.16* 
t+7 
-0.0004215 -0.14 -0.0351049 -3.20* 
t+8 0.0012181 0.39 -0.0338868 -3.09* 
t+9 
-0.0003317 -0.11 -0.0342185 -3.12* 
t+10 
-0.0017074 -0.55 -0.0359259 -3.27* 
t+11 
-0.0009065 -0.29 -0.0368324 -3.36* 
t+12 0.0015095 0.49 -0.035323 -3.22* 
t+13 
-0.0024921 -0.83 -0.038234 -3.55* 
t+14 
-0.0008977 -0.30 -0.0391317 -3.64* 
t+15 
-0.0006637 -0.22 -0.0397954 -3.70* 
t+16 
-0.0023285 -0.77 -0.0421239 -3.91* 
t+17 
-0.0002579 -0.09 -0.0423818 -3.94* 
t+18 
-0.001285 -0.43 -0.0436668 -4.06* 
t+19 
-0.0018996 -0.63 -0.0455663 -4.23* 
t+20 
-0.0003366 -0.11 -0.0459029 -4.27* 
t+21 
-0.0033767 -1.12 -0.0492797 -4.58* 
t+22 
-0.0013318 -0.44 -0.0506115 -4.70* 
t+23 
-0.0014109 -0.47 -0.0520224 -4.83* 
t+24 
-0.000649 -0.22 -0.0526714 -4.89* 
t+25 
-0.0020966 -0.70 -0.054768 -5.09* 
t+26 
-0.0017405 -0.58 -0.0565084 -5.25* 
t+27 
-0.003477 -1.15 -0.0599855 -5.57* 
t+28 
-0.0021503 -0.71 -0.0621358 -5.77* 
t+29 0.0023799 0.79 -0.0597559 -5.55* 
t+30 
-0.0046528 -1.54 -0.0644086 -5.99* 
t+31 
-0.0005088 -0.17 -0.0649174 -6.03* 
t+32 
-0.0023249 -0.77 -0.0672424 -6.25* 
t+33 
-0.0012536 -0.42 -0.068496 -6.36* 
t+34 
-0.0026623 -0.88 -0.0711583 -6.61* 
t+35 
-0.0017596 -0.58 -0.0729179 -6.78* 
t+36 
-0.001351 -0.45 -0.0742689 -6.90* 
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Table A4.5 Benchmark-Adjusted Emerging Market Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0203285 2.98* 0.0203285 1.88* 
t-35 
-0.0057971 -0.85 0.0145314 1.35 
t-34 
-0.0023923 -0.35 0.0121391 1.12 
t-33 
-0.0126852 -1.86* -0.0005461 -0.05 
t-32 
-0.0037409 -0.55 -0.004287 -0.40 
t-31 0.0082214 1.21 0.0039345 0.36 
t-30 0.0061093 0.90 0.0100437 0.93 
t-29 0.0011549 0.17 0.0111987 1.04 
t-28 0.0040131 0.59 0.0152117 1.41 
t-27 
-0.0030334 -0.44 0.0121783 1.13 
t-26 0.007827 1.15 0.0200054 1.85* 
t-25 
-0.0053709 -0.79 0.0146345 1.36 
t-24 0.0048784 0.72 0.0195129 1.81* 
t-23 
-0.0123564 -1.81* 0.0071565 0.66 
t-22 0.0064081 0.94 0.0135647 1.26 
t-21 0.0056302 0.83 0.0191948 1.78* 
t-20 0.0040036 0.59 0.0231985 2.15* 
t-19 
-0.0029417 -0.43 0.0202568 1.88* 
t-18 0.0033003 0.48 0.0235571 2.18* 
t-17 0.0076473 1.12 0.0312044 2.89* 
t-16 0.0057408 0.84 0.0369453 3.42* 
t-15 0.0003651 0.05 0.0373104 3.46* 
t-14 
-0.0003831 -0.06 0.0369272 3.42* 
t-13 
-0.0002951 -0.04 0.0366321 3.39* 
t-12 
-0.0058909 -0.86 0.0307412 2.85* 
t-11 
-0.004957 -0.73 0.0257842 2.39* 
t-10 
-0.0021001 -0.31 0.0236841 2.19* 
t-9 0.0045449 0.67 0.0282291 2.62* 
t-8 
-0.0019877 -0.29 0.0262413 2.43* 
t-7 0.0003769 0.06 0.0266182 2.47* 
t-6 
-0.0037381 -0.55 0.0228801 2.12* 
t-5 
-0.0029774 -0.44 0.0199027 1.84* 
t-4 
-0.0067331 -0.99 0.0131696 1.22 
t-3 
-0.0096837 -1.42 0.0034859 0.32 
t-2 0.0085578 1.25 0.0120437 1.12 
t-1 
-0.0088827 -1.30 0.003161 0.29 
t=0 0.0056198 0.82 0.0087808 0.81 
t+1 
-0.0028059 -0.41 0.0059749 0.55 
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t+2 
-0.0007168 -0.11 0.0052581 0.49 
t+3 
-0.0014673 -0.22 0.0037908 0.35 
t+4 0.0054603 0.80 0.0092511 0.86 
t+5 0.0010523 0.15 0.0103034 0.95 
t+6 3.347E-06 0.00 0.0103068 0.95 
t+7 
-0.006355 -0.93 0.0039518 0.37 
t+8 0.0081194 1.19 0.0120713 1.12 
t+9 
-0.0014763 -0.22 0.010595 0.98 
t+10 0.003842 0.56 0.014437 1.34 
t+11 
-0.0031751 -0.47 0.0112619 1.04 
t+12 0.003312 0.49 0.0145739 1.35 
t+13 
-0.018928 -2.78* -0.0043541 -0.40 
t+14 
-0.001228 -0.18 -0.005582 -0.52 
t+15 
-0.0006379 -0.09 -0.0062199 -0.58 
t+16 0.0013175 0.19 -0.0049024 -0.45 
t+17 0.0024414 0.36 -0.002461 -0.23 
t+18 0.0063627 0.93 0.0039016 0.36 
t+19 
-0.003738 -0.55 0.0001637 0.02 
t+20 0.0060779 0.89 0.0062415 0.58 
t+21 0.0005284 0.08 0.0067699 0.63 
t+22 
-0.0058087 -0.85 0.0009612 0.09 
t+23 0.0027282 0.40 0.0036895 0.34 
t+24 0.003286 0.48 0.0069755 0.65 
t+25 
-0.0058632 -0.86 0.0011123 0.10 
t+26 0.0119865 1.76* 0.0130988 1.21 
t+27 
-0.0067853 -0.99 0.0063135 0.58 
t+28 
-0.0042022 -0.62 0.0021113 0.20 
t+29 0.0065092 0.95 0.0086205 0.80 
t+30 0.0037029 0.54 0.0123235 1.14 
t+31 0.0017649 0.26 0.0140884 1.31 
t+32 0.0018253 0.27 0.0159137 1.47 
t+33 0.0018004 0.26 0.0177141 1.64 
t+34 
-0.0025722 -0.38 0.0151419 1.40 
t+35 0.0117804 1.73* 0.0269223 2.49* 
t+36 
-0.0061041 -0.90 0.0208182 1.93* 
171 
 
Table A4.6 Benchmark-Adjusted Developed Market Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0027129 1.01 0.0027129 0.13 
t-35 0.001142 0.43 0.0038549 0.19 
t-34 
-0.0013971 -0.52 0.0024577 0.12 
t-33 
-0.0058098 -2.16* -0.0033521 -0.16 
t-32 0.0041707 1.55 0.0008186 0.04 
t-31 
-0.0015643 -0.58 -0.0007457 -0.04 
t-30 
-0.0016779 -0.63 -0.0024236 -0.12 
t-29 
-0.0008995 -0.34 -0.003323 -0.16 
t-28 0.0005233 0.19 -0.0027998 -0.14 
t-27 
-0.0038474 -1.43 -0.0066472 -0.32 
t-26 0.0010892 0.41 -0.005558 -0.27 
t-25 0.0007805 0.29 -0.0047774 -0.23 
t-24 
-0.0038898 -1.45 -0.0086673 -0.42 
t-23 
-0.0091647 -3.41* -0.017832 -0.86 
t-22 0.0004286 0.16 -0.0174034 -0.84 
t-21 
-0.0016518 -0.62 -0.0190552 -0.92 
t-20 
-0.0069934 -2.61* -0.0260486 -1.26 
t-19 
-0.0013964 -0.52 -0.027445 -1.33 
t-18 
-0.0009212 -0.34 -0.0283662 -1.37 
t-17 
-0.0017265 -0.64 -0.0300927 -1.45 
t-16 
-0.0011504 -0.43 -0.0312431 -1.51 
t-15 0.0002155 0.08 -0.0310276 -1.50 
t-14 
-0.004445 -1.66* -0.0354726 -1.71* 
t-13 0.000655 0.24 -0.0348175 -1.68* 
t-12 
-0.0027621 -1.03 -0.0375796 -1.82* 
t-11 
-0.0006857 -0.26 -0.0382653 -1.85* 
t-10 
-0.0015605 -0.58 -0.0398258 -1.92* 
t-9 
-0.0044209 -1.65* -0.0442467 -2.14* 
t-8 
-0.004263 -1.59 -0.0485097 -2.34* 
t-7 
-0.0022447 -0.84 -0.0507544 -2.45* 
t-6 
-0.0017092 -0.64 -0.0524636 -2.53* 
t-5 
-9.569E-05 -0.04 -0.0525593 -2.54* 
t-4 
-0.0023875 -0.89 -0.0549467 -2.65* 
t-3 0.0009341 0.35 -0.0540126 -2.61* 
t-2 
-0.0044061 -1.64 -0.0584187 -2.82* 
t-1 0.000491 0.18 -0.0579277 -2.80* 
t=0 
-4.654E-05 -0.02 -0.0579743 -2.80* 
t+1 
-0.0022411 -0.83 -0.0602153 -2.91* 
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t+2 0.0004382 0.16 -0.0597771 -2.89* 
t+3 
-0.001034 -0.39 -0.0608111 -2.94* 
t+4 
-4.179E-05 -0.02 -0.0608529 -2.94* 
t+5 
-0.0022377 -0.83 -0.0630906 -3.05* 
t+6 0.0007149 0.27 -0.0623756 -3.01* 
t+7 
-0.0004862 -0.18 -0.0628619 -3.04* 
t+8 0.0001297 0.05 -0.0627322 -3.03* 
t+9 
-0.0014512 -0.54 -0.0641834 -3.10* 
t+10 
-0.0024449 -0.91 -0.0666283 -3.22* 
t+11 0.0004811 0.18 -0.0661472 -3.20* 
t+12 0.0028592 1.07 -0.063288 -3.06* 
t+13 
-0.0003504 -0.14 -0.0638311 -3.10* 
t+14 0.0008979 0.35 -0.0629332 -3.06* 
t+15 
-0.0001974 -0.08 -0.0631306 -3.07* 
t+16 
-0.0007915 -0.31 -0.0639221 -3.11* 
t+17 
-0.0010464 -0.41 -0.0649685 -3.16* 
t+18 
-0.0021113 -0.82 -0.0670798 -3.26* 
t+19 
-0.001164 -0.45 -0.0682437 -3.32* 
t+20 
-0.0002027 -0.08 -0.0684465 -3.33* 
t+21 
-0.0032905 -1.27 -0.0717369 -3.49* 
t+22 
-0.0019643 -0.76 -0.0737012 -3.58* 
t+23 
-0.002137 -0.83 -0.0758383 -3.69 
t+24 0.0006995 0.27 -0.0751388 -3.65* 
t+25 
-0.0018843 -0.73 -0.0770231 -3.75* 
t+26 
-0.0028797 -1.12 -0.0799028 -3.89* 
t+27 
-0.0013554 -0.52 -0.0812582 -3.95* 
t+28 
-0.0017744 -0.69 -0.0830326 -4.04* 
t+29 8.848E-05 0.03 -0.0829441 -4.03* 
t+30 
-0.0071405 -2.77* -0.0900846 -4.38* 
t+31 
-0.0014264 -0.55 -0.091511 -4.45* 
t+32 
-0.0033522 -1.30 -0.0948632 -4.61* 
t+33 
-0.0031276 -1.21 -0.0979908 -4.76* 
t+34 
-0.0024487 -0.95 -0.1004394 -4.88* 
t+35 
-0.0022478 -0.87 -0.1026873 -4.99* 
t+36 
-0.0011984 -0.46 -0.1038857 -5.05* 
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Table A4.7 Benchmark-Adjusted Equity Funds AARs and CAARs (* indicates 5% 
significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0055267 1.75* 0.0055267 0.29 
t-35 0.0014401 0.46 0.0069668 0.36 
t-34 
-0.0023354 -0.74 0.0046314 0.24 
t-33 
-0.0049605 -1.57 -0.0003291 -0.02 
t-32 0.0049715 1.58 0.0046424 0.24 
t-31 0.000656 0.21 0.0052983 0.27 
t-30 
-0.0008579 -0.27 0.0044405 0.23 
t-29 0.0003731 0.12 0.0048135 0.25 
t-28 0.0010771 0.34 0.0058907 0.30 
t-27 
-0.0035603 -1.13 0.0023303 0.12 
t-26 0.002676 0.85 0.0050063 0.26 
t-25 0.0007641 0.24 0.0057704 0.30 
t-24 
-0.0047653 -1.51 0.0010051 0.05 
t-23 
-0.010371 -3.29* -0.0093659 -0.48 
t-22 0.001201 0.38 -0.0081649 -0.42 
t-21 
-0.0023164 -0.73 -0.0104814 -0.54 
t-20 
-0.0071504 -2.27* -0.0176317 -0.91 
t-19 
-0.0011848 -0.38 -0.0188165 -0.97 
t-18 
-0.0015146 -0.48 -0.0203312 -1.05 
t-17 
-0.0027715 -0.88 -0.0231027 -1.19 
t-16 
-0.0008561 -0.27 -0.0239588 -1.24 
t-15 0.0018138 0.58 -0.022145 -1.15 
t-14 
-0.0041441 -1.31 -0.0262891 -1.36 
t-13 0.0016148 0.51 -0.0246744 -1.28 
t-12 
-0.0022852 -0.72 -0.0269596 -1.39 
t-11 0.0001728 0.05 -0.0267867 -1.39 
t-10 
-0.0014158 -0.45 -0.0282026 -1.46 
t-9 
-0.0049285 -1.56 -0.033131 -1.71* 
t-8 
-0.0042449 -1.35 -0.0373759 -1.93* 
t-7 
-0.0022145 -0.70 -0.0395904 -2.05* 
t-6 
-0.0030456 -0.97 -0.042636 -2.21* 
t-5 
-0.0005814 -0.18 -0.0432174 -2.24* 
t-4 
-0.0020172 -0.64 -0.0452346 -2.34* 
t-3 
-0.0007932 -0.25 -0.0460278 -2.38* 
t-2 
-0.003967 -1.26 -0.0499948 -2.59* 
t-1 
-0.0002181 -0.07 -0.0502129 -2.60* 
t=0 0.0001656 0.05 -0.0500474 -2.59* 
t+1 
-0.0025344 -0.80 -0.0525817 -2.72* 
t+2 0.0002877 0.09 -0.0522941 -2.70* 
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t+3 
-0.0017202 -0.55 -0.0540143 -2.79* 
t+4 0.0004315 0.14 -0.0535828 -2.77* 
t+5 
-0.0014346 -0.45 -0.0550174 -2.85* 
t+6 0.0019645 0.62 -0.0530529 -2.74* 
t+7 
-0.0015434 -0.49 -0.0545963 -2.82* 
t+8 0.00088 0.28 -0.0537163 -2.78* 
t+9 
-0.0009608 -0.30 -0.0546772 -2.83* 
t+10 
-0.0017266 -0.55 -0.0564038 -2.92* 
t+11 0.0002613 0.08 -0.0561425 -2.90* 
t+12 0.0021317 0.68 -0.0540108 -2.79* 
t+13 
-0.001775 -0.58 -0.0555718 -2.93* 
t+14 0.0003777 0.12 -0.0551941 -2.91* 
t+15 0.0002935 0.10 -0.0549006 -2.90* 
t+16 
-0.0007018 -0.23 -0.0556023 -2.94* 
t+17 
-0.0009888 -0.32 -0.0565912 -2.99* 
t+18 
-0.0004589 -0.15 -0.0570501 -3.01* 
t+19 
-0.0012379 -0.41 -0.0582879 -3.08* 
t+20 0.0007242 0.24 -0.0575637 -3.04* 
t+21 
-0.0028254 -0.93 -0.0603891 -3.19* 
t+22 
-0.0026384 -0.87 -0.0630276 -3.33* 
t+23 
-0.0015857 -0.52 -0.0646133 -3.41* 
t+24 0.0013564 0.45 -0.0632569 -3.34* 
t+25 
-0.0016201 -0.53 -0.064877 -3.43* 
t+26 
-0.0024857 -0.82 -0.0673627 -3.56* 
t+27 
-0.0012507 -0.41 -0.0686134 -3.62* 
t+28 
-0.0022196 -0.73 -0.070833 -3.74* 
t+29 0.0009662 0.32 -0.0698668 -3.69* 
t+30 
-0.0085934 -2.82* -0.0784602 -4.14* 
t+31 
-0.0002062 -0.07 -0.0786664 -4.15* 
t+32 
-0.0030325 -1.00 -0.0816989 -4.31* 
t+33 
-0.0019462 -0.64 -0.0836451 -4.42* 
t+34 
-0.0023034 -0.76 -0.0859485 -4.54* 
t+35 
-0.0013481 -0.44 -0.0872966 -4.61* 
t+36 
-0.0006115 -0.20 -0.0879081 -4.64* 
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Table A4.8 Benchmark-Adjusted Bond Funds AARs and CAARs (* indicates 5% 
significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 
-0.0009508 -0.27 -0.0009508 -0.05 
t-35 
-0.0030676 -0.86 -0.0040185 -0.21 
t-34 0.0019223 0.54 -0.0020962 -0.11 
t-33 
-0.0119337 -3.35* -0.0140299 -0.74 
t-32 
-0.0020442 -0.57 -0.0160741 -0.85 
t-31 
-0.0059054 -1.66* -0.0219794 -1.17 
t-30 
-0.0016695 -0.47 -0.0236489 -1.25 
t-29 
-0.0047909 -1.35 -0.0284399 -1.51 
t-28 
-0.0002306 -0.06 -0.0286704 -1.52 
t-27 
-0.004642 -1.30 -0.0333124 -1.77* 
t-26 
-0.0025011 -0.70 -0.0358135 -1.90* 
t-25 
-0.0014789 -0.42 -0.0372923 -1.98* 
t-24 0.0029245 0.82 -0.0343678 -1.82* 
t-23 
-0.0056737 -1.59 -0.0400415 -2.12* 
t-22 
-0.0003996 -0.11 -0.0404411 -2.14* 
t-21 0.0035699 1.00 -0.0368711 -1.96* 
t-20 
-0.002401 -0.67 -0.0392722 -2.08* 
t-19 
-0.0027315 -0.77 -0.0420037 -2.23* 
t-18 0.0028081 0.79 -0.0391956 -2.08* 
t-17 0.005411 1.52 -0.0337846 -1.79* 
t-16 7.422E-05 0.02 -0.0337104 -1.79* 
t-15 
-0.0059028 -1.66* -0.0396132 -2.10* 
t-14 
-0.0042316 -1.19 -0.0438448 -2.33* 
t-13 
-0.0033123 -0.93 -0.0471571 -2.50* 
t-12 
-0.005647 -1.59 -0.0528041 -2.80* 
t-11 
-0.0053513 -1.50 -0.0581554 -3.08* 
t-10 
-0.0022934 -0.64 -0.0604488 -3.21* 
t-9 0.0004626 0.13 -0.0599862 -3.18* 
t-8 
-0.0035892 -1.01 -0.0635754 -3.37* 
t-7 
-0.0015054 -0.42 -0.0650808 -3.45* 
t-6 0.0028445 0.80 -0.0622363 -3.30* 
t-5 0.0008584 0.24 -0.0613778 -3.26* 
t-4 
-0.0052538 -1.48 -0.0666316 -3.53* 
t-3 0.0042061 1.18 -0.0624255 -3.31* 
t-2 
-0.0018823 -0.53 -0.0643078 -3.41* 
t-1 0.0001949 0.05 -0.0641129 -3.40* 
t=0 0.0009779 0.27 -0.063135 -3.35* 
t+1 
-0.0012807 -0.36 -0.0644157 -3.42* 
t+2 0.0006483 0.18 -0.0637674 -3.38* 
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t+3 0.0015035 0.42 -0.0622639 -3.30* 
t+4 
-9.065E-05 -0.03 -0.0623545 -3.31* 
t+5 
-0.0042972 -1.21 -0.0666517 -3.54* 
t+6 
-0.0043957 -1.23 -0.0710475 -3.77* 
t+7 0.001722 0.48 -0.0693254 -3.68* 
t+8 
-0.0001872 -0.05 -0.0695127 -3.69* 
t+9 
-0.0033738 -0.95 -0.0728864 -3.87* 
t+10 
-0.0031935 -0.90 -0.0760799 -4.04* 
t+11 0.0001439 0.04 -0.075936 -4.03* 
t+12 0.0058472 1.64 -0.0700888 -3.72* 
t+13 
-0.0011392 -0.30 -0.0723565 -3.65* 
t+14 0.0021831 0.57 -0.0701734 -3.54* 
t+15 
-0.0022321 -0.58 -0.0724055 -3.65* 
t+16 
-0.0004189 -0.11 -0.0728243 -3.68* 
t+17 
-8.171E-05 -0.02 -0.072906 -3.68* 
t+18 
-0.0055424 -1.44 -0.0784484 -3.96* 
t+19 
-0.0017628 -0.46 -0.0802111 -4.05* 
t+20 
-0.0015614 -0.41 -0.0817726 -4.13* 
t+21 
-0.0037212 -0.97 -0.0854938 -4.32* 
t+22 
-0.0007529 -0.20 -0.0862466 -4.35* 
t+23 
-0.0025385 -0.66 -0.0887852 -4.48* 
t+24 
-0.0008893 -0.23 -0.0896744 -4.53* 
t+25 
-0.0043466 -1.13 -0.0940211 -4.75* 
t+26 0.0010558 0.27 -0.0929652 -4.69* 
t+27 
-0.0037764 -0.98 -0.0967417 -4.88* 
t+28 
-0.00091 -0.24 -0.0976517 -4.93* 
t+29 
-0.001036 -0.27 -0.0986877 -4.98* 
t+30 0.0026708 0.69 -0.0960169 -4.85* 
t+31 
-0.0048036 -1.25 -0.1008205 -5.09* 
t+32 
-0.0025506 -0.66 -0.1033711 -5.22* 
t+33 
-0.0055732 -1.45 -0.1089442 -5.50* 
t+34 
-0.0030179 -0.78 -0.1119622 -5.65* 
t+35 
-3.835E-05 -0.01 -0.1120005 -5.65* 
t+36 
-0.0049707 -1.29 -0.1169712 -5.90* 
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Table A4.9 Benchmark-Adjusted Equity Growth Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0124435 2.13* 0.0124435 0.40 
t-35 0.0010356 0.18 0.0134791 0.44 
t-34 
-0.0101119 -1.73* 0.0033672 0.11 
t-33 
-0.0145762 -2.50* -0.0112089 -0.36 
t-32 0.0060721 1.04 -0.0051368 -0.17 
t-31 
-0.0004678 -0.08 -0.0056046 -0.18 
t-30 
-0.001968 -0.34 -0.0075727 -0.25 
t-29 0.0054308 0.93 -0.0021419 -0.07 
t-28 
-0.0039177 -0.67 -0.0060596 -0.20 
t-27 
-0.0092896 -1.59 -0.0153492 -0.50 
t-26 0.0045223 0.77 -0.0108269 -0.35 
t-25 0.0021118 0.36 -0.0087151 -0.28 
t-24 
-0.0060214 -1.03 -0.0147365 -0.48 
t-23 
-0.0124222 -2.13* -0.0271587 -0.88 
t-22 0.0069325 1.19 -0.0202261 -0.66 
t-21 
-0.0045458 -0.78 -0.0247719 -0.81 
t-20 
-0.009639 -1.65* -0.0344109 -1.12 
t-19 
-0.0069368 -1.19 -0.0413477 -1.34 
t-18 
-0.0069758 -1.19 -0.0483236 -1.57 
t-17 
-0.0070355 -1.20 -0.0553591 -1.80* 
t-16 0.000891 0.15 -0.0544681 -1.77* 
t-15 0.0042005 0.72 -0.0502675 -1.63 
t-14 
-0.0044644 -0.76 -0.0547319 -1.78* 
t-13 0.0006281 0.11 -0.0541038 -1.76* 
t-12 
-0.0015112 -0.26 -0.055615 -1.81* 
t-11 4.581E-05 0.01 -0.0555692 -1.81* 
t-10 
-0.0009853 -0.17 -0.0565545 -1.84* 
t-9 
-0.0083946 -1.44 -0.0649492 -2.11* 
t-8 
-0.0074055 -1.27 -0.0723547 -2.35* 
t-7 
-0.0054589 -0.93 -0.0778136 -2.53* 
t-6 0.0014017 0.24 -0.0764118 -2.48* 
t-5 
-0.0018775 -0.32 -0.0782894 -2.55* 
t-4 
-0.0014613 -0.25 -0.0797507 -2.59* 
t-3 
-0.000646 -0.11 -0.0803967 -2.61* 
t-2 
-0.0046755 -0.80 -0.0850722 -2.77* 
t-1 0.0003141 0.05 -0.084758 -2.76* 
t=0 0.00307 0.53 -0.081688 -2.66* 
t+1 
-0.0031774 -0.54 -0.0848654 -2.76* 
t+2 0.0045379 0.78 -0.0803275 -2.61* 
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t+3 
-0.0020205 -0.35 -0.082348 -2.68* 
t+4 0.0025342 0.43 -0.0798138 -2.59* 
t+5 0.0007976 0.14 -0.0790162 -2.57* 
t+6 0.0040603 0.70 -0.0749559 -2.44* 
t+7 0.0016761 0.29 -0.0732798 -2.38* 
t+8 0.0042406 0.73 -0.0690391 -2.24* 
t+9 0.0012442 0.21 -0.0677949 -2.20* 
t+10 
-0.0024057 -0.41 -0.0702006 -2.28* 
t+11 0.000632 0.11 -0.0695687 -2.26* 
t+12 0.0039894 0.68 -0.0655792 -2.13* 
t+13 4.037E-05 0.01 -0.0644716 -2.18* 
t+14 0.0005433 0.10 -0.0639283 -2.16* 
t+15 
-0.0014226 -0.26 -0.0653509 -2.21* 
t+16 
-0.0003066 -0.06 -0.0656574 -2.22* 
t+17 
-0.0026369 -0.48 -0.0682944 -2.31* 
t+18 
-0.0008904 -0.16 -0.0691847 -2.34* 
t+19 
-1.713E-05 0.00 -0.0692019 -2.34* 
t+20 
-0.0011914 -0.22 -0.0703933 -2.38* 
t+21 
-0.0027308 -0.49 -0.073124 -2.47* 
t+22 
-0.0014027 -0.25 -0.0745267 -2.52* 
t+23 
-0.0009668 -0.17 -0.0754935 -2.55* 
t+24 0.0028381 0.51 -0.0726555 -2.45* 
t+25 
-0.0004146 -0.07 -0.0730701 -2.47* 
t+26 
-0.0020437 -0.37 -0.0751138 -2.54* 
t+27 
-0.0025939 -0.47 -0.0777077 -2.62* 
t+28 0.0012189 0.22 -0.0764888 -2.58* 
t+29 0.000317 0.06 -0.0761717 -2.57* 
t+30 
-0.0050703 -0.92 -0.081242 -2.74* 
t+31 0.0011465 0.21 -0.0800955 -2.71* 
t+32 
-0.003099 -0.56 -0.0831946 -2.81* 
t+33 
-0.0025634 -0.46 -0.085758 -2.90* 
t+34 
-0.0025009 -0.45 -0.0882589 -2.98* 
t+35 
-0.0015297 -0.28 -0.0897886 -3.03* 
t+36 0.001412 0.26 -0.0883766 -2.98* 
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Table A4.10 Benchmark-Adjusted Equity Value Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0204439 1.13 0.0204439 0.35 
t-35 0.0072315 0.40 0.0276754 0.47 
t-34 0.0115073 0.63 0.0391827 0.67 
t-33 0.0603294 3.33* 0.0995121 1.70* 
t-32 0.0567605 3.13* 0.1562726 2.67* 
t-31 0.0007915 0.04 0.1570641 2.68* 
t-30 
-0.0068041 -0.38 0.15026 2.56* 
t-29 
-0.0027473 -0.15 0.1475127 2.52* 
t-28 0.0078052 0.43 0.155318 2.65* 
t-27 0.004083 0.23 0.159401 2.72* 
t-26 0.0156481 0.86 0.1750491 2.99* 
t-25 
-0.0039433 -0.22 0.1711057 2.92* 
t-24 0.0126006 0.70 0.1837063 3.13* 
t-23 0.0003006 0.02 0.1840069 3.14* 
t-22 0.0201036 1.11 0.2041105 3.48* 
t-21 
-0.0138589 -0.76 0.1902516 3.24* 
t-20 0.0095814 0.53 0.199833 3.41* 
t-19 
-0.0132409 -0.73 0.186592 3.18* 
t-18 0.0240086 1.32 0.2106006 3.59* 
t-17 0.0231212 1.28 0.2337218 3.99* 
t-16 0.0005953 0.03 0.2343171 4.00* 
t-15 0.0051712 0.29 0.2394883 4.08* 
t-14 0.0140983 0.78 0.2535865 4.32* 
t-13 
-0.0045964 -0.25 0.2489901 4.25* 
t-12 0.0176134 0.97 0.2666035 4.55* 
t-11 
-0.023357 -1.29 0.2432465 4.15* 
t-10 
-0.0143732 -0.79 0.2288733 3.90* 
t-9 
-0.0056019 -0.31 0.2232713 3.81* 
t-8 
-0.0083181 -0.46 0.2149532 3.67* 
t-7 0.008403 0.46 0.2233563 3.81* 
t-6 
-0.0178991 -0.99 0.2054571 3.50* 
t-5 
-0.0195224 -1.08 0.1859347 3.17* 
t-4 
-0.0027276 -0.15 0.1832071 3.12* 
t-3 0.0096052 0.53 0.1928124 3.29* 
t-2 
-0.0093283 -0.51 0.1834841 3.13* 
t-1 
-0.0052442 -0.29 0.1782399 3.04* 
t=0 0.0144084 0.79 0.1926483 3.29* 
t+1 
-0.0068008 -0.38 0.1858474 3.17* 
t+2 0.0073041 0.40 0.1931515 3.29* 
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t+3 0.0007574 0.04 0.1939089 3.31* 
t+4 
-0.0007219 -0.04 0.1931869 3.29* 
t+5 0.0076452 0.42 0.2008321 3.42* 
t+6 
-0.0122122 -0.67 0.1886198 3.22* 
t+7 0.0025051 0.14 0.191125 3.26* 
t+8 0.0017932 0.10 0.1929181 3.29* 
t+9 
-0.0028212 -0.16 0.1900969 3.24* 
t+10 
-0.0056674 -0.31 0.1844295 3.15* 
t+11 
-0.005873 -0.32 0.1785565 3.05* 
t+12 0.0250893 1.38 0.2036458 3.47* 
t+13 0.0056307 0.31 0.2092765 3.57* 
t+14 0.0235364 1.30 0.2328128 3.97* 
t+15 
-0.0087898 -0.48 0.224023 3.82* 
t+16 0.0016638 0.09 0.2256868 3.85* 
t+17 
-0.0117786 -0.65 0.2139082 3.65* 
t+18 0.0002486 0.01 0.2141568 3.65* 
t+19 
-0.0025192 -0.14 0.2116376 3.61* 
t+20 0.0066851 0.37 0.2183227 3.72* 
t+21 
-0.0116254 -0.64 0.2066973 3.52* 
t+22 
-0.0081706 -0.45 0.1985267 3.39* 
t+23 
-0.0028212 -0.16 0.1957055 3.34* 
t+24 0.0020827 0.11 0.1977882 3.37* 
t+25 
-0.005252 -0.29 0.1925362 3.28* 
t+26 
-0.0195301 -1.08 0.173006 2.95* 
t+27 0.0102859 0.57 0.1832919 3.13* 
t+28 
-0.0252545 -1.39 0.1580374 2.70* 
t+29 0.003742 0.21 0.1617794 2.76* 
t+30 0.0139589 0.77 0.1757382 3.00* 
t+31 0.0126305 0.70 0.1883688 3.21* 
t+32 
-0.0012949 -0.07 0.1870738 3.19* 
t+33 
-0.0100947 -0.56 0.1769791 3.02* 
t+34 0.0089535 0.49 0.1859327 3.17* 
t+35 
-0.0130457 -0.72 0.172887 2.95* 
t+36 0.002908 0.16 0.1757949 3.00* 
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Table A4.11 Benchmark-Adjusted Equity Small-Cap Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.005308 0.75 0.005308 0.08 
t-35 
-0.0059116 -0.83 -0.0006036 -0.01 
t-34 
-0.018597 -2.63* -0.0192006 -0.27 
t-33 
-0.0056453 -0.80 -0.0248459 -0.35 
t-32 0.0075266 1.06 -0.0173193 -0.25 
t-31 
-0.0032251 -0.46 -0.0205444 -0.29 
t-30 
-0.0045265 -0.64 -0.0250709 -0.35 
t-29 0.0013463 0.19 -0.0237246 -0.34 
t-28 
-0.0069597 -0.98 -0.0306843 -0.43 
t-27 
-0.0039675 -0.56 -0.0346519 -0.49 
t-26 0.0012733 0.18 -0.0333786 -0.47 
t-25 0.0028591 0.40 -0.0305195 -0.43 
t-24 
-0.0118449 -1.67* -0.0423644 -0.60 
t-23 
-0.0155576 -2.20* -0.057922 -0.82 
t-22 
-0.0117742 -1.66* -0.0696962 -0.99 
t-21 0.0028212 0.40 -0.066875 -0.95 
t-20 
-0.016877 -2.38* -0.083752 -1.19 
t-19 0.001854 0.26 -0.081898 -1.16 
t-18 
-0.0132202 -1.87* -0.0951181 -1.35 
t-17 
-0.0088537 -1.25 -0.1039718 -1.47 
t-16 
-0.008588 -1.21 -0.1125599 -1.59 
t-15 
-0.0087472 -1.24 -0.1213071 -1.72* 
t-14 
-0.021635 -3.06* -0.1429422 -2.02* 
t-13 
-0.0036174 -0.51 -0.1465595 -2.07* 
t-12 
-0.005098 -0.72 -0.1516575 -2.15* 
t-11 0.0018316 0.26 -0.1498259 -2.12* 
t-10 
-0.0013851 -0.20 -0.151211 -2.14* 
t-9 
-0.0125644 -1.77* -0.1637754 -2.32* 
t-8 
-0.0044209 -0.62 -0.1681963 -2.38* 
t-7 
-0.0076676 -1.08 -0.1758639 -2.49* 
t-6 
-0.0132143 -1.87* -0.1890782 -2.68* 
t-5 
-0.0076344 -1.08 -0.1967126 -2.78* 
t-4 
-0.0059118 -0.83 -0.2026244 -2.87* 
t-3 
-0.0016554 -0.23 -0.2042798 -2.89* 
t-2 
-0.0109199 -1.54 -0.2151997 -3.05* 
t-1 0.0047088 0.67 -0.2104909 -2.98* 
t=0 
-0.0023942 -0.34 -0.2128851 -3.01* 
t+1 
-0.0077679 -1.10 -0.220653 -3.12* 
t+2 
-0.0056466 -0.80 -0.2262996 -3.20* 
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t+3 
-0.0014536 -0.21 -0.2277532 -3.22* 
t+4 
-0.0081293 -1.15 -0.2358826 -3.34* 
t+5 
-0.0055102 -0.78 -0.2413927 -3.42* 
t+6 0.0030133 0.43 -0.2383794 -3.37* 
t+7 
-0.005427 -0.77 -0.2438064 -3.45* 
t+8 0.0001862 0.03 -0.2436203 -3.45* 
t+9 
-0.0034977 -0.49 -0.247118 -3.50* 
t+10 0.0103178 1.46 -0.2368002 -3.35* 
t+11 0.0015025 0.21 -0.2352977 -3.33* 
t+12 0.0067092 0.95 -0.2285884 -3.23* 
t+13 
-0.0047466 -0.67 -0.233335 -3.30* 
t+14 0.0014788 0.21 -0.2318562 -3.28* 
t+15 0.003318 0.47 -0.2285382 -3.23* 
t+16 0.0020656 0.29 -0.2264726 -3.20* 
t+17 0.0035918 0.51 -0.2228808 -3.15* 
t+18 
-0.0058149 -0.82 -0.2286956 -3.24* 
t+19 0.0029552 0.42 -0.2257405 -3.19* 
t+20 0.0065629 0.93 -0.2191775 -3.10* 
t+21 0.001738 0.25 -0.2174396 -3.08* 
t+22 0.0009104 0.13 -0.2165292 -3.06* 
t+23 
-0.0038 -0.54 -0.2203292 -3.12* 
t+24 
-0.0022123 -0.31 -0.2225416 -3.15* 
t+25 
-0.0076961 -1.09 -0.2302377 -3.26* 
t+26 
-0.0024494 -0.35 -0.2326871 -3.29* 
t+27 
-0.0003536 -0.05 -0.2330407 -3.30* 
t+28 
-0.0091249 -1.29 -0.2421656 -3.43* 
t+29 0.0029473 0.42 -0.2392183 -3.38* 
t+30 
-0.0467596 -6.60* -0.2859779 -4.05* 
t+31 0.00453 0.64 -0.2814479 -3.98* 
t+32 0.0020713 0.29 -0.2793766 -3.95* 
t+33 
-0.0035981 -0.51 -0.2829747 -4.00* 
t+34 0.0078172 1.10 -0.2751575 -3.89* 
t+35 
-0.0069104 -0.98 -0.2820679 -3.99* 
t+36 
-0.0027081 -0.38 -0.284776 -4.03* 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
TableA6.1 Mean-Adjusted Total Sample AARs and CAARs (* indicates 5% 
significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.003962612 0.711 0.003962612 0.252 
t-35 0.005835099 1.048 0.009797712 0.622 
t-34 
-0.009191206 -1.65* 0.000606506 0.039 
t-33 
-0.002701489 -0.485 -0.002094983 -0.133 
t-32 0.002294173 0.412 0.00019919 0.013 
t-31 0.00136271 0.245 0.001561901 0.099 
t-30 0.003005351 0.540 0.004567252 0.290 
t-29 
-0.002114628 -0.380 0.002452624 0.156 
t-28 
-0.004196414 -0.753 -0.00174379 -0.111 
t-27 
-0.001275579 -0.229 -0.003019369 -0.192 
t-26 
-0.002183666 -0.392 -0.005203035 -0.330 
t-25 0.003302042 0.593 -0.001900993 -0.121 
t-24 
-0.008370063 -1.503 -0.010271056 -0.652 
t-23 
-0.017839078 -3.20* -0.028110134 -1.785* 
t-22 
-0.000228192 -0.041 -0.028338326 -1.799* 
t-21 
-0.000583347 -0.105 -0.028921672 -1.836* 
t-20 
-0.004070244 -0.731 -0.032991917 -2.095* 
t-19 0.006179442 1.109 -0.026812475 -1.703* 
t-18 
-0.010439704 -1.87* -0.037252179 -2.365* 
t-17 
-0.004520818 -0.812 -0.041772997 -2.652* 
t-16 0.001717994 0.308 -0.040055003 -2.543* 
t-15 0.000941598 0.169 -0.039113405 -2.484* 
t-14 0.001259382 0.226 -0.037854024 -2.404* 
t-13 0.00812357 1.458 -0.029730453 -1.888* 
t-12 
-0.006294405 -1.130 -0.036024858 -2.287* 
t-11 0.005400291 0.969 -0.030624567 -1.945* 
t-10 0.005768379 1.036 -0.024856188 -1.578 
t-9 
-0.000939357 -0.169 -0.025795546 -1.638 
t-8 
-0.000879325 -0.158 -0.02667487 -1.694* 
t-7 
-0.000566606 -0.102 -0.027241477 -1.730* 
t-6 0.001482796 0.266 -0.025758681 -1.636 
t-5 0.003886512 0.698 -0.021872169 -1.389 
t-4 0.00026774 0.048 -0.021604429 -1.372 
t-3 0.00889698 1.597 -0.012707449 -0.807 
t-2 0.004780539 0.858 -0.00792691 -0.503 
t-1 0.004646473 0.834 -0.003280436 -0.208 
t=0 
-0.010551478 -1.89* -0.013831914 -0.878 
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t+1 
-0.007977224 -1.432 -0.021809139 -1.385 
t+2 
-0.000548169 -0.098 -0.022357307 -1.420 
t+3 0.000613161 0.110 -0.021744146 -1.381 
t+4 
-0.00302301 -0.543 -0.024767157 -1.573 
t+5 0.006434297 1.155 -0.018332859 -1.164 
t+6 0.005161341 0.927 -0.013171519 -0.836 
t+7 
-0.000628311 -0.113 -0.01379983 -0.876 
t+8 0.002552604 0.458 -0.011247226 -0.714 
t+9 0.002495207 0.448 -0.008752019 -0.556 
t+10 0.003939521 0.707 -0.004812498 -0.306 
t+11 0.008711205 1.564 0.003898707 0.248 
t+12 0.005995576 1.076 0.009894282 0.628 
t+13 0.002538019 0.456 0.012432301 0.789 
t+14 0.002641834 0.474 0.015074135 0.957 
t+15 0.001969236 0.354 0.017043371 1.082 
t+16 0.00031677 0.057 0.017360141 1.102 
t+17 0.002620232 0.470 0.019980373 1.269 
t+18 
-0.001101098 -0.198 0.018879275 1.199 
t+19 0.000853757 0.153 0.019733032 1.253 
t+20 
-0.001169067 -0.210 0.018563965 1.179 
t+21 
-0.001357021 -0.244 0.017206944 1.093 
t+22 
-0.004766143 -0.856 0.0124408 0.790 
t+23 0.000722835 0.130 0.013163636 0.836 
t+24 0.00285578 0.513 0.016019416 1.017 
t+25 
-0.003795845 -0.681 0.012223571 0.776 
t+26 
-0.008017928 -1.439 0.004205643 0.267 
t+27 
-0.001077314 -0.193 0.003128328 0.199 
t+28 
-5.19017E-05 -0.009 0.003076426 0.195 
t+29 0.003556561 0.638 0.006632987 0.421 
t+30 
-0.004746339 -0.852 0.001886648 0.120 
t+31 0.000395081 0.071 0.002281729 0.145 
t+32 
-0.006096183 -1.094 -0.003814454 -0.242 
t+33 
-0.000741726 -0.133 -0.004556181 -0.289 
t+34 
-0.001465317 -0.263 -0.006021498 -0.382 
t+35 
-0.002618975 -0.470 -0.008640473 -0.549 
t+36 0.000351958 0.063 -0.008288515 -0.526 
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APPENDIX 8 
 
 
Table A8.1 Mean-Adjusted Male Managed Funds AARs and CAARs (* indicates 
5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.004284757 0.7632 0.0042848 0.297 
t-35 0.004954865 0.8825 0.0092396 0.64 
t-34 
-0.01180166 -2.102* -0.002562 -0.177 
t-33 
-0.002667148 -0.475 -0.0052292 -0.362 
t-32 0.004161319 0.7412 -0.0010679 -0.074 
t-31 0.00442483 0.7881 0.003357 0.232 
t-30 0.005574898 0.993 0.0089319 0.618 
t-29 
-0.002127498 -0.379 0.0068044 0.471 
t-28 0.00042883 0.0764 0.0072332 0.501 
t-27 
-0.002643139 -0.471 0.0045901 0.318 
t-26 
-0.004679435 -0.833 -8.938E-05 -0.006 
t-25 0.00175426 0.3125 0.0016649 0.115 
t-24 
-0.008109571 -1.444 -0.0064447 -0.446 
t-23 
-0.014094426 -2.51* -0.0205391 -1.422 
t-22 0.001247112 0.2221 -0.019292 -1.336 
t-21 0.002812257 0.5009 -0.0164797 -1.141 
t-20 
-0.003416598 -0.609 -0.0198963 -1.378 
t-19 0.003018864 0.5377 -0.0168775 -1.169 
t-18 
-0.012002063 -2.138* -0.0288795 -2.00* 
t-17 
-0.004830755 -0.86 -0.0337103 -2.334* 
t-16 0.000191826 0.0342 -0.0335185 -2.321* 
t-15 
-0.002996331 -0.534 -0.0365148 -2.528* 
t-14 
-0.000497633 -0.089 -0.0370124 -2.563* 
t-13 0.007429444 1.3233 -0.029583 -2.048* 
t-12 
-0.004735942 -0.844 -0.0343189 -2.376* 
t-11 0.007864395 1.4007 -0.0264545 -1.832* 
t-10 0.007449794 1.3269 -0.0190047 -1.316 
t-9 
-0.001057515 -0.188 -0.0200623 -1.389 
t-8 
-0.003789955 -0.675 -0.0238522 -1.651* 
t-7 
-0.000758045 -0.135 -0.0246103 -1.704* 
t-6 0.004980713 0.8871 -0.0196295 -1.359 
t-5 0.0067712 1.206 -0.0128583 -0.89 
t-4 0.00059992 0.1069 -0.0122584 -0.849 
t-3 0.006473996 1.1531 -0.0057844 -0.4 
t-2 
-0.000252468 -0.045 -0.0060369 -0.418 
t-1 0.003757325 0.6692 -0.0022796 -0.158 
t=0 
-0.01308766 -2.331* -0.0153672 -1.064 
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t+1 
-0.010002813 -1.782* -0.02537 -1.757* 
t+2 
-0.001299631 -0.231 -0.0266697 -1.847* 
t+3 
-0.001440675 -0.257 -0.0281104 -1.946* 
t+4 
-0.004825131 -0.859 -0.0329355 -2.28* 
t+5 0.005102285 0.9088 -0.0278332 -1.927* 
t+6 0.001402943 0.2499 -0.0264303 -1.83* 
t+7 
-0.004178203 -0.744 -0.0306085 -2.119* 
t+8 0.00289644 0.5159 -0.027712 -1.919* 
t+9 0.00235212 0.4189 -0.0253599 -1.756* 
t+10 0.004986764 0.8882 -0.0203731 -1.411 
t+11 0.009538397 1.6989* -0.0108347 -0.75 
t+12 0.007842407 1.3968 -0.0029923 -0.207 
t+13 0.004341 0.80 0.0146373 0.99 
t+14 0.0033432 0.61 0.0179805 1.22 
t+15 0.0015325 0.28 0.019513 1.32 
t+16 9.083E-05 0.02 0.0196038 1.33 
t+17 0.0027443 0.50 0.0223481 1.51 
t+18 
-0.002299 -0.42 0.0200491 1.36 
t+19 0.0011388 0.21 0.0211879 1.44 
t+20 
-0.0036201 -0.67 0.0175678 1.19 
t+21 0.0007525 0.14 0.0183204 1.24 
t+22 
-0.0038275 -0.70 0.0144929 0.98 
t+23 0.0007118 0.13 0.0152047 1.03 
t+24 0.0028268 0.52 0.0180314 1.22 
t+25 
-0.0057765 -1.06 0.0122549 0.83 
t+26 
-0.0070529 -1.30 0.005202 0.35 
t+27 
-0.0014508 -0.27 0.0037512 0.25 
t+28 0.0028257 0.52 0.0065769 0.45 
t+29 0.0015184 0.28 0.0080953 0.55 
t+30 
-0.0060708 -1.12 0.0020246 0.14 
t+31 
-0.0022752 -0.42 -0.0002506 -0.02 
t+32 
-0.0067486 -1.24 -0.0069992 -0.47 
t+33 
-0.0026767 -0.49 -0.0096759 -0.66 
t+34 0.0001733 0.03 -0.0095026 -0.64 
t+35 
-0.0021377 -0.39 -0.0116403 -0.79 
t+36 0.0025392 0.47 -0.0091011 -0.62 
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Table A8.2 Mean-Adjusted Female Managed Funds AARs and CAARs (* indicates 
5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.006909869 0.4988 0.00690987 0.2471 
t-35 0.017153754 1.2383 0.02406362 0.8606 
t-34 0.002153941 0.1555 0.02621756 0.9376 
t-33 
-0.006658501 -0.481 0.01955906 0.6995 
t-32 
-0.009637488 -0.696 0.00992158 0.3548 
t-31 
-0.007187671 -0.519 0.0027339 0.0978 
t-30 0.002127275 0.1536 0.00486118 0.1739 
t-29 0.008476926 0.6119 0.0133381 0.477 
t-28 
-0.024472083 -1.767* -0.01113398 -0.398 
t-27 0.001798295 0.1298 -0.00933568 -0.334 
t-26 0.007164397 0.5172 -0.00217129 -0.078 
t-25 0.005405648 0.3902 0.00323436 0.1157 
t-24 
-0.014406836 -1.04 -0.01117247 -0.4 
t-23 
-0.032090334 -2.317* -0.04326281 -1.547 
t-22 
-0.003271247 -0.236 -0.04653405 -1.664* 
t-21 
-0.017639841 -1.273 -0.0641739 -2.295* 
t-20 
-0.014152574 -1.022 -0.07832647 -2.801* 
t-19 0.022299148 1.6097 -0.05602732 -2.004* 
t-18 
-0.005899042 -0.426 -0.06192636 -2.215* 
t-17 
-0.002662066 -0.192 -0.06458843 -2.31* 
t-16 0.015562708 1.1234 -0.04902572 -1.753* 
t-15 0.02114735 1.5266 -0.02787837 -0.997 
t-14 0.008543136 0.6167 -0.01933523 -0.692 
t-13 0.012380244 0.8937 -0.00695499 -0.249 
t-12 
-0.018221021 -1.315 -0.02517601 -0.9 
t-11 
-0.002281334 -0.165 -0.02745735 -0.982 
t-10 
-0.005161361 -0.373 -0.03261871 -1.167 
t-9 
-0.005522627 -0.399 -0.03814133 -1.364 
t-8 0.013872426 1.0014 -0.02426891 -0.868 
t-7 0.00043345 0.0313 -0.02383546 -0.852 
t-6 
-0.020063776 -1.448 -0.04389923 -1.57 
t-5 
-0.011705999 -0.845* -0.05560523 -1.989 
t-4 0.002375186 0.1715* -0.05323005 -1.904 
t-3 0.021009508 1.5166 -0.03222054 -1.152 
t-2 0.023904148 1.7256 -0.00831639 -0.297* 
t-1 0.007903357 0.5705 -0.00041303 -0.015 
t=0 
-0.002377955 -0.172 -0.00279099 -0.1 
t+1 
-0.007164369 -0.517 -0.00995536 -0.356 
t+2 
-0.005400574 -0.39 -0.01535593 -0.549 
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t+3 0.005320081 0.384 -0.01003585 -0.359 
t+4 0.005356329 0.3867 -0.00467952 -0.167 
t+5 0.007718461 0.5572 0.00303894 0.1087 
t+6 0.014379588 1.038 0.01741853 0.623 
t+7 0.002046044 0.1477 0.01946457 0.6961 
t+8 0.001625967 0.1174 0.02109054 0.7543 
t+9 
-0.005861982 -0.423 0.01522856 0.5446 
t+10 
-0.00857557 -0.619 0.00665299 0.2379 
t+11 0.001366368 0.0986 0.00801936 0.2868 
t+12 
-0.00843239 -0.609 -0.00041303 -0.015 
t+13 
-0.0075 -0.54 0.0012828 0.05 
t+14 
-0.0012441 -0.09 3.868E-05 0.00 
t+15 0.0043773 0.32 0.0044159 0.16 
t+16 0.0015625 0.11 0.0059785 0.21 
t+17 0.0019363 0.14 0.0079148 0.28 
t+18 0.005687 0.41 0.0136018 0.49 
t+19 
-0.0007299 -0.05 0.0128718 0.46 
t+20 0.0123115 0.89 0.0251834 0.90 
t+21 
-0.0127838 -0.92 0.0123995 0.44 
t+22 
-0.0098506 -0.71 0.0025489 0.09 
t+23 0.0007826 0.06 0.0033315 0.12 
t+24 0.0030106 0.22 0.0063421 0.23 
t+25 0.0066579 0.48 0.013 0.46 
t+26 
-0.0130845 -0.94 -8.456E-05 0.00 
t+27 0.0008835 0.06 0.0007989 0.03 
t+28 
-0.0151594 -1.09 -0.0143605 -0.51 
t+29 0.0140303 1.01 -0.0003302 -0.01 
t+30 0.0018758 0.14 0.0015457 0.06 
t+31 0.0136702 0.99 0.0152159 0.54 
t+32 
-0.0025895 -0.19 0.0126264 0.45 
t+33 0.0094167 0.68 0.0220431 0.79 
t+34 
-0.009863 -0.71 0.01218 0.44 
t+35 
-0.0050707 -0.37 0.0071094 0.25 
t+36 
-0.0107959 -0.78 -0.0036865 -0.13 
197 
Table A8.3 Mean-Adjusted UK Funds AARs and CAARs (* indicates 5% 
significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0080484 1.33 0.0080484 0.59 
t-35 0.0068871 1.14 0.0149355 1.10 
t-34 
-0.0087707 -1.45 0.0061648 0.45 
t-33 
-0.0005709 -0.09 0.0055939 0.41 
t-32 0.0054354 0.90 0.0110293 0.81 
t-31 
-0.0041657 -0.69 0.0068637 0.50 
t-30 0.0001112 0.02 0.0069749 0.51 
t-29 
-0.001054 -0.17 0.0059208 0.43 
t-28 0.0018906 0.31 0.0078114 0.57 
t-27 
-0.0020675 -0.34 0.005744 0.42 
t-26 0.0035931 0.59 0.0093371 0.69 
t-25 0.0068198 1.12 0.0161569 1.19 
t-24 
-0.0027824 -0.46 0.0133745 0.98 
t-23 
-0.0083903 -1.38 0.0049843 0.37 
t-22 
-0.0029862 -0.49 0.0019981 0.15 
t-21 0.0079096 1.30 0.0099077 0.73 
t-20 
-1.754E-05 0.00 0.0098901 0.73 
t-19 
-0.0006864 -0.11 0.0092038 0.68 
t-18 
-0.0120261 -1.98* -0.0028223 -0.21 
t-17 
-0.0038664 -0.64 -0.0066887 -0.49 
t-16 
-0.000866 -0.14 -0.0075547 -0.55 
t-15 
-0.0104208 -1.72* -0.0179755 -1.32 
t-14 
-0.0046369 -0.76 -0.0226124 -1.66* 
t-13 0.0013311 0.22 -0.0212813 -1.56 
t-12 
-0.0122282 -2.02* -0.0335095 -2.46* 
t-11 0.0060035 0.99 -0.027506 -2.02* 
t-10 0.0089186 1.47 -0.0185875 -1.37 
t-9 0.0006664 0.11 -0.0179211 -1.32 
t-8 
-0.0016569 -0.27 -0.019578 -1.44 
t-7 
-0.0014503 -0.24 -0.0210284 -1.54 
t-6 0.0082739 1.36 -0.0127545 -0.94 
t-5 0.0031254 0.52 -0.0096291 -0.71 
t-4 0.000494 0.08 -0.0091351 -0.67 
t-3 0.0023691 0.39 -0.006766 -0.50 
t-2 
-0.0054946 -0.91 -0.0122607 -0.90 
t-1 0.0124486 2.05* 0.0001879 0.01 
t=0 
-0.0178262 -2.94* -0.0176383 -1.30 
t+1 
-0.0087979 -1.45 -0.0264362 -1.94* 
t+2 
-0.0024842 -0.41 -0.0289204 -2.12* 
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t+3 
-0.0026565 -0.44 -0.0315769 -2.32* 
t+4 
-0.0069925 -1.15 -0.0385694 -2.83* 
t+5 0.0070508 1.16 -0.0315186 -2.32* 
t+6 0.0034138 0.56 -0.0281049 -2.06* 
t+7 0.0039968 0.66 -0.0241081 -1.77 
t+8 0.0062703 1.03 -0.0178378 -1.31 
t+9 
-0.0022891 -0.38 -0.0201269 -1.48 
t+10 0.0026851 0.44 -0.0174418 -1.28 
t+11 0.0109773 1.81* -0.0064645 -0.47 
t+12 0.0063124 1.04 -0.0001522 -0.01 
t+13 0.0063682 1.06 0.0097046 0.75 
t+14 0.0064825 1.08 0.0161871 1.24 
t+15 0.0018273 0.30 0.0180145 1.38 
t+16 0.0020266 0.34 0.0200411 1.54 
t+17 0.0006634 0.11 0.0207044 1.59 
t+18 
-0.0024914 -0.42 0.018213 1.40 
t+19 0.0021017 0.35 0.0203147 1.56 
t+20 
-0.0018355 -0.31 0.0184792 1.42 
t+21 0.0040724 0.68* 0.0225517 1.73 
t+22 
-0.0058859 -0.98 0.0166658 1.28 
t+23 
-0.0017287 -0.29 0.014937 1.15 
t+24 0.0077861 1.30* 0.0227231 1.75 
t+25 
-0.0028743 -0.48 0.0198488 1.53 
t+26 
-0.0041627 -0.69 0.015686 1.21 
t+27 
-0.0012867 -0.21 0.0143993 1.11 
t+28 0.0032283 0.54 0.0176276 1.36 
t+29 
-0.0039365 -0.66 0.0136911 1.05 
t+30 
-0.0056525 -0.94 0.0080387 0.62 
t+31 
-0.0072461 -1.21 0.0007926 0.06 
t+32 
-0.0038025 -0.63 -0.0030099 -0.23 
t+33 
-0.0048754 -0.81 -0.0078853 -0.61 
t+34 0.0006024 0.10 -0.0072829 -0.56 
t+35 
-0.0011885 -0.20 -0.0084714 -0.65 
t+36 
-0.0002178 -0.04 -0.0086892 -0.67 
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Table A8.4 Mean-Adjusted International Funds AARs and CAARs (* indicates 5% 
significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0023517 0.30 0.0023517 0.11 
t-35 0.0068423 0.87 0.009194 0.44 
t-34 
-0.0102693 -1.30 -0.0010753 -0.05 
t-33 
-0.0051632 -0.65 -0.0062385 -0.30 
t-32 
-0.0005057 -0.06 -0.0067441 -0.32 
t-31 0.0072938 0.92 0.0005497 0.03 
t-30 0.0085045 1.08 0.0090542 0.43 
t-29 
-6.897E-05 -0.01 0.0089852 0.43 
t-28 
-0.0074126 -0.94 0.0015726 0.07 
t-27 
-0.001809 -0.23 -0.0002364 -0.01 
t-26 
-0.0071542 -0.91 -0.0073906 -0.35 
t-25 
-0.0007224 -0.09 -0.008113 -0.38 
t-24 
-0.0134191 -1.70* -0.0215321 -1.02 
t-23 
-0.0228491 -2.90* -0.0443812 -2.10* 
t-22 0.0029127 0.37 -0.0414685 -1.96* 
t-21 
-0.0062751 -0.80 -0.0477436 -2.26* 
t-20 
-0.0086483 -1.10 -0.0563919 -2.67* 
t-19 0.0108221 1.37 -0.0455698 -2.16* 
t-18 
-0.0102978 -1.31 -0.0558676 -2.64* 
t-17 
-0.0048939 -0.62 -0.0607615 -2.88* 
t-16 0.0051015 0.65 -0.05566 -2.63* 
t-15 0.0087802 1.11 -0.0468798 -2.22* 
t-14 0.0048254 0.61 -0.0420544 -1.99* 
t-13 0.0130476 1.65* -0.0290068 -1.37 
t-12 
-0.0032576 -0.41 -0.0322644 -1.53 
t-11 0.0064075 0.81 -0.0258569 -1.22 
t-10 0.002924 0.37 -0.0229328 -1.09 
t-9 
-0.0035058 -0.44 -0.0264387 -1.25 
t-8 
-0.0004187 -0.05 -0.0268573 -1.27 
t-7 5.224E-05 0.01 -0.0268051 -1.27 
t-6 
-0.00417 -0.53 -0.0309751 -1.47 
t-5 0.0042728 0.54 -0.0267023 -1.26 
t-4 0.0011593 0.15 -0.0255429 -1.21 
t-3 0.0133205 1.69* -0.0122225 -0.58 
t-2 0.0100199 1.27 -0.0022026 -0.10 
t-1 
-0.0011933 -0.15 -0.0033959 -0.16 
t=0 
-0.0068433 -0.87 -0.0102393 -0.48 
t+1 
-0.0100704 -1.28 -0.0203097 -0.96 
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t+2 
-0.0015914 -0.20 -0.0219011 -1.04 
t+3 0.0012584 0.16 -0.0206427 -0.98 
t+4 
-0.000525 -0.07 -0.0211677 -1.00 
t+5 0.0044534 0.56 -0.0167143 -0.79 
t+6 0.0035423 0.45 -0.013172 -0.62 
t+7 
-0.0081994 -1.04 -0.0213714 -1.01 
t+8 0.0001875 0.02 -0.0211839 -1.00 
t+9 0.0033558 0.43 -0.0178281 -0.84 
t+10 0.0028909 0.37 -0.0149372 -0.71 
t+11 0.0062975 0.80 -0.0086397 -0.41 
t+12 0.004465 0.57 -0.0041747 -0.20 
t+13 
-0.0002799 -0.04 0.0143659 0.67 
t+14 
-0.0001564 -0.02 0.0142095 0.67 
t+15 0.0020734 0.27 0.0162829 0.76 
t+16 
-0.0009379 -0.12 0.015345 0.72 
t+17 0.0040562 0.54 0.0194012 0.91 
t+18 
-9.088E-05 -0.01 0.0193103 0.91 
t+19 
-3.247E-05 0.00 0.0192778 0.91 
t+20 
-0.0007055 -0.09 0.0185724 0.87 
t+21 
-0.0050823 -0.67 0.01349 0.63 
t+22 
-0.0039978 -0.53 0.0094922 0.45 
t+23 0.002387 0.32 0.0118792 0.56 
t+24 
-0.0005406 -0.07 0.0113386 0.53 
t+25 
-0.004417 -0.59 0.0069216 0.33 
t+26 
-0.0105881 -1.40 -0.0036665 -0.17 
t+27 
-0.0009377 -0.12 -0.0046042 -0.22 
t+28 
-0.0022387 -0.30 -0.0068429 -0.32 
t+29 0.0086087 1.14 0.0017658 0.08 
t+30 
-0.0041234 -0.55 -0.0023576 -0.11 
t+31 0.0055299 0.73 0.0031724 0.15 
t+32 
-0.0077017 -1.02 -0.0045294 -0.21 
t+33 0.0020719 0.27 -0.0024574 -0.12 
t+34 
-0.0028913 -0.38 -0.0053488 -0.25 
t+35 
-0.0035932 -0.48 -0.008942 -0.42 
t+36 0.0007523 0.10 -0.0081896 -0.38 
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Table A8.5 Mean-Adjusted Emerging Market Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0199773 1.12 0.0199773 0.33 
t-35 0.0002562 0.01 0.0202336 0.33 
t-34 0.0045412 0.25 0.0247748 0.41 
t-33 
-0.0097402 -0.54 0.0150346 0.25 
t-32 
-0.007968 -0.45 0.0070666 0.12 
t-31 
-0.0172543 -0.96 -0.0101877 -0.17 
t-30 0.0146082 0.82 0.0044205 0.07 
t-29 
-0.0173107 -0.97 -0.0128902 -0.21 
t-28 
-0.017529 -0.98 -0.0304192 -0.50 
t-27 
-0.0290515 -1.62 -0.0594707 -0.98 
t-26 
-0.0152978 -0.86 -0.0747685 -1.23 
t-25 0.0109037 0.61 -0.0638648 -1.05 
t-24 
-0.0221563 -1.24 -0.0860211 -1.41 
t-23 
-0.0331625 -1.85* -0.1191836 -1.96* 
t-22 0.0074013 0.41 -0.1117824 -1.84* 
t-21 0.0048395 0.27 -0.1069429 -1.76* 
t-20 
-0.0198974 -1.11 -0.1268403 -2.08* 
t-19 
-0.0082487 -0.46 -0.1350889 -2.22* 
t-18 
-0.0057558 -0.32 -0.1408447 -2.31* 
t-17 
-0.0166013 -0.93 -0.157446 -2.59* 
t-16 0.0244977 1.37 -0.1329483 -2.18* 
t-15 0.0225987 1.26 -0.1103496 -1.81* 
t-14 0.0234269 1.31 -0.0869227 -1.43 
t-13 0.0297335 1.66* -0.0571892 -0.94 
t-12 0.0130808 0.73 -0.0441084 -0.72 
t-11 0.0349125 1.95* -0.009196 -0.15 
t-10 0.019949 1.12 0.010753 0.18 
t-9 0.0280447 1.57 0.0387977 0.64 
t-8 
-0.0089994 -0.50 0.0297982 0.49 
t-7 
-0.0013894 -0.08 0.0284088 0.47 
t-6 
-0.0041558 -0.23 0.0242531 0.40 
t-5 
-0.0206454 -1.15 0.0036076 0.06 
t-4 
-0.0076237 -0.43 -0.004016 -0.07 
t-3 0.0096707 0.54 0.0056547 0.09 
t-2 0.0022763 0.13 0.0079309 0.13 
t-1 
-0.0079309 -0.44 -3.816E-17 0.00 
t=0 
-0.0034808 -0.19 -0.0034808 -0.06 
t+1 
-0.0261673 -1.46 -0.0296482 -0.49 
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t+2 
-0.0100385 -0.56 -0.0396867 -0.65 
t+3 
-0.0124387 -0.70 -0.0521254 -0.86 
t+4 0.0138576 0.77 -0.0382677 -0.63 
t+5 0.0083453 0.47 -0.0299225 -0.49 
t+6 0.0237665 1.33 -0.006156 -0.10 
t+7 
-0.0107823 -0.60 -0.0169383 -0.28 
t+8 0.0233853 1.31 0.006447 0.11 
t+9 
-0.0053026 -0.30 0.0011444 0.02 
t+10 0.0089239 0.50 0.0100683 0.17 
t+11 
-0.0122987 -0.69 -0.0022304 -0.04 
t+12 0.0022304 0.12 -3.686E-17 0.00 
t+13 
-0.0156727 -0.88 0.0165691 0.27 
t+14 
-0.0043014 -0.24 0.0122677 0.20 
t+15 
-0.008032 -0.45 0.0042357 0.07 
t+16 0.0065282 0.36 0.0107638 0.18 
t+17 
-0.02261 -1.26 -0.0118462 -0.19 
t+18 
-0.0008673 -0.05 -0.0127135 -0.21 
t+19 
-0.0115938 -0.65 -0.0243074 -0.40 
t+20 0.003036 0.17 -0.0212713 -0.35 
t+21 
-0.0045741 -0.26 -0.0258454 -0.42 
t+22 
-0.001187 -0.07 -0.0270324 -0.44 
t+23 0.0059399 0.33 -0.0210925 -0.35 
t+24 
-0.0021807 -0.12 -0.0232732 -0.38 
t+25 
-0.0234237 -1.31 -0.0466969 -0.77 
t+26 
-0.0046009 -0.26 -0.0512979 -0.84 
t+27 
-0.0016941 -0.09 -0.052992 -0.87 
t+28 0.0015395 0.09 -0.0514525 -0.84 
t+29 0.0108 0.60 -0.0406525 -0.67 
t+30 
-0.0086157 -0.48 -0.0492682 -0.81 
t+31 0.0239428 1.34 -0.0253254 -0.42 
t+32 
-0.0168878 -0.94 -0.0422132 -0.69 
t+33 0.0325923 1.82* -0.0096208 -0.16 
t+34 0.0023108 0.13 -0.00731 -0.12 
t+35 0.0275817 1.54 0.0202717 0.33 
t+36 
-0.0149403 -0.84 0.0053314 0.09 
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Table A8.6 Mean-Adjusted Developed Market Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0031205 0.56 0.0031205 0.22 
t-35 0.0075025 1.34 0.010623 0.74 
t-34 
-0.011006 -1.97* -0.0003829 -0.03 
t-33 
-0.0026644 -0.48 -0.0030473 -0.21 
t-32 0.0028681 0.51 -0.0001792 -0.01 
t-31 0.0044083 0.79 0.0042291 0.29 
t-30 0.0041561 0.74 0.0083853 0.58 
t-29 0.0010336 0.18 0.0094189 0.66 
t-28 
-0.0023761 -0.42 0.0070428 0.49 
t-27 0.0004405 0.08 0.0074833 0.52 
t-26 
-0.0017337 -0.31 0.0057497 0.40 
t-25 0.0016362 0.29 0.0073858 0.51 
t-24 
-0.0080514 -1.44 -0.0006656 -0.05 
t-23 
-0.0157138 -2.81* -0.0163794 -1.14 
t-22 
-3.496E-05 -0.01 -0.0164144 -1.14 
t-21 
-0.0009023 -0.16 -0.0173166 -1.21 
t-20 
-0.0039636 -0.71 -0.0212802 -1.48 
t-19 0.0072778 1.30 -0.0140024 -0.97 
t-18 
-0.0114001 -2.04* -0.0254025 -1.77* 
t-17 
-0.0035484 -0.63 -0.0289509 -2.01* 
t-16 0.0010271 0.18 -0.0279238 -1.94* 
t-15 
-0.0007552 -0.13 -0.028679 -2.00* 
t-14 
-0.0007361 -0.13 -0.0294151 -2.05* 
t-13 0.0066133 1.18 -0.0228019 -1.59 
t-12 
-0.0083822 -1.50 -0.0311841 -2.17* 
t-11 0.0041492 0.74 -0.0270349 -1.88* 
t-10 0.0043454 0.78 -0.0226895 -1.58 
t-9 
-0.0039418 -0.70 -0.0266313 -1.85* 
t-8 
-0.0003462 -0.06 -0.0269776 -1.88* 
t-7 
-0.0005077 -0.09 -0.0274852 -1.91* 
t-6 0.0013189 0.24 -0.0261663 -1.82* 
t-5 0.0055465 0.99 -0.0206198 -1.43 
t-4 0.0014931 0.27 -0.0191267 -1.33 
t-3 0.0087497 1.56 -0.010377 -0.72 
t-2 0.0037283 0.67 -0.0066487 -0.46 
t-1 0.0053064 0.95 -0.0013422 -0.09 
t=0 
-0.0119289 -2.13* -0.0132712 -0.92 
t+1 
-0.0083592 -1.49 -0.0216304 -1.51 
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t+2 
-0.0013819 -0.25 -0.0230123 -1.60 
t+3 0.0005096 0.09 -0.0225027 -1.57 
t+4 
-0.0044057 -0.79 -0.0269084 -1.87* 
t+5 0.0053213 0.95 -0.021587 -1.50 
t+6 0.002041 0.36 -0.019546 -1.36 
t+7 
-0.0026342 -0.47 -0.0221803 -1.54 
t+8 0.0012141 0.22 -0.0209662 -1.46 
t+9 0.0014839 0.27 -0.0194823 -1.36 
t+10 0.0023692 0.42 -0.0171131 -1.19 
t+11 0.0096904 1.73* -0.0074227 -0.52 
t+12 0.0054396 0.97 -0.0019831 -0.14 
t+13 0.0039156 0.71 0.0130704 0.90 
t+14 0.0032245 0.59 0.0162949 1.12 
t+15 0.0026618 0.48 0.0189567 1.30 
t+16 
-0.0002319 -0.04 0.0187248 1.28 
t+17 0.0045494 0.83 0.0232742 1.59 
t+18 
-0.0011522 -0.21 0.022122 1.52 
t+19 0.0019676 0.36 0.0240896 1.65* 
t+20 
-0.0014163 -0.26 0.0226732 1.55 
t+21 
-0.0010816 -0.20 0.0215916 1.48 
t+22 
-0.0051854 -0.94 0.0164062 1.12 
t+23 0.0003493 0.06 0.0167555 1.15 
t+24 0.00331 0.60 0.0200655 1.37 
t+25 
-0.002148 -0.39 0.0179175 1.23 
t+26 
-0.0083412 -1.52 0.0095763 0.66 
t+27 
-0.0011372 -0.21 0.0084391 0.58 
t+28 
-0.0002389 -0.04 0.0082001 0.56 
t+29 0.0030096 0.55 0.0112097 0.77 
t+30 
-0.0045247 -0.82 0.006685 0.46 
t+31 
-0.0014143 -0.26 0.0052707 0.36 
t+32 
-0.0051903 -0.94 8.036E-05 0.01 
t+33 
-0.0039134 -0.71 -0.0038331 -0.26 
t+34 
-0.001854 -0.34 -0.0056871 -0.39 
t+35 
-0.005294 -0.96 -0.010981 -0.75 
t+36 0.0017375 0.32 -0.0092435 -0.63 
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Table A8.7 Mean-Adjusted Equity Funds AARs and CAARs (* indicates 5% 
significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0043837 0.60 0.0043837 0.23 
t-35 0.0109248 1.49 0.0153085 0.81 
t-34 
-0.0128388 -1.75* 0.0024698 0.13 
t-33 
-0.0039266 -0.53 -0.0014568 -0.08 
t-32 0.0034693 0.47 0.0020125 0.11 
t-31 0.0029102 0.40 0.0049227 0.26 
t-30 0.0064203 0.87 0.0113431 0.60 
t-29 
-0.0008123 -0.11 0.0105307 0.55 
t-28 
-0.0038094 -0.52 0.0067213 0.35 
t-27 
-0.0025613 -0.35 0.00416 0.22 
t-26 
-0.0035973 -0.49 0.0005627 0.03 
t-25 0.0040096 0.55 0.0045722 0.24 
t-24 
-0.0124502 -1.70* -0.007878 -0.41 
t-23 
-0.0222372 -3.03* -0.0301152 -1.58 
t-22 
-0.0003663 -0.05 -0.0304814 -1.60 
t-21 
-0.0007779 -0.11 -0.0312593 -1.64 
t-20 
-0.0059753 -0.81 -0.0372346 -1.96* 
t-19 0.0073758 1.00 -0.0298588 -1.57 
t-18 
-0.0126774 -1.73* -0.0425362 -2.24* 
t-17 
-0.0053786 -0.73 -0.0479148 -2.52* 
t-16 0.0036972 0.50 -0.0442176 -2.33* 
t-15 0.0020172 0.27 -0.0422005 -2.22* 
t-14 0.0014553 0.20 -0.0407452 -2.14* 
t-13 0.0105501 1.44 -0.0301951 -1.59 
t-12 
-0.0086338 -1.18 -0.0388289 -2.04* 
t-11 0.0098673 1.34 -0.0289615 -1.52 
t-10 0.0061676 0.84 -0.022794 -1.20 
t-9 
-0.0018207 -0.25 -0.0246147 -1.29 
t-8 
-0.0011283 -0.15 -0.025743 -1.35 
t-7 
-0.0020082 -0.27 -0.0277512 -1.46 
t-6 0.0013099 0.18 -0.0264412 -1.39 
t-5 0.0034367 0.47 -0.0230045 -1.21 
t-4 0.0005403 0.07 -0.0224642 -1.18 
t-3 0.010832 1.48 -0.0116322 -0.61 
t-2 0.0047411 0.65 -0.006891 -0.36 
t-1 0.0046296 0.63 -0.0022614 -0.12 
t=0 
-0.0146029 -1.99* -0.0168643 -0.89 
t+1 
-0.0124704 -1.70* -0.0293347 -1.54 
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t+2 
-0.0032483 -0.44 -0.032583 -1.71* 
t+3 
-0.0003766 -0.05 -0.0329596 -1.73* 
t+4 
-0.004465 -0.61 -0.0374246 -1.97* 
t+5 0.0076449 1.04 -0.0297797 -1.57 
t+6 0.0058351 0.79 -0.0239445 -1.26 
t+7 
-0.0039555 -0.54 -0.0279 -1.47 
t+8 0.0031738 0.43 -0.0247262 -1.30 
t+9 0.0011643 0.16 -0.0235619 -1.24 
t+10 0.0036053 0.49 -0.0199566 -1.05 
t+11 0.0103235 1.41 -0.0096331 -0.51 
t+12 0.0066311 0.90 -0.003002 -0.16 
t+13 0.0039733 0.55 0.0123735 0.63 
t+14 0.003598 0.50 0.0159715 0.82 
t+15 0.0022919 0.32 0.0182634 0.94 
t+16 0.00195 0.27 0.0202134 1.04 
t+17 0.0030184 0.42 0.0232318 1.19 
t+18 
-0.0013143 -0.18 0.0219175 1.12 
t+19 0.0009353 0.13 0.0228528 1.17 
t+20 
-0.0018555 -0.26 0.0209973 1.08 
t+21 
-0.0016762 -0.23 0.0193211 0.99 
t+22 
-0.0063185 -0.87 0.0130026 0.67 
t+23 0.0009032 0.12 0.0139058 0.71 
t+24 0.0038535 0.53 0.0177593 0.91 
t+25 
-0.0041631 -0.58 0.0135961 0.70 
t+26 
-0.0096119 -1.33 0.0039843 0.20 
t+27 
-0.0013532 -0.19 0.0026311 0.13 
t+28 
-0.0004723 -0.07 0.0021589 0.11 
t+29 0.004964 0.69 0.0071228 0.37 
t+30 
-0.0063755 -0.88 0.0007474 0.04 
t+31 0.0025613 0.35 0.0033087 0.17 
t+32 
-0.0081255 -1.12 -0.0048168 -0.25 
t+33 
-0.0004941 -0.07 -0.0053109 -0.27 
t+34 
-0.0014015 -0.19 -0.0067124 -0.34 
t+35 
-0.0037821 -0.52 -0.0104945 -0.54 
t+36 0.0007769 0.11 -0.0097176 -0.50 
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Table A8.8 Mean-Adjusted Bond Funds AARs and CAARs (* indicates 5% 
significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0060128 1.79* 0.0060128 1.08 
t-35 
-0.0090819 -2.70* -0.0030691 -0.55 
t-34 0.0030552 0.91 -1.389E-05 0.00 
t-33 
-0.0007171 -0.21 -0.000731 -0.13 
t-32 
-0.0037653 -1.12 -0.0044963 -0.81 
t-31 0.0013835 0.41 -0.0031129 -0.56 
t-30 
-0.0001366 -0.04 -0.0032495 -0.58 
t-29 0.0007426 0.22 -0.0025069 -0.45 
t-28 
-0.002823 -0.84 -0.0053299 -0.96 
t-27 0.0005755 0.17 -0.0047544 -0.85 
t-26 0.0003483 0.10 -0.0044061 -0.79 
t-25 
-0.0041453 -1.23 -0.0085514 -1.53 
t-24 0.004215 1.25 -0.0043364 -0.78 
t-23 0.0030969 0.92 -0.0012395 -0.22 
t-22 0.0039377 1.17 0.0026982 0.48 
t-21 0.0006902 0.21 0.0033885 0.61 
t-20 
-0.0018513 -0.55 0.0015372 0.28 
t-19 0.0015212 0.45 0.0030584 0.55 
t-18 
-0.0045674 -1.36 -0.001509 -0.27 
t-17 
-0.0010682 -0.32 -0.0025772 -0.46 
t-16 
-0.0011391 -0.34 -0.0037164 -0.67 
t-15 
-0.0035163 -1.05 -0.0072327 -1.30 
t-14 
-0.0010231 -0.30 -0.0082558 -1.48 
t-13 
-0.0006555 -0.20 -0.0089113 -1.60 
t-12 
-0.000256 -0.08 -0.0091673 -1.64 
t-11 
-0.0075666 -2.25* -0.0167339 -3.00* 
t-10 0.0024381 0.73 -0.0142958 -2.56* 
t-9 
-0.0016427 -0.49 -0.0159385 -2.86* 
t-8 
-0.0001521 -0.05 -0.0160906 -2.88* 
t-7 0.0050617 1.51 -0.011029 -1.98* 
t-6 
-0.0004358 -0.13 -0.0114647 -2.06* 
t-5 0.0052198 1.55 -0.0062449 -1.12 
t-4 0.0022323 0.66 -0.0040126 -0.72 
t-3 0.0009217 0.27 -0.0030909 -0.55 
t-2 
-0.0007001 -0.21 -0.003791 -0.68 
t-1 0.0036209 1.08 -0.0001701 -0.03 
t=0 0.001272 0.38 0.0011019 0.20 
t+1 0.0018683 0.56 0.0029702 0.53 
208 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t+2 0.0030741 0.91 0.0060443 1.08 
t+3 
-0.0002641 -0.08 0.0057802 1.04 
t+4 0.0017967 0.53 0.0075768 1.36 
t+5 
-0.0027611 -0.82 0.0048157 0.86 
t+6 
-0.0056681 -1.69* -0.0008524 -0.15 
t+7 
-0.0001401 -0.04 -0.0009925 -0.18 
t+8 0.0008119 0.24 -0.0001805 -0.03 
t+9 0.0005127 0.15 0.0003321 0.06 
t+10 
-0.0003136 -0.09 1.857E-05 0.00 
t+11 3.015E-05 0.01 4.872E-05 0.01 
t+12 
-0.0002609 -0.08 -0.0002121 -0.04 
t+13 
-0.003002 -0.86 0.01382 2.50* 
t+14 
-0.0010299 -0.29 0.0127901 2.31* 
t+15 0.0007366 0.21 0.0135267 2.45* 
t+16 
-0.0059221 -1.69* 0.0076046 1.38 
t+17 0.0010992 0.31 0.0087039 1.57 
t+18 
-0.0002909 -0.08 0.008413 1.52 
t+19 0.0005502 0.16 0.0089632 1.62 
t+20 0.0014909 0.43 0.0104542 1.89* 
t+21 
-0.0001402 -0.04 0.0103139 1.87* 
t+22 0.0011523 0.33 0.0114663 2.07* 
t+23 2.051E-05 0.01 0.0114868 2.08* 
t+24 
-0.0009863 -0.28 0.0105004 1.90* 
t+25 
-0.0023586 -0.67 0.0081418 1.47 
t+26 
-0.0016422 -0.47 0.0064996 1.18 
t+27 2.607E-05 0.01 0.0065257 1.18 
t+28 0.0016295 0.47 0.0081552 1.48 
t+29 
-0.0021051 -0.60 0.0060501 1.09 
t+30 0.0016221 0.46 0.0076721 1.39 
t+31 
-0.0077283 -2.21* -5.621E-05 -0.01 
t+32 0.001502 0.43 0.0014458 0.26 
t+33 
-0.001646 -0.47 -0.0002002 -0.04 
t+34 
-0.0016923 -0.48 -0.0018925 -0.34 
t+35 0.0014926 0.43 -0.0003999 -0.07 
t+36 
-0.0011354 -0.32 -0.0015354 -0.28 
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Table A8.9 Mean-Adjusted Equity Growth Funds AARs and CAARs (* indicates 
5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0100857 0.97 0.0100857 0.50 
t-35 0.0144151 1.39 0.0245008 1.21 
t-34 
-0.024288 -2.34* 0.0002127 0.01 
t-33 
-0.0036794 -0.35 -0.0034667 -0.17 
t-32 0.0131967 1.27 0.00973 0.48 
t-31 0.0059854 0.58 0.0157154 0.78 
t-30 0.0068679 0.66 0.0225832 1.12 
t-29 0.00108 0.10 0.0236632 1.17 
t-28 
-0.015929 -1.54 0.0077342 0.38 
t-27 
-0.0047428 -0.46 0.0029914 0.15 
t-26 0.0083586 0.81 0.01135 0.56 
t-25 0.0072872 0.70 0.0186372 0.92 
t-24 
-0.0117871 -1.14 0.0068501 0.34 
t-23 
-0.0216824 -2.09* -0.0148323 -0.73 
t-22 
-0.0014701 -0.14 -0.0163024 -0.81 
t-21 0.007662 0.74 -0.0086404 -0.43 
t-20 0.0006393 0.06 -0.0080011 -0.40 
t-19 
-0.0013445 -0.13 -0.0093456 -0.46 
t-18 
-0.0146876 -1.42 -0.0240333 -1.19 
t-17 
-0.0140508 -1.36 -0.0380841 -1.88* 
t-16 
-0.0014821 -0.14 -0.0395662 -1.96* 
t-15 0.0129971 1.25 -0.0265692 -1.31 
t-14 
-0.00074 -0.07 -0.0273092 -1.35 
t-13 0.0060756 0.59 -0.0212335 -1.05 
t-12 
-0.0132823 -1.28 -0.0345158 -1.71* 
t-11 0.0045089 0.44 -0.0300069 -1.48 
t-10 0.0075772 0.73 -0.0224297 -1.11 
t-9 
-0.0058193 -0.56 -0.028249 -1.40 
t-8 0.0015708 0.15 -0.0266782 -1.32 
t-7 
-0.009683 -0.93 -0.0363612 -1.80* 
t-6 
-0.0030429 -0.29 -0.0394041 -1.95* 
t-5 0.0046349 0.45 -0.0347691 -1.72* 
t-4 0.0009831 0.09 -0.033786 -1.67* 
t-3 0.0187884 1.81* -0.0149976 -0.74 
t-2 0.0098981 0.95 -0.0050995 -0.25 
t-1 0.005368 0.52 0.0002685 0.01 
t=0 
-0.0144814 -1.40 -0.0142129 -0.70 
t+1 
-0.0118812 -1.15 -0.026094 -1.29 
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t+2 
-0.0022886 -0.22 -0.0283826 -1.40 
t+3 0.0021765 0.21 -0.0262061 -1.30 
t+4 
-0.0028467 -0.27 -0.0290528 -1.44 
t+5 0.0116349 1.12 -0.0174179 -0.86 
t+6 0.0076737 0.74 -0.0097443 -0.48 
t+7 
-0.0018435 -0.18 -0.0115878 -0.57 
t+8 0.0001505 0.01 -0.0114374 -0.57 
t+9 0.0063988 0.62 -0.0050386 -0.25 
t+10 
-0.0047091 -0.45 -0.0097477 -0.48 
t+11 0.0068484 0.66 -0.0028993 -0.14 
t+12 0.0011896 0.11 -0.0017097 -0.08 
t+13 
-0.0012568 -0.13 0.0133042 0.63 
t+14 
-0.0004983 -0.05 0.0128058 0.61 
t+15 
-0.0001508 -0.02 0.012655 0.60 
t+16 
-0.0021046 -0.21 0.0105504 0.50 
t+17 0.0054924 0.55 0.0160428 0.76 
t+18 
-0.0043995 -0.44 0.0116433 0.55 
t+19 
-0.0020795 -0.21 0.0095638 0.45 
t+20 
-0.00016 -0.02 0.0094038 0.45 
t+21 
-0.0020735 -0.21 0.0073302 0.35 
t+22 0.0004553 0.05 0.0077856 0.37 
t+23 0.0051795 0.52 0.0129651 0.61 
t+24 0.0045742 0.46 0.0175393 0.83 
t+25 
-0.0050531 -0.50 0.0124862 0.59 
t+26 
-0.0083273 -0.83 0.0041589 0.20 
t+27 
-0.0018413 -0.18 0.0023177 0.11 
t+28 0.0009132 0.09 0.0032308 0.15 
t+29 0.0048371 0.48 0.008068 0.38 
t+30 
-0.0063967 -0.64 0.0016713 0.08 
t+31 
-0.0006018 -0.06 0.0010695 0.05 
t+32 
-0.0092667 -0.92 -0.0081972 -0.39 
t+33 
-0.0057997 -0.58 -0.0139969 -0.66 
t+34 0.0014142 0.14 -0.0125826 -0.60 
t+35 
-0.0043818 -0.44 -0.0169644 -0.80 
t+36 0.0063713 0.63 -0.0105931 -0.50 
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Table A8.10 Mean-Adjusted Equity Value Funds AARs and CAARs (* indicates 
5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 
-0.0342597 -1.08 -0.0342597 -0.45 
t-35 0.0277083 0.87 -0.0065514 -0.09 
t-34 
-0.0448981 -1.42 -0.0514495 -0.67 
t-33 0.0039595 0.13 -0.04749 -0.62 
t-32 
-0.046692 -1.47 -0.094182 -1.23 
t-31 
-0.0061736 -0.19 -0.1003556 -1.31 
t-30 
-0.0575597 -1.82* -0.1579153 -2.06* 
t-29 
-0.0049017 -0.15 -0.162817 -2.12* 
t-28 0.0036168 0.11 -0.1592002 -2.07* 
t-27 0.012735 0.40 -0.1464652 -1.91* 
t-26 
-0.0275887 -0.87 -0.1740539 -2.27* 
t-25 
-0.0082733 -0.26 -0.1823272 -2.38* 
t-24 0.0416528 1.32 -0.1406743 -1.83* 
t-23 
-0.0651322 -2.06* -0.2058066 -2.68* 
t-22 
-0.0479293 -1.51 -0.2537359 -3.31* 
t-21 
-0.0312228 -0.99 -0.2849586 -3.71* 
t-20 
-0.0089412 -0.28 -0.2938999 -3.83* 
t-19 0.0283243 0.89 -0.2655755 -3.46* 
t-18 
-0.0156583 -0.49 -0.2812339 -3.67* 
t-17 0.0560776 1.77* -0.2251562 -2.93* 
t-16 0.064448 2.04* -0.1607083 -2.09* 
t-15 
-0.0102418 -0.32 -0.1709501 -2.23* 
t-14 
-0.007983 -0.25 -0.1789331 -2.33* 
t-13 0.0144553 0.46 -0.1644778 -2.14* 
t-12 
-0.0097205 -0.31 -0.1741983 -2.27* 
t-11 0.026457 0.84 -0.1477413 -1.93* 
t-10 
-0.0052437 -0.17 -0.1529851 -1.99* 
t-9 0.024715 0.78 -0.1282701 -1.67* 
t-8 0.0290103 0.92 -0.0992598 -1.29 
t-7 0.0246932 0.78 -0.0745666 -0.97 
t-6 
-0.0246541 -0.78 -0.0992207 -1.29 
t-5 0.0245089 0.77 -0.0747118 -0.97 
t-4 
-0.0217817 -0.69 -0.0964935 -1.26 
t-3 0.0310668 0.98 -0.0654267 -0.85 
t-2 0.0310198 0.98 -0.0344068 -0.45 
t-1 0.006272 0.20 -0.0281349 -0.37 
t=0 0.0121365 0.38 -0.0159984 -0.21 
t+1 
-0.0044728 -0.14 -0.0204712 -0.27 
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t+2 0.0025326 0.08 -0.0179385 -0.23 
t+3 0.0146494 0.46 -0.0032892 -0.04 
t+4 
-0.0349757 -1.10 -0.0382648 -0.50 
t+5 
-0.0199079 -0.63 -0.0581727 -0.76 
t+6 0.0141406 0.45 -0.0440321 -0.57 
t+7 0.0155805 0.49 -0.0284517 -0.37 
t+8 0.0229239 0.72 -0.0055278 -0.07 
t+9 
-0.0104467 -0.33 -0.0159746 -0.21 
t+10 0.0029396 0.09 -0.013035 -0.17 
t+11 
-0.0253132 -0.80 -0.0383482 -0.50 
t+12 0.0102133 0.32 -0.0281349 -0.37 
t+13 
-0.0048716 -0.15 -0.0040494 -0.05 
t+14 0.0500649 1.58 0.0460154 0.60 
t+15 0.0061773 0.20 0.0521928 0.68 
t+16 0.0362252 1.14 0.088418 1.15 
t+17 0.0002227 0.01 0.0886407 1.16 
t+18 
-0.0331651 -1.05 0.0554756 0.72 
t+19 
-0.0090571 -0.29 0.0464186 0.60 
t+20 0.0108061 0.34 0.0572247 0.75 
t+21 
-0.0141558 -0.45 0.0430689 0.56 
t+22 0.0036662 0.12 0.0467351 0.61 
t+23 0.0131405 0.41 0.0598756 0.78 
t+24 0.0141965 0.45 0.0740721 0.97 
t+25 
-0.0084275 -0.27 0.0656446 0.86 
t+26 
-0.0383256 -1.21 0.027319 0.36 
t+27 
-0.0043466 -0.14 0.0229723 0.30 
t+28 
-0.0072904 -0.23 0.0156819 0.20 
t+29 0.0189609 0.60 0.0346428 0.45 
t+30 0.0160956 0.51 0.0507384 0.66 
t+31 
-0.0091919 -0.29 0.0415465 0.54 
t+32 
-0.024683 -0.78 0.0168636 0.22 
t+33 
-0.0173205 -0.55 -0.000457 -0.01 
t+34 
-0.0066993 -0.21 -0.0071563 -0.09 
t+35 0.0073671 0.23 0.0002109 0.00 
t+36 
-0.0354322 -1.12 -0.0352213 -0.46 
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Table A8.11 Mean-Adjusted Equity Small-Cap Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0124922 0.72 0.0124922 0.39 
t-35 
-0.0017885 -0.10 0.0107037 0.34 
t-34 
-0.0183511 -1.05 -0.0076474 -0.24 
t-33 
-0.012323 -0.71 -0.0199704 -0.63 
t-32 0.0201082 1.15 0.0001378 0.00 
t-31 0.0073296 0.42 0.0074674 0.24 
t-30 0.0099456 0.57 0.017413 0.55 
t-29 0.0338731 1.95* 0.0512862 1.61 
t-28 0.0182493 1.05 0.0695355 2.19* 
t-27 0.0157655 0.91 0.085301 2.69* 
t-26 0.0107071 0.61 0.0960081 3.02* 
t-25 0.0091062 0.52 0.1051143 3.31* 
t-24 
-0.0321892 -1.85* 0.0729252 2.30* 
t-23 
-0.0303384 -1.74* 0.0425867 1.34 
t-22 0.0011623 0.07 0.043749 1.38 
t-21 
-0.0050973 -0.29 0.0386517 1.22 
t-20 
-0.007171 -0.41 0.0314807 0.99 
t-19 0.0134854 0.77 0.0449661 1.42 
t-18 
-0.0230101 -1.32 0.021956 0.69 
t-17 
-0.0250131 -1.44 -0.0030571 -0.10 
t-16 0.0086203 0.50 0.0055632 0.18 
t-15 
-0.008612 -0.49 -0.0030488 -0.10 
t-14 
-0.0223843 -1.29 -0.0254331 -0.80 
t-13 0.0293564 1.69* 0.0039233 0.12 
t-12 
-0.0095358 -0.55 -0.0056124 -0.18 
t-11 0.026584 1.53 0.0209716 0.66 
t-10 0.0264678 1.52 0.0474394 1.49 
t-9 
-0.0060501 -0.35 0.0413893 1.30 
t-8 
-0.0116122 -0.67 0.0297771 0.94 
t-7 
-0.0176616 -1.01 0.0121156 0.38 
t-6 3.711E-05 0.00 0.0121527 0.38 
t-5 
-0.0076019 -0.44 0.0045507 0.14 
t-4 
-0.0004316 -0.02 0.0041191 0.13 
t-3 0.0007406 0.04 0.0048598 0.15 
t-2 
-0.0126825 -0.73 -0.0078228 -0.25 
t-1 0.020043 1.15 0.0122202 0.38 
t=0 
-0.0247079 -1.42 -0.0124877 -0.39 
t+1 
-0.0257634 -1.48 -0.0382511 -1.20 
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t+2 0.0024377 0.14 -0.0358134 -1.13 
t+3 0.0045297 0.26 -0.0312837 -0.99 
t+4 
-0.0094476 -0.54 -0.0407313 -1.28 
t+5 0.006604 0.38 -0.0341273 -1.07 
t+6 0.0162051 0.93 -0.0179222 -0.56 
t+7 
-0.0058651 -0.34 -0.0237873 -0.75 
t+8 0.009315 0.53 -0.0144723 -0.46 
t+9 
-0.0084318 -0.48 -0.0229041 -0.72 
t+10 0.0029537 0.17 -0.0199505 -0.63 
t+11 0.015705 0.90 -0.0042454 -0.13 
t+12 0.0164656 0.95 0.0122202 0.38 
t+13 0.0163964 0.94 0.0741224 2.33* 
t+14 0.0052072 0.30 0.0793295 2.50* 
t+15 0.004875 0.28 0.0842045 2.65* 
t+16 0.0050415 0.29 0.089246 2.81* 
t+17 0.0087698 0.50 0.0980158 3.09* 
t+18 
-0.0100567 -0.58 0.0879592 2.77* 
t+19 0.0079405 0.46 0.0958997 3.02* 
t+20 
-0.0022813 -0.13 0.0936184 2.95* 
t+21 0.002446 0.14 0.0960644 3.02* 
t+22 
-0.0097188 -0.56 0.0863456 2.72* 
t+23 
-0.0106774 -0.61 0.0756681 2.38* 
t+24 0.0022459 0.13 0.077914 2.45* 
t+25 
-0.0144129 -0.83 0.0635012 2.00* 
t+26 
-0.0116838 -0.67 0.0518174 1.63 
t+27 
-0.0075528 -0.43 0.0442646 1.39 
t+28 
-0.0085204 -0.49 0.0357442 1.13 
t+29 
-0.0012801 -0.07 0.0344641 1.09 
t+30 
-0.0355136 -2.04* -0.0010495 -0.03 
t+31 0.0122253 0.70 0.0111758 0.35 
t+32 
-0.0012755 -0.07 0.0099003 0.31 
t+33 0.004587 0.26 0.0144873 0.46 
t+34 0.0003695 0.02 0.0148568 0.47 
t+35 
-0.0131637 -0.76 0.0016931 0.05 
t+36 
-0.0187085 -1.07 -0.0170154 -0.54 
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APPENDIX 9 
 
TableA9.1 Peer Group-Adjusted Total Sample AARs and CAARs (* indicates 5% 
significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0024982 0.97 0.0024982 0.08 
t-35 0.0033135 1.29 0.0058117 0.19 
t-34 0.0011478 0.45 0.0069596 0.23 
t-33 
-0.0007302 -0.28 0.0062294 0.21 
t-32 
-0.0012309 -0.48 0.0049985 0.17 
t-31 0.0006551 0.25 0.0056535 0.19 
t-30 0.0001156 0.04 0.0057691 0.19 
t-29 4.747E-05 0.02 0.0058166 0.19 
t-28 
-0.0018646 -0.73 0.0039519 0.13 
t-27 
-0.0047779 -1.86* -0.0008259 -0.03 
t-26 
-0.0015129 -0.59 -0.0023388 -0.08 
t-25 
-0.0013643 -0.53 -0.0037032 -0.12 
t-24 
-0.0040011 -1.56 -0.0077043 -0.26 
t-23 
-0.0087974 -3.42* -0.0165016 -0.55 
t-22 
-0.0018048 -0.70 -0.0183065 -0.61 
t-21 0.0001759 0.07 -0.0181306 -0.61 
t-20 
-0.0066853 -2.60* -0.0248159 -0.83 
t-19 
-0.0013391 -0.52 -0.026155 -0.88 
t-18 
-0.0053819 -2.09* -0.0315369 -1.06 
t-17 
-0.0033707 -1.31 -0.0349076 -1.17 
t-16 
-0.0018705 -0.73 -0.0367781 -1.23 
t-15 
-0.0013032 -0.51 -0.0380813 -1.28 
t-14 
-0.0024492 -0.95 -0.0405305 -1.36 
t-13 
-9.976E-05 -0.04 -0.0406302 -1.36 
t-12 
-0.0049157 -1.91 -0.0455459 -1.53 
t-11 
-0.0023913 -0.93 -0.0479372 -1.61 
t-10 
-0.0023697 -0.92 -0.0503069 -1.69* 
t-9 
-0.0064435 -2.51 -0.0567505 -1.90* 
t-8 
-0.0033275 -1.30 -0.060078 -2.01* 
t-7 
-0.0037072 -1.44 -0.0637852 -2.14* 
t-6 
-0.0051587 -2.01 -0.0689439 -2.31* 
t-5 
-0.0011815 -0.46 -0.0701254 -2.35* 
t-4 
-0.0045155 -1.76 -0.0746408 -2.50* 
t-3 
-0.0015018 -0.58 -0.0761427 -2.55* 
t-2 
-0.0038788 -1.51 -0.0800215 -2.68* 
t-1 
-0.0027911 -1.09 -0.0828126 -2.77* 
t=0 
-0.0030751 -1.20 -0.0858877 -2.88* 
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t+1 
-0.001915 -0.75 -0.0878027 -2.94* 
t+2 
-0.0021721 -0.85 -0.0899748 -3.01* 
t+3 
-0.0022684 -0.88 -0.0922432 -3.09* 
t+4 
-0.002442 -0.95 -0.0946852 -3.17* 
t+5 0.0002121 0.08 -0.0944731 -3.17* 
t+6 
-0.0005209 -0.20 -0.094994 -3.18* 
t+7 
-0.001269 -0.49 -0.096263 -3.23* 
t+8 
-0.002148 -0.84 -0.098411 -3.30* 
t+9 
-0.000384 -0.15 -0.098795 -3.31* 
t+10 
-0.0017559 -0.68 -0.1005509 -3.37* 
t+11 
-0.0002982 -0.12 -0.1008492 -3.38* 
t+12 0.0003781 0.15 -0.100471 -3.37* 
t+13 0.003223315 1.280 -0.097168084 -3.257* 
t+14 
-0.000590134 -0.234 -0.097758218 -3.277* 
t+15 
-0.001352273 -0.537 -0.099110491 -3.322* 
t+16 0.000392705 0.156 -0.098717786 -3.309* 
t+17 0.000172231 0.068 -0.098545555 -3.303* 
t+18 
-0.001033288 -0.410 -0.099578843 -3.338* 
t+19 0.000400605 0.159 -0.099178239 -3.325* 
t+20 0.00061532 0.244 -0.098562919 -3.304* 
t+21 
-0.000308609 -0.123 -0.098871527 -3.314* 
t+22 
-0.003328227 -1.321 -0.102199754 -3.426* 
t+23 
-0.001630325 -0.647 -0.103830079 -3.480* 
t+24 
-0.001197503 -0.475 -0.105027582 -3.521* 
t+25 
-0.003408642 -1.353 -0.108436224 -3.635* 
t+26 
-0.000784653 -0.312 -0.109220877 -3.661* 
t+27 
-0.000980741 -0.389 -0.110201618 -3.694* 
t+28 
-0.000684991 -0.272 -0.11088661 -3.717* 
t+29 
-0.001171562 -0.465 -0.112058171 -3.756* 
t+30 
-0.006351595 -2.522* -0.118409766 -3.969* 
t+31 
-0.000438275 -0.174 -0.118848041 -3.984* 
t+32 
-0.000991083 -0.393 -0.119839124 -4.017* 
t+33 
-0.00043354 -0.172 -0.120272664 -4.032* 
t+34 0.000562382 0.223 -0.119710282 -4.013* 
t+35 0.00091175 0.362 -0.118798532 -3.982* 
t+36 
-0.000223058 -0.089 -0.11902159 -3.990* 
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APPENDIX 10 
 
 
 
Table A10.1 Information Ratio and Summary of Peer Group-Adjusted AARs and 
CAARs pre-and post-event 
 
 
Information Ratio, Peer Group-Adjusted AARs and CAARs 36 months pre- and 
post-event 
  
Average 
Tracking Error 
Information 
Ratio 
Average 
Abnormal Returns 
Sum Average 
Abnormal Return 
 
Pre-
event 
Post-
event 
Pre-
event 
Post-
event 
Pre-
event 
Post-
event Pre-event 
Post-
event 
Total Sample 0.0225 
 
0.0178 
 
-
0.1258 -0.0750 
 
-0.0025 
 
 
-0.0010 
 
-0.0823 -0.0366 
Male 0.0220 0.0172 -0.1154 -0.0674 
 
-0.0023 
 
 
-0.0012 
 
-0.0745 -0.0403 
Female 0.0254 0.0206 -0.1811 -0.1153 
 
-0.0035 
 
 
-0.0003 
 
-0.1248 -0.0176 
UK Funds 0.0195 0.0127 -0.1733 -0.0892 
 
-0.0036 
 
 
-0.0014 
 
-0.1179 -0.0513 
International 
Funds 0.0247 0.0213 
-
0.0922 -0.0649 
 
-0.0018 
 
 
-0.0008 
 
-0.0575 -0.0264 
Emerging 
Markets 0.0271 0.0242 
-
0.0873 -0.0507 
 
-0.0015 
 
 
0.0009 
 
-0.0531 
 
0.0514 
 
Developed 
Markets 0.0221 
 
0.0173 
 
-
0.1286 -0.0767 
 
-0.0026 
 
 
-0.0012 
 
-0.0847 -0.0441 
Equity 0.0244 0.0193 -0.1266 -0.0682 
 
-0.0028 
 
-0.0010 -0.0893 -0.0339 
Bonds 0.0153 0.0118 -0.1228 -0.1019 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0549 -0.0474 
Value 0.0185 0.0190 -0.1289 
 
-0.1061 
 
-0.0027 -0.0015 -0.0694 
 
-0.0552 
 
Growth 0.0262 0.0182 -0.1287 -0.0276 -0.0039 0.0005 -0.1252 -0.0201 
Small 0.0319 0.0255 -0.1910 
 
-0.1099 
 
-0.0061 -0.0030 -0.1793 
 
-0.1022 
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APPENDIX 12 
 
 
Table A12.1 Peer Group-Adjusted Male Managed Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0031386 1.13 0.0031386 0.11 
t-35 0.0040713 1.46 0.0072099 0.25 
t-34 0.0015107 0.54 0.0087206 0.30 
t-33 0.0005134 0.18 0.009234 0.32 
t-32 0.0002239 0.08 0.0094578 0.33 
t-31 0.0028003 1.00 0.0122581 0.42 
t-30 0.0007109 0.25 0.012969 0.45 
t-29 
-0.0009477 -0.34 0.0120213 0.42 
t-28 3.305E-05 0.01 0.0120543 0.42 
t-27 
-0.0044005 -1.58 0.0076539 0.27 
t-26 
-0.0025617 -0.92 0.0050922 0.18 
t-25 
-0.0021351 -0.77 0.0029571 0.10 
t-24 
-0.0031366 -1.12 -0.0001795 -0.01 
t-23 
-0.0087492 -3.14 -0.0089287 -0.31 
t-22 
-0.0032905 -1.18 -0.0122191 -0.42 
t-21 
-4.779E-05 -0.02 -0.0122669 -0.43 
t-20 
-0.0037271 -1.34 -0.0159941 -0.55 
t-19 
-0.00084 -0.30 -0.0168341 -0.58 
t-18 
-0.0056848 -2.04 -0.0225189 -0.78 
t-17 
-0.0042085 -1.51 -0.0267274 -0.93 
t-16 
-0.0037126 -1.33 -0.0304399 -1.06 
t-15 
-0.0021165 -0.76 -0.0325564 -1.13 
t-14 
-0.0023781 -0.85 -0.0349345 -1.21 
t-13 0.0006026 0.22 -0.034332 -1.19 
t-12 
-0.0045039 -1.61 -0.0388359 -1.35 
t-11 
-0.0024352 -0.87 -0.0412711 -1.43 
t-10 
-0.0015206 -0.55 -0.0427916 -1.48 
t-9 
-0.0067567 -2.42 -0.0495483 -1.72 
t-8 
-0.0028519 -1.02 -0.0524002 -1.82 
t-7 
-0.0032627 -1.17 -0.0556629 -1.93 
t-6 
-0.0050224 -1.80 -0.0606853 -2.10 
t-5 
-0.0003041 -0.11 -0.0609893 -2.11 
t-4 
-0.0048902 -1.75 -0.0658795 -2.28 
t-3 
-0.0023885 -0.86 -0.068268 -2.37 
t-2 
-0.0046183 -1.66 -0.0728863 -2.53 
t-1 
-0.0021388 -0.77 -0.0750251 -2.60 
t=0 
-0.0035435 -1.27 -0.0785687 -2.72 
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t+1 
-0.0020014 -0.72 -0.0805701 -2.79 
t+2 
-0.0024994 -0.90 -0.0830695 -2.88 
t+3 
-0.0023315 -0.84 -0.0854011 -2.96 
t+4 
-0.0021515 -0.77 -0.0875526 -3.04 
t+5 
-0.0001716 -0.06 -0.0877241 -3.04 
t+6 
-0.0009 -0.32 -0.0886241 -3.07 
t+7 
-0.0023818 -0.85 -0.0910059 -3.16 
t+8 
-0.0026722 -0.96 -0.0936781 -3.25 
t+9 
-0.0010108 -0.36 -0.0946889 -3.28 
t+10 
-0.0007537 -0.27 -0.0954426 -3.31 
t+11 0.0006463 0.23 -0.0947963 -3.29 
t+12 0.0005706 0.20 -0.0942257 -3.27 
t+13 0.0035807 1.31 -0.090577 -3.14* 
t+14 
-0.0007314 -0.27 -0.0913084 -3.17* 
t+15 
-0.001239 -0.45 -0.0925474 -3.21* 
t+16 0.0001221 0.04 -0.0924253 -3.21* 
t+17 
-0.0004944 -0.18 -0.0929197 -3.22* 
t+18 
-0.0013366 -0.49 -0.0942563 -3.27* 
t+19 0.0004993 0.18 -0.093757 -3.25* 
t+20 
-0.0006813 -0.25 -0.0944382 -3.28* 
t+21 0.0004274 0.16 -0.0940109 -3.26* 
t+22 
-0.0027315 -1.00 -0.0967424 -3.36* 
t+23 
-0.0015222 -0.56 -0.0982646 -3.41* 
t+24 
-0.0012696 -0.46 -0.0995342 -3.45* 
t+25 
-0.0036192 -1.32 -0.1031534 -3.58* 
t+26 
-0.0006973 -0.25 -0.1038507 -3.60* 
t+27 
-0.0009694 -0.35 -0.1048201 -3.64* 
t+28 
-0.0007493 -0.27 -0.1055694 -3.66* 
t+29 
-0.0006032 -0.22 -0.1061726 -3.68* 
t+30 
-0.0074855 -2.73* -0.1136581 -3.94* 
t+31 
-0.0008984 -0.33 -0.1145565 -3.97* 
t+32 
-0.0010411 -0.38 -0.1155976 -4.01* 
t+33 
-0.0001104 -0.04 -0.1157079 -4.01* 
t+34 0.0007016 0.26 -0.1150063 -3.99* 
t+35 7.521E-05 0.03 -0.1149311 -3.99* 
t+36 0.0001594 0.06 -0.1147717 -3.98* 
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Table A12.2 Peer Group-Adjusted Female Managed Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 
-0.0010569 -0.03 -0.0010569 -0.03 
t-35 
-0.0008798 -0.03 -0.0019367 -0.05 
t-34 
-0.0008961 -0.03 -0.0028328 -0.08 
t-33 
-0.0075897 -0.22 -0.0104225 -0.28 
t-32 
-0.0090049 -0.15 -0.0194275 -0.53 
t-31 
-0.0109424 -0.30* -0.0303698 -0.83 
t-30 
-0.0031403 -0.07 -0.0335101 -0.91 
t-29 0.0054154 0.20 -0.0280946 -0.76 
t-28 
-0.0118555 -0.34* -0.0399501 -1.09 
t-27 
-0.0067403 -0.21 -0.0466905 -1.27 
t-26 0.0040906 0.16 -0.0425999 -1.16 
t-25 0.0026607 0.09 -0.0399392 -1.09 
t-24 
-0.0086119 -0.18 -0.048551 -1.32 
t-23 
-0.0090499 -0.21 -0.057601 -1.57 
t-22 0.0060651 0.13 -0.0515358 -1.40 
t-21 0.0013666 0.05 -0.0501692 -1.36 
t-20 
-0.0220991 -0.24* -0.0722684 -1.97* 
t-19 
-0.0038856 -0.17 -0.0761539 -2.07* 
t-18 
-0.003821 -0.13 -0.0799749 -2.17* 
t-17 0.0009901 0.03 -0.0789848 -2.15* 
t-16 0.0077652 0.24 -0.0712196 -1.94* 
t-15 0.0030135 0.11 -0.0682061 -1.85* 
t-14 
-0.0028283 -0.12 -0.0710344 -1.93* 
t-13 
-0.0037694 -0.16 -0.0748038 -2.03* 
t-12 
-0.0070877 -0.23 -0.0818915 -2.23* 
t-11 
-0.0021575 -0.13 -0.084049 -2.29* 
t-10 
-0.006802 -0.29 -0.0908509 -2.47* 
t-9 
-0.0048092 -0.27 -0.0956601 -2.60* 
t-8 
-0.0058333 -0.30 -0.1014934 -2.76* 
t-7 
-0.0060598 -0.33 -0.1075532 -2.92* 
t-6 
-0.0058801 -0.37 -0.1134333 -3.08* 
t-5 
-0.0058255 -0.36 -0.1192588 -3.24* 
t-4 
-0.0025322 -0.16 -0.121791 -3.31* 
t-3 0.0031912 0.14 -0.1185998 -3.22* 
t-2 3.492E-05 0.00 -0.1185649 -3.22* 
t-1 
-0.0062437 -0.38 -0.1248086 -3.39* 
t=0 
-0.0005958 -0.05 -0.1254044 -3.41* 
t+1 
-0.0014576 -0.08 -0.126862 -3.45* 
t+2 
-0.0004392 -0.02 -0.1273012 -3.46* 
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t+3 
-0.0019341 -0.12 -0.1292353 -3.51* 
t+4 
-0.0039798 -0.26 -0.1332152 -3.62* 
t+5 0.0022427 0.12 -0.1309725 -3.56* 
t+6 0.0014854 0.07 -0.1294871 -3.52* 
t+7 0.0046203 0.18 -0.1248668 -3.40* 
t+8 0.0006267 0.03 -0.1242401 -3.38* 
t+9 0.0029334 0.09 -0.1213067 -3.30* 
t+10 
-0.0070601 -0.31 -0.1283668 -3.49* 
t+11 
-0.0052973 -0.27 -0.1336642 -3.63* 
t+12 
-0.0006406 -0.03 -0.1343048 -3.65* 
t+13 0.0012239 0.21 -0.1330809 -3.62* 
t+14 0.0001962 0.03 -0.1328847 -3.61* 
t+15 
-0.0019798 -0.34 -0.1348644 -3.67* 
t+16 0.001892 0.32 -0.1329724 -3.62* 
t+17 0.0038658 0.66 -0.1291066 -3.51* 
t+18 0.0006941 0.12 -0.1284126 -3.49* 
t+19 
-0.0001506 -0.03 -0.1285632 -3.50* 
t+20 0.0077825 1.33 -0.1207807 -3.28* 
t+21 
-0.0043157 -0.74 -0.1250963 -3.40* 
t+22 
-0.0065769 -1.12 -0.1316732 -3.58* 
t+23 
-0.0022159 -0.38 -0.1338891 -3.64* 
t+24 
-0.0008129 -0.14 -0.134702 -3.66* 
t+25 
-0.0023267 -0.40 -0.1370288 -3.73* 
t+26 
-0.0012191 -0.21 -0.1382479 -3.76* 
t+27 
-0.0010414 -0.18 -0.1392892 -3.79* 
t+28 
-0.0003459 -0.06 -0.1396352 -3.80* 
t+29 
-0.0040822 -0.70 -0.1437174 -3.91* 
t+30 
-0.0006136 -0.10 -0.144331 -3.92* 
t+31 0.0019366 0.33 -0.1423943 -3.87* 
t+32 
-0.0007459 -0.13 -0.1431402 -3.89* 
t+33 
-0.0019765 -0.34 -0.1451167 -3.95* 
t+34 
-8.898E-05 -0.02 -0.1452057 -3.95* 
t+35 0.0048993 0.84 -0.1403064 -3.82* 
t+36 
-0.0020562 -0.35 -0.1423626 -3.87* 
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Table A12.3 Peer Group-Adjusted UK Funds AARs and CAARs (* indicates 5% 
significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0011033 0.03 0.0011033 0.03 
t-35 0.0030216 0.11 0.0041249 0.10 
t-34 0.0022205 0.05 0.0063453 0.16 
t-33 
-0.0057343 -0.25* 0.0006111 0.02 
t-32 
-0.0015649 -0.04 -0.0009538 -0.02 
t-31 
-0.0034721 -0.11 -0.004426 -0.11 
t-30 0.0011161 0.04 -0.0033098 -0.08 
t-29 
-0.0022063 -0.07 -0.0055162 -0.14 
t-28 
-0.0012789 -0.06 -0.0067951 -0.17 
t-27 
-0.0068683 -0.22* -0.0136634 -0.34 
t-26 
-0.0022849 -0.10 -0.0159483 -0.39 
t-25 
-0.0001808 -0.01 -0.0161291 -0.40 
t-24 
-0.0028032 -0.11 -0.0189323 -0.47 
t-23 
-0.0079468 -0.33* -0.0268791 -0.66 
t-22 
-0.0028076 -0.10 -0.0296867 -0.73 
t-21 
-0.003425 -0.23 -0.0331117 -0.81 
t-20 
-0.0011363 -0.05 -0.034248 -0.84 
t-19 
-0.0060478 -0.21* -0.0402959 -0.99 
t-18 
-0.0083996 -0.33* -0.0486954 -1.20 
t-17 
-0.004478 -0.20 -0.0531734 -1.31 
t-16 
-0.0033602 -0.12 -0.0565336 -1.39 
t-15 
-0.0048816 -0.18* -0.0614152 -1.51 
t-14 
-0.0036062 -0.18 -0.0650214 -1.60 
t-13 
-0.0038141 -0.20 -0.0688354 -1.69* 
t-12 
-0.0089074 -0.34* -0.0777429 -1.91* 
t-11 
-0.0019053 -0.11 -0.0796482 -1.96* 
t-10 
-0.0019162 -0.10 -0.0815644 -2.01* 
t-9 
-0.0084011 -0.41* -0.0899654 -2.21* 
t-8 
-0.0017659 -0.09 -0.0917314 -2.26* 
t-7 
-0.005089 -0.28* -0.0968204 -2.38* 
t-6 
-0.0031767 -0.15 -0.0999971 -2.46* 
t-5 
-0.0018436 -0.11 -0.1018407 -2.51* 
t-4 
-0.0050237 -0.25* -0.1068644 -2.63* 
t-3 
-0.002782 -0.17 -0.1096464 -2.70* 
t-2 
-0.0065863 -0.32* -0.1162326 -2.86* 
t-1 
-0.001365 -0.10 -0.1175977 -2.89* 
t=0 
-0.0035883 -0.23 -0.121186 -2.98* 
t+1 
-0.0025894 -0.13 -0.1237754 -3.05* 
t+2 0.0001932 0.01 -0.1235822 -3.04* 
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t+3 
-0.0016061 -0.10 -0.1251883 -3.08* 
t+4 
-0.0036932 -0.23 -0.1288815 -3.17* 
t+5 0.000953 0.07 -0.1279285 -3.15* 
t+6 
-0.0009042 -0.06 -0.1288327 -3.17* 
t+7 
-0.0010837 -0.07 -0.1299165 -3.20* 
t+8 
-0.0030765 -0.21 -0.132993 -3.27* 
t+9 
-0.0031809 -0.22 -0.1361739 -3.35* 
t+10 
-0.0012236 -0.11 -0.1373975 -3.38* 
t+11 0.0015257 0.08 -0.1358718 -3.34* 
t+12 0.0006821 0.05 -0.1351897 -3.33* 
t+13 
-0.0008299 -0.30 -0.1374302 -3.38* 
t+14 8.72E-05 0.03 -0.137343 -3.37* 
t+15 
-0.0006846 -0.24 -0.1380277 -3.39* 
t+16 
-0.0020413 -0.73 -0.140069 -3.44* 
t+17 
-0.0014869 -0.53 -0.1415558 -3.48* 
t+18 
-0.0013029 -0.46 -0.1428587 -3.51* 
t+19 0.0005325 0.19 -0.1423262 -3.50* 
t+20 
-0.0003365 -0.12 -0.1426628 -3.50* 
t+21 
-0.0020012 -0.71 -0.1446639 -3.55* 
t+22 
-0.0021319 -0.76 -0.1467959 -3.61* 
t+23 
-0.0023485 -0.84 -0.1491443 -3.66* 
t+24 0.0031439 1.12 -0.1460004 -3.59* 
t+25 
-0.0032564 -1.16 -0.1492568 -3.67* 
t+26 
-0.0019759 -0.70 -0.1512327 -3.71* 
t+27 0.0002177 0.08 -0.151015 -3.71* 
t+28 
-0.0004504 -0.16 -0.1514655 -3.72* 
t+29 
-0.0008114 -0.29 -0.1522768 -3.74* 
t+30 
-0.0110064 -3.92* -0.1632833 -4.01* 
t+31 
-0.0003046 -0.11 -0.1635879 -4.02* 
t+32 
-0.002622 -0.93 -0.1662099 -4.08* 
t+33 
-0.0015381 -0.55 -0.1677481 -4.12* 
t+34 
-0.0009266 -0.33 -0.1686747 -4.14* 
t+35 0.0001706 0.06 -0.1685041 -4.14* 
t+36 
-0.0006396 -0.23 -0.1691437 -4.15* 
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Table A12.4 Peer Group-Adjusted International Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0034697 0.09 0.0034697 0.15 
t-35 0.0035235 0.09 0.0069932 0.31 
t-34 0.0003803 0.01 0.0073735 0.33 
t-33 0.0027601 0.09 0.0101336 0.45 
t-32 
-0.0009952 -0.02 0.0091384 0.40 
t-31 0.0035785 0.09 0.0127169 0.56 
t-30 
-0.0006099 -0.02 0.0121071 0.54 
t-29 0.00166 0.05 0.013767 0.61 
t-28 
-0.002277 -0.07 0.01149 0.51 
t-27 
-0.0033518 -0.12 0.0081382 0.36 
t-26 
-0.0009766 -0.03 0.0071616 0.32 
t-25 
-0.0021892 -0.07 0.0049724 0.22 
t-24 
-0.0048264 -0.14 0.0001461 0.01 
t-23 
-0.009381 -0.27* -0.0092349 -0.41 
t-22 
-0.0011022 -0.03 -0.0103371 -0.46 
t-21 0.0026808 0.12 -0.0076563 -0.34 
t-20 
-0.0104904 -0.20* -0.0181466 -0.80 
t-19 0.0019002 0.07 -0.0162464 -0.72 
t-18 
-0.0033349 -0.12 -0.0195813 -0.87 
t-17 
-0.0026041 -0.08 -0.0221854 -0.98 
t-16 
-0.0008463 -0.03 -0.0230317 -1.02 
t-15 0.0012315 0.05 -0.0218002 -0.97 
t-14 
-0.0016353 -0.05 -0.0234355 -1.04 
t-13 0.0025206 0.11 -0.0209149 -0.93 
t-12 
-0.0021376 -0.08 -0.0230525 -1.02 
t-11 
-0.002736 -0.13 -0.0257886 -1.14 
t-10 
-0.0026924 -0.12 -0.028481 -1.26 
t-9 
-0.0050509 -0.21 -0.0335319 -1.48 
t-8 
-0.0044237 -0.18 -0.0379556 -1.68* 
t-7 
-0.002728 -0.11 -0.0406836 -1.80* 
t-6 
-0.0065631 -0.29* -0.0472468 -2.09* 
t-5 
-0.0007124 -0.04 -0.0479591 -2.12* 
t-4 
-0.0041553 -0.19 -0.0521145 -2.31* 
t-3 
-0.0005947 -0.02 -0.0527091 -2.33* 
t-2 
-0.0019603 -0.07 -0.0546695 -2.42* 
t-1 
-0.0038017 -0.16 -0.0584712 -2.59* 
t=0 
-0.0027114 -0.15 -0.0611826 -2.71* 
t+1 
-0.0014371 -0.07 -0.0626197 -2.77* 
t+2 
-0.0038481 -0.17 -0.0664678 -2.94* 
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t+3 
-0.0027377 -0.13 -0.0692054 -3.06* 
t+4 
-0.0015555 -0.09 -0.0707609 -3.13* 
t+5 
-0.0003129 -0.01 -0.0710738 -3.15* 
t+6 
-0.0002493 -0.01 -0.0713231 -3.16* 
t+7 
-0.0014003 -0.07 -0.0727235 -3.22* 
t+8 
-0.00149 -0.08 -0.0742135 -3.29* 
t+9 0.0015979 0.07 -0.0726156 -3.21* 
t+10 
-0.0021331 -0.09 -0.0747487 -3.31* 
t+11 
-0.0015907 -0.08 -0.0763394 -3.38* 
t+12 0.0001628 0.01 -0.0761766 -3.37* 
t+13 0.0061842 1.86* -0.068883 -3.06* 
t+14 
-0.0010801 -0.32 -0.0699631 -3.11* 
t+15 
-0.0018387 -0.55 -0.0718018 -3.19* 
t+16 0.002166 0.65 -0.0696358 -3.10* 
t+17 0.001381 0.41 -0.0682548 -3.03* 
t+18 
-0.0008388 -0.25 -0.0690936 -3.07* 
t+19 0.0003076 0.09 -0.0687859 -3.06* 
t+20 0.0012727 0.38 -0.0675132 -3.00* 
t+21 0.0008443 0.25 -0.0666689 -2.96* 
t+22 
-0.0041431 -1.24 -0.070812 -3.15* 
t+23 
-0.0011464 -0.34 -0.0719584 -3.20* 
t+24 
-0.0041344 -1.24 -0.0760927 -3.38* 
t+25 
-0.0035113 -1.05 -0.079604 -3.54* 
t+26 
-5.751E-06 0.00 -0.0796098 -3.54* 
t+27 
-0.0017957 -0.54 -0.0814054 -3.62* 
t+28 
-0.0008389 -0.25 -0.0822443 -3.66* 
t+29 
-0.0014127 -0.42 -0.083657 -3.72* 
t+30 
-0.0032484 -0.98 -0.0869054 -3.86* 
t+31 
-0.0005305 -0.16 -0.0874359 -3.89* 
t+32 0.0001162 0.03 -0.0873197 -3.88* 
t+33 0.0003272 0.10 -0.0869925 -3.87* 
t+34 0.0016177 0.49 -0.0853748 -3.80* 
t+35 0.0014401 0.43 -0.0839348 -3.73* 
t+36 6.726E-05 0.02 -0.0838675 -3.73* 
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Table A12.5 Peer Group-Adjusted Emerging Market Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0220099 2.96* 0.0220099 1.21 
t-35 
-0.0015147 -0.20 0.0204953 1.13 
t-34 
-0.006646 -0.89 0.0138493 0.76 
t-33 
-0.0052586 -0.71 0.0085908 0.47 
t-32 
-0.0062221 -0.84 0.0023687 0.13 
t-31 0.0002075 0.03 0.0025762 0.14 
t-30 0.0028139 0.38 0.0053901 0.30 
t-29 0.0016207 0.22 0.0070109 0.39 
t-28 0.0021086 0.28 0.0091195 0.50 
t-27 
-0.0042033 -0.57 0.0049162 0.27 
t-26 0.0075693 1.02 0.0124855 0.69 
t-25 
-0.0054302 -0.73 0.0070553 0.39 
t-24 
-0.0059027 -0.79 0.0011526 0.06 
t-23 
-0.013595 -1.83* -0.0124424 -0.69 
t-22 
-0.0021164 -0.28 -0.0145588 -0.80 
t-21 0.007417 1.00 -0.0071417 -0.39 
t-20 
-0.0135247 -1.82* -0.0206664 -1.14 
t-19 0.0039136 0.53 -0.0167528 -0.92 
t-18 0.0010367 0.14 -0.015716 -0.87 
t-17 0.0052865 0.71 -0.0104295 -0.57 
t-16 0.002944 0.40 -0.0074855 -0.41 
t-15 
-0.0017308 -0.23 -0.0092163 -0.51 
t-14 0.0067268 0.90 -0.0024894 -0.14 
t-13 
-0.0016065 -0.22 -0.004096 -0.23 
t-12 
-0.0087796 -1.18 -0.0128756 -0.71 
t-11 
-0.0084809 -1.14 -0.0213566 -1.18 
t-10 0.0080075 1.08 -0.0133491 -0.74 
t-9 
-0.0006324 -0.09 -0.0139815 -0.77 
t-8 
-0.0024964 -0.34 -0.0164778 -0.91 
t-7 0.0005442 0.07 -0.0159336 -0.88 
t-6 
-0.0085856 -1.15 -0.0245192 -1.35 
t-5 
-0.0032738 -0.44 -0.027793 -1.53 
t-4 
-0.0110169 -1.48 -0.0388099 -2.14* 
t-3 
-0.0106446 -1.43 -0.0494544 -2.72* 
t-2 0.0078164 1.05 -0.041638 -2.29* 
t-1 
-0.0114296 -1.54 -0.0530677 -2.92* 
t=0 0.0069762 0.94 -0.0460915 -2.54* 
t+1 
-0.0038968 -0.52 -0.0499883 -2.75* 
t+2 
-0.0048517 -0.65 -0.05484 -3.02* 
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t+3 
-0.0015254 -0.21 -0.0563654 -3.11* 
t+4 0.0005646 0.08 -0.0558008 -3.07* 
t+5 0.0048015 0.65 -0.0509992 -2.81* 
t+6 0.0018772 0.25 -0.0491221 -2.71* 
t+7 0.0038712 0.52 -0.0452509 -2.49* 
t+8 0.0047186 0.63 -0.0405323 -2.23* 
t+9 0.0062426 0.84 -0.0342897 -1.89* 
t+10 
-0.004898 -0.66 -0.0391877 -2.16* 
t+11 
-0.0036449 -0.49 -0.0428326 -2.36* 
t+12 0.0004056 0.05 -0.0424271 -2.34* 
t+13 
-0.0255177 -3.43* -0.0679448 -3.74* 
t+14 
-0.0039993 -0.54 -0.0719441 -3.96* 
t+15 
-0.0025239 -0.34 -0.074468 -4.10* 
t+16 0.0133185 1.79* -0.0611495 -3.37* 
t+17 0.0089862 1.21 -0.0521632 -2.87* 
t+18 
-5.93E-05 -0.01 -0.0522225 -2.88* 
t+19 
-0.0088564 -1.19 -0.0610789 -3.36* 
t+20 0.0126911 1.71* -0.0483878 -2.67* 
t+21 
-0.0006307 -0.08 -0.0490185 -2.70* 
t+22 
-0.0077201 -1.04 -0.0567386 -3.13* 
t+23 0.0102774 1.38 -0.0464613 -2.56* 
t+24 
-0.0079845 -1.07 -0.0544457 -3.00* 
t+25 
-0.0082863 -1.11 -0.062732 -3.46* 
t+26 0.0078718 1.06 -0.0548602 -3.02* 
t+27 
-0.0070331 -0.95 -0.0618933 -3.41* 
t+28 
-0.005276 -0.71 -0.0671693 -3.70* 
t+29 
-0.003445 -0.46 -0.0706143 -3.89* 
t+30 0.0127393 1.71* -0.057875 -3.19* 
t+31 0.0043405 0.58 -0.0535345 -2.95* 
t+32 0.0051593 0.69 -0.0483752 -2.67* 
t+33 
-0.000158 -0.02 -0.0485332 -2.67* 
t+34 0.0179858 2.42* -0.0305473 -1.68* 
t+35 0.0214287 2.88* -0.0091186 -0.50 
t+36 0.0074586 1.00 -0.0016601 -0.09 
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Table A12.6 Peer Group-Adjusted Developed Market Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0005809 0.23 0.0005809 0.02 
t-35 0.0037721 1.48 0.0043529 0.14 
t-34 0.0018758 0.74 0.0062288 0.20 
t-33 
-0.000314 -0.12 0.0059147 0.19 
t-32 
-0.0007748 -0.30 0.00514 0.17 
t-31 0.0006955 0.27 0.0058355 0.19 
t-30 
-0.0001259 -0.05 0.0057096 0.18 
t-29 
-9.04E-05 -0.04 0.0056192 0.18 
t-28 
-0.0022093 -0.87 0.00341 0.11 
t-27 
-0.0048267 -1.89* -0.0014167 -0.05 
t-26 
-0.0022661 -0.89 -0.0036828 -0.12 
t-25 
-0.0010304 -0.40 -0.0047132 -0.15 
t-24 
-0.0038479 -1.51 -0.0085611 -0.28 
t-23 
-0.0084163 -3.30* -0.0169773 -0.55 
t-22 
-0.0017803 -0.70 -0.0187576 -0.61 
t-21 
-0.0003914 -0.15 -0.0191491 -0.62 
t-20 
-0.0061544 -2.41* -0.0253035 -0.82 
t-19 
-0.0017432 -0.68 -0.0270467 -0.88 
t-18 
-0.0058712 -2.30* -0.0329179 -1.07 
t-17 
-0.0040248 -1.58 -0.0369427 -1.20 
t-16 
-0.0022326 -0.88 -0.0391753 -1.27 
t-15 
-0.0012714 -0.50 -0.0404467 -1.31 
t-14 
-0.0031274 -1.23 -0.0435741 -1.41 
t-13 1.065E-05 0.00 -0.0435635 -1.41 
t-12 
-0.0046349 -1.82* -0.0481984 -1.56 
t-11 
-0.0019526 -0.77 -0.0501511 -1.62 
t-10 
-0.003111 -1.22 -0.053262 -1.72* 
t-9 
-0.0068586 -2.69* -0.0601206 -1.95* 
t-8 
-0.0033864 -1.33 -0.063507 -2.06* 
t-7 
-0.0040071 -1.57 -0.0675141 -2.19* 
t-6 
-0.004917 -1.93* -0.0724311 -2.35* 
t-5 
-0.0010339 -0.41 -0.073465 -2.38* 
t-4 
-0.0040569 -1.59 -0.0775219 -2.51* 
t-3 
-0.0008569 -0.34 -0.0783788 -2.54* 
t-2 
-0.0047038 -1.84* -0.0830826 -2.69* 
t-1 
-0.0021818 -0.86 -0.0852643 -2.76* 
t=0 
-0.0037841 -1.48 -0.0890484 -2.88* 
t+1 
-0.0017752 -0.70 -0.0908236 -2.94* 
t+2 
-0.001983 -0.78 -0.0928067 -3.01* 
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t+3 
-0.0023208 -0.91 -0.0951275 -3.08* 
t+4 
-0.0026541 -1.04 -0.0977816 -3.17* 
t+5 
-0.0001116 -0.04 -0.0978932 -3.17* 
t+6 
-0.0006901 -0.27 -0.0985833 -3.19* 
t+7 
-0.0016316 -0.64 -0.1002149 -3.25* 
t+8 
-0.0026324 -1.03 -0.1028473 -3.33* 
t+9 
-0.0008514 -0.33 -0.1036987 -3.36* 
t+10 
-0.0015343 -0.60 -0.105233 -3.41* 
t+11 
-6.217E-05 -0.02 -0.1052951 -3.41* 
t+12 0.0003762 0.15 -0.1049189 -3.40* 
t+13 0.0053757 2.16* -0.0994351 -3.22* 
t+14 
-0.0003337 -0.13 -0.0997688 -3.23* 
t+15 
-0.0012637 -0.51 -0.1010326 -3.27* 
t+16 
-0.0005839 -0.23 -0.1016165 -3.29* 
t+17 
-0.0004937 -0.20 -0.1021102 -3.31* 
t+18 
-0.0011072 -0.44 -0.1032174 -3.34* 
t+19 0.0011159 0.45 -0.1021015 -3.31* 
t+20 
-0.0003264 -0.13 -0.1024279 -3.32* 
t+21 
-0.0002831 -0.11 -0.102711 -3.33* 
t+22 
-0.002981 -1.20 -0.105692 -3.42* 
t+23 
-0.0025763 -1.03 -0.1082682 -3.51* 
t+24 
-0.0006507 -0.26 -0.1089189 -3.53* 
t+25 
-0.0030022 -1.21 -0.1119211 -3.63* 
t+26 
-0.0015279 -0.61 -0.113449 -3.68* 
t+27 
-0.0004476 -0.18 -0.1138966 -3.69* 
t+28 
-0.0002742 -0.11 -0.1141708 -3.70* 
t+29 
-0.000976 -0.39 -0.1151468 -3.73* 
t+30 
-0.0080117 -3.22* -0.1231585 -3.99* 
t+31 
-0.0008456 -0.34 -0.124004 -4.02* 
t+32 
-0.0015402 -0.62 -0.1255443 -4.07* 
t+33 
-0.0004587 -0.18 -0.126003 -4.08* 
t+34 
-0.0010609 -0.43 -0.1270639 -4.12* 
t+35 
-0.0008948 -0.36 -0.1279587 -4.15* 
t+36 
-0.0008673 -0.35 -0.128826 -4.17* 
236 
Table A12.7 Peer Group-Adjusted Equity Funds AARs and CAARs (* indicates 5% 
significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0018896 0.62 0.0018896 0.06 
t-35 0.0052877 1.73* 0.0071773 0.22 
t-34 0.001287 0.42 0.0084643 0.26 
t-33 
-0.0016875 -0.55 0.0067768 0.21 
t-32 
-0.0018176 -0.59 0.0049592 0.15 
t-31 0.0002909 0.09 0.0052501 0.16 
t-30 0.0004985 0.16 0.0057487 0.18 
t-29 
-0.0001553 -0.05 0.0055934 0.17 
t-28 
-0.0019556 -0.64 0.0036378 0.11 
t-27 
-0.0050285 -1.64 -0.0013907 -0.04 
t-26 
-0.0015052 -0.49 -0.002896 -0.09 
t-25 
-0.0003158 -0.10 -0.0032118 -0.10 
t-24 
-0.004586 -1.50 -0.0077978 -0.24 
t-23 
-0.0110687 -3.61* -0.0188665 -0.58 
t-22 
-0.002905 -0.95 -0.0217714 -0.67 
t-21 0.0002466 0.08 -0.0215248 -0.66 
t-20 
-0.0083702 -2.73* -0.029895 -0.91 
t-19 
-0.0007346 -0.24 -0.0306296 -0.94 
t-18 
-0.0053335 -1.74* -0.0359631 -1.10 
t-17 
-0.0043158 -1.41 -0.0402789 -1.23 
t-16 
-0.0023882 -0.78 -0.0426671 -1.30 
t-15 
-0.0002273 -0.07 -0.0428944 -1.31 
t-14 
-0.0026275 -0.86 -0.0455219 -1.39 
t-13 0.0002154 0.07 -0.0453065 -1.38 
t-12 
-0.0054787 -1.79* -0.0507852 -1.55 
t-11 
-0.0020389 -0.67 -0.052824 -1.61 
t-10 
-0.0027415 -0.89 -0.0555655 -1.70* 
t-9 
-0.0068406 -2.23* -0.0624061 -1.91* 
t-8 
-0.004097 -1.34 -0.0665031 -2.03* 
t-7 
-0.0042795 -1.40 -0.0707827 -2.16* 
t-6 
-0.005358 -1.75* -0.0761407 -2.33* 
t-5 
-0.0014879 -0.49 -0.0776286 -2.37* 
t-4 
-0.0044048 -1.44 -0.0820334 -2.51* 
t-3 
-0.0011457 -0.37 -0.0831792 -2.54* 
t-2 
-0.0042443 -1.38 -0.0874234 -2.67* 
t-1 
-0.0029904 -0.98 -0.0904138 -2.76* 
t=0 
-0.0038224 -1.25 -0.0942363 -2.88* 
t+1 
-0.0018784 -0.61 -0.0961147 -2.94* 
t+2 
-0.0023733 -0.77 -0.098488 -3.01* 
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t+3 
-0.0025205 -0.82 -0.1010085 -3.09* 
t+4 
-0.0029779 -0.97 -0.1039865 -3.18* 
t+5 0.0002367 0.08 -0.1037498 -3.17* 
t+6 0.0008644 0.28 -0.1028854 -3.14* 
t+7 
-0.0011359 -0.37 -0.1040213 -3.18* 
t+8 
-0.0025567 -0.83 -0.106578 -3.26* 
t+9 0.0003181 0.10 -0.1062599 -3.25* 
t+10 
-0.0022214 -0.72 -0.1084813 -3.31* 
t+11 
-0.0003537 -0.12 -0.108835 -3.33* 
t+12 0.0012172 0.40 -0.1076178 -3.29* 
t+13 0.00221 0.73 -0.1035497 -3.19* 
t+14 
-0.0004097 -0.13 -0.1039594 -3.20* 
t+15 
-0.0012281 -0.40 -0.1051875 -3.24* 
t+16 0.0011209 0.37 -0.1040665 -3.20* 
t+17 
-0.0001063 -0.03 -0.1041729 -3.20* 
t+18 
-0.0001359 -0.04 -0.1043087 -3.21* 
t+19 0.0010018 0.33 -0.1033069 -3.18* 
t+20 0.0017375 0.57 -0.1015694 -3.12* 
t+21 
-0.0001726 -0.06 -0.101742 -3.13* 
t+22 
-0.0031184 -1.02 -0.1048604 -3.23* 
t+23 
-0.0020802 -0.68 -0.1069407 -3.29* 
t+24 
-0.0009502 -0.31 -0.1078909 -3.32* 
t+25 
-0.0029763 -0.98 -0.1108672 -3.41* 
t+26 
-0.0013727 -0.45 -0.1122399 -3.45* 
t+27 
-0.0009769 -0.32 -0.1132168 -3.48* 
t+28 
-0.0011391 -0.37 -0.1143558 -3.52* 
t+29 
-0.0006771 -0.22 -0.115033 -3.54* 
t+30 
-0.009526 -3.13* -0.124559 -3.83* 
t+31 0.0003285 0.11 -0.1242305 -3.82* 
t+32 
-0.0016942 -0.56 -0.1259247 -3.87* 
t+33 
-0.0005087 -0.17 -0.1264334 -3.89* 
t+34 0.0014135 0.46 -0.12502 -3.85* 
t+35 0.0010529 0.35 -0.1239671 -3.81* 
t+36 0.0008284 0.27 -0.1231387 -3.79* 
238 
Table A12.8 Peer Group-Adjusted Bond Funds AARs and CAARs (* indicates 5% 
significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0051017 1.97* 0.0051017 0.27 
t-35 
-0.0046337 -1.79* 0.0004679 0.02 
t-34 0.0005767 0.22 0.0010447 0.06 
t-33 0.0030292 1.17 0.0040738 0.22 
t-32 0.0010181 0.39 0.0050919 0.27 
t-31 0.002027 0.78 0.0071189 0.38 
t-30 
-0.0013452 -0.52 0.0057738 0.31 
t-29 0.0008169 0.31 0.0065907 0.35 
t-28 
-0.0015153 -0.58 0.0050754 0.27 
t-27 
-0.0037923 -1.46 0.0012831 0.07 
t-26 
-0.001543 -0.59 -0.0002599 -0.01 
t-25 
-0.0055351 -2.13* -0.005795 -0.31 
t-24 
-0.0016226 -0.63 -0.0074176 -0.39 
t-23 9.473E-05 0.04 -0.0073229 -0.39 
t-22 0.0025488 0.98 -0.004774 -0.25 
t-21 
-0.0001058 -0.04 -0.0048799 -0.26 
t-20 
-8.614E-05 -0.03 -0.004966 -0.26 
t-19 
-0.0036708 -1.42 -0.0086368 -0.46 
t-18 
-0.0055658 -2.15* -0.0142026 -0.75 
t-17 0.0002585 0.10 -0.0139441 -0.74 
t-16 0.000128 0.05 -0.0138161 -0.73 
t-15 
-0.0055208 -2.13* -0.0193368 -1.02 
t-14 
-0.0017466 -0.67 -0.0210834 -1.12 
t-13 
-0.0013233 -0.51 -0.0224067 -1.19 
t-12 
-0.0027078 -1.04 -0.0251145 -1.33 
t-11 
-0.0037535 -1.45 -0.028868 -1.53 
t-10 
-0.0009184 -0.35 -0.0297865 -1.58 
t-9 
-0.0048935 -1.89* -0.03468 -1.84* 
t-8 
-0.000294 -0.11 -0.034974 -1.85* 
t-7 
-0.0014398 -0.56 -0.0364138 -1.93* 
t-6 
-0.004369 -1.68* -0.0407829 -2.16* 
t-5 3.234E-05 0.01 -0.0407505 -2.16* 
t-4 
-0.0049538 -1.91* -0.0457043 -2.42* 
t-3 
-0.0029124 -1.12 -0.0486167 -2.58* 
t-2 
-0.0024312 -0.94 -0.0510479 -2.70* 
t-1 
-0.0020017 -0.77 -0.0530496 -2.81* 
t=0 
-0.0001144 -0.04 -0.053164 -2.82* 
t+1 
-0.00206 -0.79 -0.0552241 -2.93* 
t+2 
-0.0013746 -0.53 -0.0565987 -3.00* 
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t+3 
-0.0012695 -0.49 -0.0578682 -3.07* 
t+4 
-0.0003192 -0.12 -0.0581874 -3.08* 
t+5 0.0001147 0.04 -0.0580727 -3.08* 
t+6 
-0.0060089 -2.32* -0.0640816 -3.39* 
t+7 
-0.0017964 -0.69 -0.065878 -3.49* 
t+8 
-0.0005289 -0.20 -0.0664069 -3.52* 
t+9 
-0.0031652 -1.22 -0.0695721 -3.69* 
t+10 8.825E-05 0.03 -0.0694839 -3.68* 
t+11 
-7.858E-05 -0.03 -0.0695625 -3.69* 
t+12 
-0.0029457 -1.14 -0.0725082 -3.84* 
t+13 0.0070579 2.61* -0.072101 -3.69* 
t+14 
-0.0012695 -0.47 -0.0733705 -3.75* 
t+15 
-0.0018174 -0.67 -0.0751879 -3.84* 
t+16 
-0.0023346 -0.86 -0.0775225 -3.96* 
t+17 0.0012154 0.45 -0.0763071 -3.90* 
t+18 
-0.0043767 -1.62 -0.0806838 -4.12* 
t+19 
-0.001792 -0.66 -0.0824758 -4.22* 
t+20 
-0.0036445 -1.35 -0.0861203 -4.40* 
t+21 
-0.0008164 -0.30 -0.0869367 -4.44* 
t+22 
-0.0041118 -1.52 -0.0910485 -4.65* 
t+23 8.495E-05 0.03 -0.0909635 -4.65* 
t+24 
-0.0021499 -0.80 -0.0931135 -4.76* 
t+25 
-0.0050534 -1.87 -0.0981669 -5.02* 
t+26 0.0014368 0.53 -0.09673 -4.95* 
t+27 
-0.0009952 -0.37 -0.0977252 -5.00* 
t+28 0.0009971 0.37 -0.0967281 -4.94* 
t+29 
-0.002947 -1.09 -0.0996751 -5.10* 
t+30 0.0049031 1.81* -0.094772 -4.84* 
t+31 
-0.0030772 -1.14 -0.0978493 -5.00* 
t+32 0.0016919 0.63 -0.0961573 -4.92* 
t+33 
-0.0001545 -0.06 -0.0963119 -4.92* 
t+34 
-0.0025284 -0.94 -0.0988403 -5.05* 
t+35 0.0004103 0.15 -0.09843 -5.03* 
t+36 
-0.0039457 -1.46 -0.1023757 -5.23* 
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Table A12.9 Peer Group-Adjusted Equity Growth Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 
-0.0042208 -0.43 -0.0042208 -0.16 
t-35 
-0.0021095 -0.22 -0.0063302 -0.25 
t-34 
-0.010326 -1.05 -0.0166562 -0.65 
t-33 0.0197476 2.01* 0.0030914 0.12 
t-32 
-0.001136 -0.12 0.0019554 0.08 
t-31 0.0019577 0.20 0.0039131 0.15 
t-30 
-0.0235243 -2.40* -0.0196113 -0.76 
t-29 0.0077261 0.79 -0.0118851 -0.46 
t-28 0.0061909 0.63 -0.0056943 -0.22 
t-27 
-0.0083412 -0.85 -0.0140355 -0.55 
t-26 
-0.0057452 -0.59 -0.0197807 -0.77 
t-25 
-0.007733 -0.79 -0.0275137 -1.07 
t-24 0.0185782 1.89* -0.0089355 -0.35 
t-23 
-0.0219767 -2.24* -0.0309122 -1.20 
t-22 
-0.0001031 -0.01 -0.0310153 -1.21 
t-21 
-0.0111403 -1.14 -0.0421556 -1.64 
t-20 
-0.0036659 -0.37 -0.0458215 -1.78* 
t-19 
-0.0210035 -2.14* -0.066825 -2.60* 
t-18 
-0.0057769 -0.59* -0.0726019 -2.83* 
t-17 0.0172075 1.75 -0.0553944 -2.16* 
t-16 0.0023285 0.24 -0.0530659 -2.07* 
t-15 0.0037106 0.38 -0.0493554 -1.92* 
t-14 
-0.0019237 -0.20 -0.051279 -2.00* 
t-13 0.0052439 0.53 -0.0460351 -1.79* 
t-12 
-0.0086531 -0.88 -0.0546882 -2.13* 
t-11 
-0.0048309 -0.49 -0.0595192 -2.32* 
t-10 
-0.0030352 -0.31 -0.0625543 -2.44* 
t-9 6.91E-05 0.01 -0.0624852 -2.43* 
t-8 0.0076664 0.78 -0.0548188 -2.14* 
t-7 0.0007363 0.08 -0.0540825 -2.11* 
t-6 
-0.0113072 -1.15 -0.0653897 -2.55* 
t-5 
-0.0021379 -0.22 -0.0675276 -2.63* 
t-4 
-0.0073759 -0.75 -0.0749035 -2.92* 
t-3 0.0047192 0.48 -0.0701843 -2.73* 
t-2 2.562E-05 0.00 -0.0701587 -2.73* 
t-1 0.0007364 0.08 -0.0694223 -2.70* 
t=0 
-0.0029565 -0.30 -0.0723788 -2.82* 
t+1 
-0.012687 -1.29 -0.0850658 -3.31* 
t+2 
-0.0027749 -0.28 -0.0878407 -3.42* 
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t+3 1.111E-05 0.00 -0.0878296 -3.42* 
t+4 
-0.0055853 -0.57 -0.0934149 -3.64* 
t+5 0.0040677 0.41 -0.0893472 -3.48* 
t+6 
-0.0164938 -1.68* -0.105841 -4.12* 
t+7 0.0011842 0.12 -0.1046568 -4.08* 
t+8 
-0.0004951 -0.05 -0.1051518 -4.10* 
t+9 
-0.001851 -0.19 -0.1070028 -4.17* 
t+10 0.0030118 0.31 -0.103991 -4.05* 
t+11 
-0.0010877 -0.11 -0.1050787 -4.09* 
t+12 0.0206407 2.10* -0.084438 -3.29* 
t+13 
-0.0045251 -0.94 -0.1372736 -2.82* 
t+14 
-0.0014484 -0.30 -0.1387221 -2.85* 
t+15 
-0.0009779 -0.20 -0.1397 -2.87* 
t+16 0.0009464 0.20 -0.1387536 -2.85* 
t+17 
-0.0004133 -0.09 -0.1391669 -2.86* 
t+18 0.0002422 0.05 -0.1389247 -2.86* 
t+19 0.001953 0.41 -0.1369717 -2.82* 
t+20 
-0.000369 -0.08 -0.1373407 -2.82* 
t+21 0.0005055 0.11 -0.1368352 -2.81* 
t+22 0.0002123 0.04 -0.1366229 -2.81* 
t+23 
-0.0004452 -0.09 -0.1370681 -2.82* 
t+24 0.0005905 0.12 -0.1364776 -2.81* 
t+25 
-0.000982 -0.20 -0.1374595 -2.83* 
t+26 
-0.0007633 -0.16 -0.1382228 -2.84* 
t+27 
-0.0027875 -0.58 -0.1410103 -2.90* 
t+28 0.0014296 0.30 -0.1395807 -2.87* 
t+29 
-0.00261 -0.54 -0.1421908 -2.92* 
t+30 
-0.0075358 -1.57 -0.1497266 -3.08* 
t+31 
-0.0006035 -0.13 -0.1503301 -3.09* 
t+32 
-0.0012295 -0.26 -0.1515595 -3.12* 
t+33 
-0.0027472 -0.57 -0.1543068 -3.17* 
t+34 
-0.0015544 -0.32 -0.1558612 -3.20* 
t+35 0.0008326 0.17 -0.1550286 -3.19* 
t+36 0.002371 0.49 -0.1526576 -3.14* 
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Table A12.10 Peer Group-Adjusted Equity Value Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 
-0.0042208 -0.43 -0.0042208 -0.16 
t-35 
-0.0021095 -0.22 -0.0063302 -0.25 
t-34 
-0.010326 -1.05 -0.0166562 -0.65 
t-33 0.0197476 2.01* 0.0030914 0.12 
t-32 
-0.001136 -0.12 0.0019554 0.08 
t-31 0.0019577 0.20 0.0039131 0.15 
t-30 
-0.0235243 -2.40* -0.0196113 -0.76 
t-29 0.0077261 0.79 -0.0118851 -0.46 
t-28 0.0061909 0.63 -0.0056943 -0.22 
t-27 
-0.0083412 -0.85 -0.0140355 -0.55 
t-26 
-0.0057452 -0.59 -0.0197807 -0.77 
t-25 
-0.007733 -0.79 -0.0275137 -1.07 
t-24 0.0185782 1.89* -0.0089355 -0.35 
t-23 
-0.0219767 -2.24* -0.0309122 -1.20 
t-22 
-0.0001031 -0.01 -0.0310153 -1.21 
t-21 
-0.0111403 -1.14 -0.0421556 -1.64 
t-20 
-0.0036659 -0.37 -0.0458215 -1.78* 
t-19 
-0.0210035 -2.14* -0.066825 -2.60* 
t-18 
-0.0057769 -0.59* -0.0726019 -2.83* 
t-17 0.0172075 1.75 -0.0553944 -2.16* 
t-16 0.0023285 0.24 -0.0530659 -2.07* 
t-15 0.0037106 0.38 -0.0493554 -1.92* 
t-14 
-0.0019237 -0.20 -0.051279 -2.00* 
t-13 0.0052439 0.53 -0.0460351 -1.79* 
t-12 
-0.0086531 -0.88 -0.0546882 -2.13* 
t-11 
-0.0048309 -0.49 -0.0595192 -2.32* 
t-10 
-0.0030352 -0.31 -0.0625543 -2.44* 
t-9 6.91E-05 0.01 -0.0624852 -2.43* 
t-8 0.0076664 0.78 -0.0548188 -2.14* 
t-7 0.0007363 0.08 -0.0540825 -2.11* 
t-6 
-0.0113072 -1.15 -0.0653897 -2.55* 
t-5 
-0.0021379 -0.22 -0.0675276 -2.63* 
t-4 
-0.0073759 -0.75 -0.0749035 -2.92* 
t-3 0.0047192 0.48 -0.0701843 -2.73* 
t-2 2.562E-05 0.00 -0.0701587 -2.73* 
t-1 0.0007364 0.08 -0.0694223 -2.70* 
t=0 
-0.0029565 -0.30 -0.0723788 -2.82* 
t+1 
-0.012687 -1.29 -0.0850658 -3.31* 
t+2 
-0.0027749 -0.28 -0.0878407 -3.42* 
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t+3 1.111E-05 0.00 -0.0878296 -3.42* 
t+4 
-0.0055853 -0.57 -0.0934149 -3.64* 
t+5 0.0040677 0.41 -0.0893472 -3.48* 
t+6 
-0.0164938 -1.68* -0.105841 -4.12* 
t+7 0.0011842 0.12 -0.1046568 -4.08* 
t+8 
-0.0004951 -0.05 -0.1051518 -4.10* 
t+9 
-0.001851 -0.19 -0.1070028 -4.17* 
t+10 0.0030118 0.31 -0.103991 -4.05* 
t+11 
-0.0010877 -0.11 -0.1050787 -4.09* 
t+12 0.0206407 2.10* -0.084438 -3.29* 
t+13 
-0.0316964 -3.23* -0.1161344 -4.52* 
t+14 0.0135175 1.38 -0.1026169 -4.00* 
t+15 
-0.00243 -0.25 -0.1050469 -4.09* 
t+16 
-2.21E-05 0.00 -0.105069 -4.09* 
t+17 
-0.0002446 -0.02 -0.1053136 -4.10* 
t+18 0.0008876 0.09 -0.104426 -4.07* 
t+19 
-0.0022444 -0.23 -0.1066704 -4.15* 
t+20 0.0033388 0.34 -0.1033316 -4.02* 
t+21 
-0.0021831 -0.22 -0.1055147 -4.11* 
t+22 
-0.0178411 -1.82 -0.1233558 -4.80* 
t+23 
-0.0017268 -0.18 -0.1250827 -4.87* 
t+24 
-0.0079508 -0.81 -0.1330335 -5.18* 
t+25 
-0.0032749 -0.33 -0.1363084 -5.31* 
t+26 
-0.014713 -1.50 -0.1510213 -5.88* 
t+27 0.0116661 1.19 -0.1393553 -5.43* 
t+28 
-0.0264778 -2.70* -0.1658331 -6.46* 
t+29 0.0013136 0.13 -0.1645195 -6.41* 
t+30 0.0086483 0.88 -0.1558712 -6.07* 
t+31 0.0068931 0.70 -0.1489781 -5.80* 
t+32 
-0.0020402 -0.21 -0.1510182 -5.88* 
t+33 0.0129193 1.32 -0.1380989 -5.38* 
t+34 0.0159266 1.62 -0.1221723 -4.76* 
t+35 
-0.0079352 -0.81 -0.1301074 -5.07* 
t+36 0.0055278 0.56 -0.1245796 -4.85* 
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Table A12.11 Peer Group-Adjusted Equity Small-Cap Funds AARs and CAARs (* 
indicates 5% significance level) 
Event Time 
Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns 
T-test 
t-36 0.0059246 0.73 0.0059246 0.09 
t-35 0.00211 0.26 0.0080346 0.12 
t-34 
-0.0082133 -1.02 -0.0001786 0.00 
t-33 
-0.0035665 -0.44 -0.0037451 -0.06 
t-32 0.0056421 0.70 0.001897 0.03 
t-31 
-0.0031574 -0.39 -0.0012604 -0.02 
t-30 0.0044309 0.55 0.0031705 0.05 
t-29 0.0124908 1.54 0.0156613 0.24 
t-28 
-0.006999 -0.87 0.0086623 0.13 
t-27 
-0.0126368 -1.56 -0.0039745 -0.06 
t-26 0.0024038 0.30 -0.0015706 -0.02 
t-25 0.0133248 1.65* 0.0117542 0.18 
t-24 
-0.0011332 -0.14 0.010621 0.16 
t-23 
-0.0101128 -1.25 0.0005081 0.01 
t-22 
-0.0061389 -0.76 -0.0056308 -0.09 
t-21 0.0030265 0.37 -0.0026043 -0.04 
t-20 
-0.0151376 -1.87* -0.0177419 -0.27 
t-19 
-0.0037791 -0.47 -0.0215209 -0.33 
t-18 
-0.0146189 -1.81* -0.0361398 -0.55 
t-17 
-0.012021 -1.49 -0.0481608 -0.74 
t-16 
-0.005794 -0.72 -0.0539548 -0.83 
t-15 
-0.0067703 -0.84 -0.0607251 -0.93 
t-14 
-0.0197914 -2.45* -0.0805165 -1.24 
t-13 
-0.0061415 -0.76 -0.086658 -1.33 
t-12 
-0.0137687 -1.70* -0.1004267 -1.54 
t-11 
-0.0005111 -0.06 -0.1009378 -1.55 
t-10 0.0006458 0.08 -0.100292 -1.54 
t-9 
-0.0169256 -2.09* -0.1172176 -1.80* 
t-8 
-0.0067819 -0.84 -0.1239995 -1.90* 
t-7 
-0.0064811 -0.80 -0.1304806 -2.00* 
t-6 
-0.0123143 -1.52 -0.142795 -2.19* 
t-5 
-0.0048748 -0.60 -0.1476698 -2.27* 
t-4 
-0.0082283 -1.02 -0.1558981 -2.39* 
t-3 
-0.0062599 -0.77 -0.162158 -2.49* 
t-2 
-0.018562 -2.29* -0.18072 -2.77* 
t-1 0.0014346 0.18 -0.1792854 -2.75* 
t=0 
-0.0062473 -0.77 -0.1855328 -2.85* 
t+1 
-0.0040687 -0.50 -0.1896015 -2.91* 
t+2 
-0.0053101 -0.66 -0.1949116 -2.99* 
245 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t+3 
-0.0096709 -1.20 -0.2045825 -3.14* 
t+4 
-0.0105614 -1.31 -0.2151439 -3.30* 
t+5 
-0.002833 -0.35 -0.2179769 -3.34* 
t+6 0.0012074 0.15 -0.2167696 -3.33* 
t+7 
-0.0053776 -0.66 -0.2221472 -3.41* 
t+8 
-0.0009735 -0.12 -0.2231206 -3.42* 
t+9 
-0.0047706 -0.59 -0.2278912 -3.50* 
t+10 0.0089475 1.11 -0.2189437 -3.36* 
t+11 
-4.875E-06 0.00 -0.2189486 -3.36* 
t+12 0.0046621 0.58 -0.2142865 -3.29* 
t+13 0.0148068 1.83* -0.1994797 -3.06* 
t+14 0.0024328 0.30 -0.1970468 -3.02* 
t+15 
-0.0014535 -0.18 -0.1985004 -3.05* 
t+16 
-0.0016828 -0.21 -0.2001831 -3.07* 
t+17 
-0.0025504 -0.32 -0.2027335 -3.11* 
t+18 
-0.009781 -1.21 -0.2125145 -3.26* 
t+19 
-0.0011157 -0.14 -0.2136302 -3.28* 
t+20 0.0034059 0.42 -0.2102243 -3.23* 
t+21 2.635E-05 0.00 -0.2101979 -3.22* 
t+22 0.0008281 0.10 -0.2093698 -3.21* 
t+23 
-0.0027733 -0.34 -0.2121431 -3.25* 
t+24 
-0.0033738 -0.42 -0.2155169 -3.31* 
t+25 
-0.008816 -1.09 -0.2243329 -3.44* 
t+26 0.0016014 0.20 -0.2227315 -3.42* 
t+27 0.0017803 0.22 -0.2209512 -3.39* 
t+28 
-0.0019303 -0.24 -0.2228815 -3.42* 
t+29 
-0.0063685 -0.79 -0.22925 -3.52* 
t+30 
-0.0664246 -8.21* -0.2956745 -4.54* 
t+31 6.855E-05 0.01 -0.295606 -4.53* 
t+32 
-0.0011726 -0.14 -0.2967786 -4.55* 
t+33 0.0035684 0.44 -0.2932102 -4.50* 
t+34 0.0134446 1.66* -0.2797656 -4.29* 
t+35 
-0.0012704 -0.16 -0.281036 -4.31* 
t+36 
-0.000479 -0.06 -0.2815149 -4.32* 
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APPENDIX 13: Peer Group Adjusted Average Abnormal Returns for Top/Bottom 
10% Funds 
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APPENDIX 14: Test in Difference of Means of all categories for each method 
(Market-, Peer group- and mean-adjusted), *Significant at 5% significance level 
 
 
Test in Difference of Means for Male and Female Managed Funds 
 MARKET PEER MEAN 
T-Statistic 13.437* 30.742* -0.365 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.717 
   
    
Test in Difference of Means for UK and International Funds 
 MARKET PEER MEAN 
T-Statistic -17.546* -18.809* 4.119* 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
    
Test in Difference of Means for Emerging and Developed Market Funds 
 MARKET PEER MEAN 
T-Statistic 18.570* 12.995* -3.565* 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.001 
    
    
Test in Difference of Means for Equity and Bonds Funds 
 MARKET PEER MEAN 
T-Statistic 24.544* -14.428* -5.455* 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
    
Test in Difference of Means for Small-Cap and Growth Funds 
 MARKET PEER MEAN 
T-Statistic -15.236* -8.225* 10.495* 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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CHAPTER THREE  
 
 
Do Fund Flows Play a Role in UK Fund Manager 
Changes? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study investigates the relationship between manager changes and mutual fund 
flows. Using our unique, hand-constructed database of fund manager changes, we 
examine whether the fund flows are influenced by the change in manager and in turn by 
the past performance, gender of the fund manager, market in which the fund invests or 
the type of fund by asset class. The study uses an unbalanced panel data and an event 
study methodology to trace fund flows. We show that fund flows substantially 
deteriorate after the manager leaves the fund. Moreover, we find that there is a negative 
relationship between fund flows and returns over longer period horizons and a positive 
relationship over shorter periods. In addition, our results suggest that poor past 
performance causes significant fund withdrawals, however, we find no evidence that the 
gender of the fund manager, the market in which the fund invests, or the type of fund 
plays any role in determining the size of the fund flows. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is an extensive empirical literature analysing the relationship between the 
performance of mutual funds and subsequent inflows of new money into these funds. 
Examining the mutual fund flow data, one is able to implicitly study the behaviour and 
decisions of individual investors, which in turn may affect fund returns. One of the most 
divisive topics within the fund management performance literature is the debate on the 
interdependence between fund performance and the size of the fund. Khorana and 
Servaes (1999) and Chen et al. (2004) find a positive relationship between fund size and 
fund performance. On the other hand, Grinblatt and Titman (1994), Dahlquist et al. 
(2000) and Gallagher and Martin (2005) find no association between these outlined 
factors. However, there has been little evidence devoted to the impact that a manager 
has on the level of fund flows31.  Mutual fund managers come and go, as companies 
look for new superstars or shift top managers to underperforming funds in their family 
or as managers simply leave the mutual fund industry. Be it as it may, such changes 
could have a large impact on the inflows into the funds and eventually returns of the 
funds.  
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between fund manager changes 
and fund flows into and out of UK funds over the period April 2002 to December 2006. 
In other words, we attempt to answer whether fund manager changes have an impact on 
the inflows into the funds and eventually the returns of these funds. This study attempts 
to fill the gap in the literature by offering a comprehensive study of fund manager 
changes and gender influences in different types of funds in the UK managed fund 
industry and to highlight the effect a fund manager change (replacement) has on fund 
flows. Therefore, using an event study methodology, we aim to highlight the influence 
of fund flows on manager change. To the best of our knowledge, there have been no 
previous studies looking at the interdependence of mutual fund flows and fund manager 
change. In addition, we further examine whether fund characteristics, such as gender of 
fund manager, type of fund and the market in which the fund invests, plays a role in 
determining the level of fund flows. Our study is aimed at addressing these issues.  
 
                                                 
31
 Chevalier and Ellison (1999) examined the labour market for mutual fund manages and find that, 
among other things, termination of their jobs is positively linked with an outflow of funds.  
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1.2 Objectives and Significance of Research 
 
The objective of this study is to examine the flow of mutual funds and to determine 
whether manager changes play a role in influencing these trends of fund flows. Using 
our unique, hand-constructed database of UK fund manager changes and an event study 
methodology, we intend to highlight the apparent trends of fund flows before and after 
the manager change. Through our event study methodology we aim to examine whether 
the level of fund flows leads to a fund manager change and whether the change in 
manager has an impact on the level of fund flows after the change. In addition, we test 
whether the level of fund flows persists after the fund manager change has occurred.   
 
Numerous studies have analysed the relationship between the level of flow and the 
performance of mutual funds, among other determinants that may influence the level of 
fund flows. However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that examines 
the relationship between fund flows and fund manager change. In particular, this study 
is devoted to determining whether fund manager changes affect the level of fund flows.  
 
Furthermore, using a panel least squares model, we examine whether the impact of fund 
manager changes on the level of fund flows varies depending upon whether the fund 
manager is male or female, whether the fund is a developed or emerging market, and 
depending upon the fund‟s asset class, that is, equity or bond.  
 
The structure of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two comprises the 
literature review, which discusses the earlier findings related to this study. Section three 
explains the data and methodology used in this chapter. Section four is devoted to the 
results of our findings.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There is an extensive empirical literature focusing on the relationship between the 
performance of mutual funds and subsequent inflows or outflows of money into and out 
of those funds. Most studies have found that the relationship between performance and 
flow is positive, where investors tend to move cash into the funds that had the highest 
returns in the previous year. However, there is no evidence on the study of the impact of 
fund managers on fund flows. This review of the literature is intended to cover most 
indicative and influential studies that have been carried out so far in the US and the UK.     
 
2.1 Fund Flows and Returns 
 
One of the most contentious issues within the fund management performance literature 
is the nature of the relationship between fund performance and the size of the fund. 
Khorana and Servaes (1999) and Chen at al. (2004) find a positive relationship between 
fund size and fund performance. However, Grinblatt and Titman (1994), Dahliquist et 
al. (β000) and Gallagher and Martin (β005) find no association between the fund‟s size 
and performance. However, studies by Arshanapalli et al. (1998) and Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999) argue that small-sized US mutual funds tend to outperform larger funds. 
Nevertheless, most studies agree that mutual funds, as well as hedge funds that exhibit 
higher returns experience higher net inflows (Ippolito (1992), Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997), Goetzmann and Peles (1997), Gruber (1996), and Agarwal et al. (2004)).  
  
Warther (1995) performed a study using U.S. aggregate mutual fund flows and security 
returns. Using monthly data he divided fund flows into anticipated and unanticipated 
flows, using time-series models to estimate anticipated flows. Results suggest that 
monthly returns are strongly correlated with unexpected flows and that they are 
uncorrelated with expected flows. He also found a positive relation between flows and 
subsequent returns in weekly data and evidence of a negative relation between returns 
and subsequent flows in monthly data. 
 
Ippolito (1992) used annual US data to examine investors reaction to funds that had 
performed well in the recent past and compared with these that had performed poorly. 
He shows that this is rational investor behaviour as they are aiming to maximise their 
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returns, which in turn regulates the fund manager and aligns their interests with those of 
the investors. Sirri and Tufano (1993) examine flows at an individual level and using 
yearly data, they find that money flows into the fund with the best performance in the 
previous year. This is also consistent with the findings of Hendricks, Patel and 
Zeckhauser (1993).    
 
Furthermore, Sirri and Tufano (1998) study the flows of funds into and out of individual 
U.S. equity mutual funds concentrating on the impact of search costs on fund flows. In 
particular their study focused on the period from December 1971 through to December 
1990. Using a linear regression they analysed the relationship between returns, risk, fees 
and flows. They treated search costs, such as marketing expenses as the fees that the 
investor has to incur. They found that investors of equity funds chase high performing 
funds while failing to flee lower performing funds at the same rate. They also document 
that mutual fund flows are affected by factors related to the search costs that investors 
must bear. In addition, high-fee funds, which spend more on marketing than their rivals, 
enjoy a much stronger performance-flow relationship than do their rivals. They also 
report that funds that are part of a large fund complex are an important determinant of 
fund flows and larger complexes reduce investors‟ search costs.  
 
Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) extended the study of Sirri and Tufano and argued that funds 
not only compete for flows within their market segment but also within their fund 
family. Using US equity mutual funds from 1993 to 2001 they found that there is a 
positive and convex relationship between the family rank of a fund and its subsequent 
growth in size.   
 
Keswani and Stolin (2006) examine whether performance persistence within a peer 
group of competing mutual funds depends on the group‟s composition. In particular, 
they construct several variables intended to capture the intensity of competition in a 
sector, including the number of funds in a sector, the proportion of mature funds, and 
the Herfindahl index of asset concentration. Their data consist of UK mutual funds 
comprised from the Unit Trust Yearbook, from 1991 to 2001. In their study they 
employ the Spearman rank correlation coefficient and the log-odds ratio to test the 
performance persistence and use variables such as the number of funds in the sector and 
the proportion of mature funds in the sector in order to measure the intra-sector rivalry. 
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According to their results persistence is higher in sectors where concentration of assets 
under management is higher. 
 
Taking a different approach, Berk and Tonks (2007) study the relationship between 
return persistence and fund flows in the worst performing mutual funds. Using a large 
data set of US mutual funds from January 1962 to December 2004, they use relative and 
absolute methods to measure the level of yearly fund flow. The reason for using the 
absolute method is due to the fact that the relative measure does not capture the growth 
in the number of very small funds. Furthermore, they implement Carhart‟s 4 factor 
model to test for performance. They also divide the results in best/worst performing and 
examine the flow of funds in those categories. To investigate the flow of funds-
performance relation in the subcategories of the bottom decile they use the controls that 
have been identified by prior research. Finally, they regress fund flows on the prior year 
return, including the annualized Jensen-alpha, estimated over the previous 36 months 
from a 4-factor model, the associated tracking error estimated as the variance of the 
residuals from the 4-factor model, fund size, fees, age, and the prior year fund flow. The 
authors show that the observed persistence in the returns of the worst performing funds 
can be attributed to funds that do not have a strong flow of funds-performance relation. 
However, funds in the worst performing decile that do show evidence of a strong flow 
of funds-performance relation do not have persistent returns.  
 
Moreover, Friesen and Sapp (forthcoming) focus their research on the timing ability of 
mutual fund investors using cash flow data at an individual level. Using a data of 7,125 
US mutual funds, they compute monthly dollar-weighted returns and find that the 
average active fund investor substantially underperforms the growth of a dollar invested 
in the fund over the entire measurement period. They further test this on various 
subcategories based on size, objective or risk preference and find consistent results. 
Their results suggest that due to the underperformance of new cash flows losses from 
poor market timing decisions are most likely to overshadow any potential gains from 
over performing funds.  
 
Green and Hodges (2001) show that mutual fund flows that are correlated with 
subsequent fund returns have a diluting impact on the performance of open-ended 
funds. In previous studies Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) outlined the “smart money” 
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effect where fund flows tend to find funds that have a higher likelihood of good future 
performance. On the other hand, Green and Hodges show that daily fund flows in 
international funds are able to predict subsequent day returns whereas the flows in 
domestic funds have no relation with the following day‟s return. Using a sample of 8γγ 
US mutual funds, their results suggest that the domestic equity funds show no dilution 
impact. However, international funds demonstrate an annualized negative impact of 
0.48%.  
 
In fact, a body of literature has revealed that investors are potentially rewarded for 
chasing returns. A study by Wermers (2003) examined fund returns and cash flows over 
a 20-year period for the US market. In his study, Wermers found prior-year top funds 
beat bottom funds by 5% during the following year, and the S&P500 index by 2%. He 
argues that the behaviour of fund managers is influenced by the flow of new money. 
Winning fund managers use cash inflows to increase existing equity positions and to 
take new positions in new winning stocks, thus reinforcing the positive momentum 
effect. Therefore, at least a portion of the persistence in fund returns is the result of 
investors aggressively upgrading or moving into funds with superior returns over the 
last year.   
 
2.2 Do other factors affect Fund Flows? 
 
One of the studies that look at different factors that affect fund flows is by Cooper et al. 
(2004). In particular, they analyse the effect a mutual fund name change has on the fund 
flow and subsequent returns. Using an event study methodology, their sample data 
comprises 296 US mutual funds that had a style name changed over the period April 
1994 to July 2001. Applying the change of name of fund as the event date, they measure 
the level of fund flow and abnormal return before and after the event date. According to 
their results, the funds that had changed names had experienced a negative fund flow 
over the six months before the name change, earned lower excess returns, are older and 
had lower marketing fees. Once the name change occurs, these funds experience 
significantly positive abnormal fund flows. This is most pronounced for the funds that 
had made a hot-style name change, or the current glamour style fund name. Cooper et 
al. argue that the funds that had taken up a hot-style name had increased their 
advertising expenditures, leading to increased fund inflows and a rise in abnormal 
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returns. However, the increase in abnormal returns does not occur in the period 
immediately after the name change, but shows a steady increase one year after the name 
change. The study by Copper et al. documents irrational behaviour by the investors, as 
they seem to disregard the underlying performance of the fund and invest in those that 
had a hot-style name change.  
 
On the other hand, Barber et al. (2005) take a different approach and concentrate on the 
effect that expenses have on mutual fund flows. Morse specifically, they analyse the 
changes in how investors treat various mutual fund expenses such as load fees, 
commissions and operating expenses. Analysing the period from 1970 to 1999, they 
measure US mutual fund flows and actual mutual fund purchase and sale decisions by 
investors at a large discount broker from 1991 to 1996. Their results show consistently 
negative relations between fund flows and load fees or commissions, but no relation 
between fund flows and operating expenses. Furthermore, they divided the operating 
expenses into marketing expenses and other expenses and found that the inflow of funds 
increased for the mutual funds that had higher marketing expenses and decreased for 
those that had higher other operating expenses. This is also consistent with Jain and Wu 
(2000) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) who argue that increased flows are associated with 
increased marketing expenditure.  
 
It is evident from the literature review that there are numerous studies on the 
relationship between fund flows and returns, as well as factors such as expenses and 
fund name changes. Most literature advocates that it is primarily the fund‟s returns that 
influence the level of fund flow. Our study differs from the others due to the fact that we 
take into account a different factor, fund manager replacement. Therefore, to the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the impact of a fund manager 
replacement on the subsequent level of fund flows. Using an event study methodology 
and an empirical model we examine the level of fund flows before and after the 
replacement of fund manager. As a result, we attempt to fill the gap in the literature that 
it is in fact a fund manager that has plays a role in determining the level of fund flows.   
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
  
3.1 Data 
 
In this study, we utilize the unique, hand-constructed data set of fund manager changes 
that we have employed in the second chapter, „The Impact of Manager Changes on UK 
Fund Performance‟. In the second chapter, the Standard & Poor‟s data source provided 
us with information of manager replacements from April 2002 to December 2005. 
However, for this study we extended the data to December 2006. The monthly fund size 
or the total net assets for each fund was provided by our primary data source Lipper. 
However, out of the initial 258 funds, some were excluded from our study as the data on 
fund size provided by Lipper did not cover the manager change. More specifically, the 
monthly fund size provided for these funds was either before the manager change or 
after the manager change, leaving a final sample of 207 funds.  
 
Similarly to the second chapter, we use an event study methodology to examine the 
relationship between the level of abnormal fund flow in the pre and post manager 
change periods. The time line for our event study is as follows:  
 
estimation period   estimation period 
 
 
         t-36        t= 0     t+ 36 
 
     pre-change       manager change       post-change 
 
In our analysis, we measure the abnormal level of fund flow three years before and after 
the fund manager change, t= 0. In this way we will not only be able to determine 
whether the level of fund flow pre-manager change is associated with a manager 
change32, but also whether the change in manager had an impact on the level of fund 
flow.   
 
                                                 
32
 Increasing fund flow pre-manager change may indicate that manager was headhunted for another fund, 
while decrease in the flow may contribute to the reason why the manager left. 
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3.2 Methodology  
 
3.2.1 Event Study 
 
We use an event study methodology in order to assess the trend of fund flow before and 
after the manager change. Due to data limitations, we do not observe inflows (outflows) 
into (out of) a fund directly. Instead, we employ the standard procedure to calculate the 
growth of fund i in month t and as in Sirri and Tufano (1998), define the fund flow over 
the period t-1 to t by the formula 
 
                              Fund Flowt = [ TNAt – (1+rt) TNAt-1 ] / TNAt-1  
  (1) 
 
where TNAt is a fund‟s total net assets at time t, and rt is the fund‟s return at time t. 
Fund Flow reflects the percentage growth of a fund in excess of the growth that would 
have been earned had no new funds flows in and had all dividends been reinvested. In 
particular, this measure reflects the growth of the fund that is not due to the rate of 
return earned on the assets under management, but due to new external money. Sirri and 
Tufano (1998) show that this assumption is robust throughout the results in their study. 
We assume that the new money flows in and out of each fund at the end of each month 
since we do not know the exact timing of cash flows.  
 
The monthly price data for each fund is obtained from Datastream. We calculate the 
monthly return of each fund simply as the log difference between month t and t-1. We 
carry out the calculation of the fund flow three years before and after the event date for 
all 207 funds. For the event study methodology, we calculate the abnormal fund flow 
levels, AF it, before and after the fund manager change, using the mean-adjusted method: 
 
iitit FFAF    (2) 
 
where  iF  is the mean flow of fund i for which the management change has occurred 
over the 36 months prior to the change of fund manager.  
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Subsequently, we calculate the Average Abnormal Flow for the entire data sample: 
 
                                     ni itt AFnAAF 11   (3) 
 
where n is the number of funds in which the change of a fund manager occurred and 
AF it is the abnormal flow of fund i at period t. Furthermore, we assess the impact of the 
event by evaluating the difference between cumulative average abnormal flow before 
and after the change in fund manager: 
 
    3636t tit AFiCAAF      (4) 
 
In the previous chapter, we ascertained that the prior three year performance of a fund 
had a substantial impact of managerial change. In other words, from the overall sample 
of funds, the three year underperformance of the funds in relation to their respective 
benchmarks had led to a change in fund manager. By evaluating the level of fund flow 
three years before the fund manager change, we will be able to determine whether in 
fact it was the flow, in particular the outflow, that was the reason behind the managerial 
change. Furthermore, we will also be able to compare the two factors of performance 
and fund flow before and after the fund manger change. Many studies have confirmed 
that performance and fund flow are highly correlated and our study will in part add to 
this area of literature.  
 
 
3.2.2 Significance Tests 
 
In order to test the significance of the average abnormal fund flow and cumulative 
average abnormal fund flow we calculate the aggregate pre-event standard deviation of 
average abnormal flow for each of the funds as shown by Brown and Warner (1985):   
 
              
1
)( 2
1
36
, 
 



n
AFAF eventpre
t
it
eventprei                                                 (5)   
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where eventprei ,  is the standard deviation of average abnormal flow of fund i estimated 
from pre-event period, eventpreAF   is the average abnormal flow of fund i in the pre-
event period and n is the number of months in the pre-event period (in our case 36). 
Therefore, the aggregate standard deviation across all funds is calculated as: 
 
 
N
N
i
eventprei
eventpreN
   1 2,,                                                                   (6)   
 
where N is the number of funds in the sample. Using these standard deviations, we 
compute the T-test for AFs and CAFs as: 
  
eventpreN
t
testT
AF
tAF   ,                            (7) 
 and       
    
                      
112,   ttCAFtCAF eventpreN ttestT    (8) 
 
where 1t is the first day and 2t is the last day in the period over which we calculate 
cumulative returns. 
 
 
3.2.3 Empirical Model 
 
Through the event study we will be able to determine whether the level of fund flow 
had an impact on the change in fund manager. In order to evaluate whether a change in 
fund manager had an impact on the level of fund flow, we propose to run a number of 
Ordinary Least Squares regressions. To begin with, the average abnormal fund flow33 is 
used as our dependent variable and the fund manager change is the independent 
variable. The fund manager change is a dummy variable which takes the value of 0 for 
                                                 
33
 The average abnormal fund flow is calculated as shown in Equation (3).  
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the three years before the event date, and the value of 1 for the three years after the 
event date.  
 
                       Fund Flowt = α + ȕ1Fund Manager Change1t +  εt         (9) 
 
where α is the intercept and ε is the error term. This will provide us with a simple result 
as to whether a change in fund manager solely has an impact on the level of fund flows 
that occur in the following three years.  
 
Second, in order to determine whether fund flows are a function of other factors and to 
test the existing literature that fund flows are positively correlated with current and past 
performance, we add monthly returns of the funds as an independent variable: 
 
        Fund Flowt  =  α + ȕ1Fund Manager Change1t  +  ȕ2Performance2t  + 
          ȕ3Performance3t-1  +  εt  (10) 
 
where Performance denotes the return of the funds at month t. We initially carry out 
these regressions on the aggregate mutual fund flows. In other words, we run the 
regressions for the aggregate average fund flows and the aggregate cumulative fund 
flows.  
  
In addition to the aggregate empirical model, we test our hypothesis at an individual 
level as well. This necessitates the use of panel data or longitudinal data where the same 
economic units (here fund manager change and returns) are observed over time (Baltagi 
(2001)). Therefore, the data is an unbalanced panel dataset including fund flows, returns 
(current and period lagged) and fund manager change (value of 0 and 1 three years 
before and after the manager change respectively). Furthermore, we include other fund 
characteristic variables such as manager gender (value of 0 if male and 1 if female), 
market (value of 0 for developed market funds and 1 for emerging market funds) and 
type (value of 0 for equity funds and 1 for bond funds). The complete model then reads: 
 
      Fund Flowt = α + ȕ1Fund Manager Change1t + ȕ2Performance2t  + 
   ȕ3Performance3t-1 + ȕ4Gender4t +  ȕ5Market5t  +  ȕ6Type6t  +  εt (11) 
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The results of the regressions will be able to determine the effects that a new fund 
manager and the performance of the fund has had on the level of fund flow. Moreover, 
our results will indicate whether the gender of the fund manager influences the inflows 
of funds and if the fund characteristics play a role in determining the inflow of funds.  
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Due to the fact that we have used two different sets of methodologies (event study and 
regression analysis) in our study, we report the results separately for each. The first set 
of results corresponds to the event study, which will show the trend of the fund flows 
over our event period. This is followed by the results from the regression models, which 
will confirm whether the change in fund manager has had an effect on the level of fund 
flow and whether the gender of the fund manager and fund characteristics play a part in 
determining the level of flow.  
 
 
4.1 Fund Flow for All Funds 
 
Applying our event study methodology, we measure the level of abnormal fund flow 
three years before (pre-event) and after (post-event) the change in fund manager (event 
date). Table A1.1 in Appendix 1 depicts the average abnormal fund flow and the 
cumulative average abnormal fund flow for the entire event period in our estimation. 
The period t-36 to t-1 corresponds to the pre-event period. The period t= 0 is the event 
date, which corresponds to the month that the fund manager has stopped running the 
particular fund. The period t+ 1 to t+ 36 relate to the post-event period, where the 
previous manager has been replaced. At the outset, the results for the average abnormal 
fund flow show a less volatile and decreasing trend during the pre-event period as 
opposed to the post-event, with predominantly positive values. This can also be seen in 
Figure A2.1 in Appendix 2, which graphically depicts this trend. However, only months 
t-32, t-28, t-26 and t-21 are statistically significant. Furthermore, we see that the average 
abnormal returns are decreasing in value from t-11 leading to the change in fund 
manager. On the other hand, the post-event period shows a somewhat different picture. 
Three months after the change in fund manager, the level of fund flow increase sharply 
due to an increase in flow for a specific developed market equity fund. However, during 
the period t+ 4 and onwards the trend continues to decrease up to the end of our 
analysis, t-36, with predominantly negative average abnormal flow. During the post-
event period, the average abnormal level of flow is more volatile as compared to the 
pre-event period and we see an decrease in inflows as a new fund manager takes over. 
Furthermore, months t+ 3, and t+ 17 are statistically significant.  
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Furthermore, Table A1.1 (Appendix 1) gives results for the cumulative average 
abnormal fund flows for all of the 207 funds in our data sample and their corresponding 
tests for significance. During the third and second year of the pre-event period, t-36 to t-
10, the cumulative average abnormal flow is increasing in values and from periods t-28 
to t-1 they are statistically significant. This can also be clearly seen in Figure 3.1, which 
shows that the monthly cumulative average abnormal fund flow increases by about 32% 
a year before the change in fund manager. Nevertheless, during the ten months leading 
to the change in fund manager the flow of the funds decreases substantially, albeit 
remaining in positive values. Three months after the change in fund manager, the funds 
in our sample experience a small increase in inflow, which is attributed to the large 
increase in flow for the one specific fund. However, after t+ 3 the cumulative average 
abnormal fund flow begins to decline once again and continues to do so until the end of 
our post-event. In fact, during the last three months of the post-event analysis, the fund 
flows decrease by approximately 28%. Moreover, our results indicate that the 
cumulative average abnormal fund flows are statistically significant during t+ 3 to t+ 5 
and t+ 27 to t+ 36 (Table A1.1 in Appendix 1).  
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There are two clear conclusions that can be drawn from Figure 3.1: 1) one of the 
reasons that led to manager replacement may have been the decrease in fund flows in 
the year before the replacement and 2) on average fund flows start deteriorating after the 
manager change and continue to do so until the end of our sample period. In particular, 
three years before the change in fund manager the level of fund flow improves 
substantially and continues to do so up to a year before the event date, when the fund 
manager is replaced. Once a new fund manager takes over, the level of fund flow 
decreases considerably up to t+ 36. Due to the fact that 96 out of 207 funds in our 
analysis belong to the 2004 and 2005 period, the 36 months post-event period includes 
the severe market downturn of 2007 and 2008. Therefore, the obvious decrease in flow 
for our funds in the last two years of the post-event analysis may have been affected by 
the market crisis of 2007 and 2008. Our results coincide with those from our previous 
study, where the performance or the return of the funds deteriorated during the same 
period.  Therefore, we can conclude that level of fund flow exhibited a poor outcome a 
year before the change in fund manager, and once a new manager takes over the fund 
flow depict a slight improvement followed by a substantial decrease up to three years 
post change.  
 
A wide literature is devoted to the relationship between fund flows and performance or 
the returns of the funds. The fund flow literature has shown that investors base their 
fund purchase decisions on previous performance (Spitz (1970), Smith (1978), Warther 
(1995) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997)). In our study, we also attempt to answer 
whether the performance of the funds in return influences the level of flow into those 
funds. In order to emphasise the extent of the relationship between performance and 
flow, we take into account only the top and bottom ten percent of the funds according to 
their information ratios. Primarily, we rank the funds according to the corresponding 
information ratios 36 months before the event date and identify the top and bottom ten 
percent. Subsequently, this allows us to examine the level of fund flows for those top 
and bottom ten percent of funds during the post-event period.  
 
Our results indicate that the level of fund flow in the post-event period decreases as a 
comparison to the pre-event period. This can be seen in Figure 3.2. During the pre-event 
period the top ten percent of the funds show a more volatile movement in their level of 
flows. Furthermore, we see positive fund flows for approximately two years, starting 
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from t-32 to t-10, reaching an increase of about 80% a year before the change. These 
specific funds exhibited the highest information ratios during the pre-event period and 
the positive fund flows during this period may be attributed to the superior performance 
of these funds. In other words, from the pre-event results we can deduce that a positive 
relationship exists between fund flows and the return of these funds. However, once a 
new fund manager takes over, we see deterioration in the level of fund flows. In the 
previous chapter, we find that there is no persistence in the top performers as the 
performance of these funds declines once a new fund manager takes over. Our results 
for the fund flows in the post-event period also highlight this trend where we see a 
substantial decrease in flow as a new fund manager takes over. Once more, we see a 
positive relationship between fund flows and returns over approximately a year. From 
this result we can conclude that the pre-event outperformance of the top ten percent 
funds according to returns had a negative impact on the flow of funds in the post-event 
period. Therefore, we see a negative relationship between fund flows and returns over 
longer period horizons and a positive relationship over shorter periods.  
 
 
 
When taking into account the bottom ten percent of funds, the trend of the fund flows in 
the post-event period is very similar compared to the top ten percent, as shown in Figure 
3.3. Two years before the event date the funds experience an increase of about 36% in 
270 
the level of flow, which may have been caused by the performance of the funds in the 
previous years, which is before t-36. However, the level of flow into these funds 
deteriorates one and a half years before the change in fund manager and continues to 
decline up to the end of our analysis, t+ 36. This is not surprising as these worst 
performing funds had the lowest information ratios during the pre-event period and their 
performance continued to persist even after the fund manager was replaced. As a result, 
the poor performance of these funds had led to negative fund flows throughout the 
entire post-event period.   Based on our results, we can conclude that there is a lagged 
positive relationship between performance and fund flow where investors seem to base 
their purchase decisions on previous performance and changing the fund manager 
makes little difference.  
 
 
 
4.1.2 Fund Flow for Male vs. Female Managed Funds 
 
In order to determine whether the gender of a fund manager has an impact on the level 
of fund flows, we initially identify the funds that are managed by males and those by 
females during the pre-event period. Out of total sample of 207 funds, 32 are female 
managed and the remaining funds are male managed. Even though the female managed 
funds are a minority in relation to the male managed funds, the results obtained are 
worth reporting. 
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Due to the fact that the majority of funds in our data sample are managed by men, fund 
flows for male managers throughout our event analysis are similar to that of the total 
sample. Table A3.1 in Appendix 3 reports the results for the monthly average abnormal 
and cumulative average abnormal fund flows for the male managed funds. During the 
pre-event period the average abnormal fund flows depict a more volatile movement and 
mainly positive average abnormal fund flows (Figure A2.2 in Appendix 2), with months 
t-33, t-32, t-29, t-26, t-21 and t-13 being statistically significant. Once the male fund 
manager is replaced, the level of fund flow decreases, experiencing negative fund flows 
for the most part. However, only months t+ 3, t+ 8 and t+ 17 are statistically significant. 
This trend is more pronounced when taking into account the cumulative average 
abnormal fund flows. As shown in Figure 3.4, the cumulative average abnormal fund 
flows for the male managed funds show an increase in flow of about 29% followed by a 
decrease leading up to the event date, albeit still remaining positive. Once the male 
manager has been replaced the funds experience an increase in fund flows for about a 
year. However, this trend does not persist and the abnormal flow decreases up to the end 
of our analysis, with a decline of about 16% in fund flow in t-33. Furthermore, our 
results indicate that the cumulative average fund flows are statistically significant from 
t-29 to t-1, t+ 3 to t+ 16 and t+ 32 to t+ 36. We can conclude that a change in the male 
fund manager has had a negative impact on the level of fund flow, as we see a 
significant decrease in the flow during the post-event period.         
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When comparing the female fund managers and their male counterparts, the results 
indicate that the former obtain less constant and more volatile average abnormal fund 
flows (Figure A2.3 in Appendix 2). During the first year of the pre-event period (t-36 to 
t-24), the female fund managers experience a rise in fund flows followed a declining 
trend which continues up to the end of the pre-event period, t-1. Table A3.2 in 
Appendix 3 reports the results for the monthly average and cumulative average 
abnormal fund flows for the female managed funds, with months t-28 and t+ 12 being 
statistically significant when taking into account the average fund flows. In terms of the 
cumulative average abnormal fund flows, shown in Figure 3.5, the female managed 
funds depict a rising trend from t-29 to t-12, with a substantial increase in flow of about 
50% in t-12. This is contrast to the findings of Atkinson et al. (2003), who advocate that 
the net assets flows into funds managed by females are lower than for males. In fact, our 
results indicate that female fund managers exhibit greater flows as compared to the male 
fund managers during the pre-event period. Similar to the male managed funds, 
approximately a year before the change of the female fund manager, the funds depict a 
decrease in the level of flow and continue to do so until the end of the post event 
analysis. Additionally, our results indicate that the cumulative average abnormal flows 
are statistically significant from t-24 to t-4, t+ 11 and from t+ 16 to t+ 36. Although both 
the previously male and female managed funds depict a decrease in flow after they are 
replaced, it is interesting to note that the decrease is much earlier for the previously 
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female managed funds.  Once the female fund manager is replaced, the fund flows 
continue to decline to greater extent reaching an outflow of almost 100% in t-36. Figure 
3.5 suggests that the level of fund flows in the pre-event period is more favourable 
when compared to the post-event period. As a result, the replacement of the female fund 
manager has decreased the inflow of funds.  
 
 
 
Indeed, when comparing the female and male fund managers, our results suggest that 
the replacement of the female fund managers has caused a more adverse effect on the 
level of fund flow during the post-event. We can conclude that the female managed 
funds exhibit a substantially higher level of flow during the pre-event period as opposed 
to the male managed funds. In addition, the replacement of the female fund manager 
proves to have a significantly more unfavourable outcome on the fund flow as 
compared to the replacement of male fund managers. We also carried out a significance 
test of the difference between the previously male and female managed funds categories 
as shown in Appendix 4. The results show that there is a difference between their 
corresponding abnormal flows.  
 
 
 
274 
4.2 Aggregate Mutual Fund Flow Results 
 
Through the event study methodology, we were able to determine the trend of the fund 
flows preceding the fund manager change and the outcome that resulted from the 
replacement on the fund flows. However, through our empirical model we are able to 
further test the impact that the fund manager change has had on the level of fund flows 
and whether specific fund characteristics, or the  gender of the fund manager are 
significant in the outcome. Primarily, we estimate regressions on the aggregate data of 
fund flows, following Warther (1995). More specifically, we carry out our analysis on 
the average abnormal fund flows.     
 
4.2.1 Average Abnormal Fund Flows 
 
In order to determine whether a manager change solely has an effect on the level of fund 
flows, we estimate a simple regression model with 73 included observations. Seventy-
two observations correspond to the three years before and after the fund manager 
change respectively and one observation corresponds to the month the fund manager 
change took place. Table 3.1 reports the results of the regression, where average 
abnormal fund flows are treated as the dependent variable and the manager change is 
the independent variable. Manager change is a dummy variable which takes the value of 
0 for the thirty-six observations before the change in fund manager, and a value of 1 for 
the remaining observations. According to the results in Table 3.1, a replacement of a 
fund manager does influence the level of fund flows. Due to the fact that the manager 
change dummy is significant at a 5% significance level, we can conclude that when a 
change in fund manager occurs, the level of fund flow will decrease by about 1.66%.  
 
Table 3.1: Determinants of Average Abnormal Mutual Fund Flows  
**Significant at 5% significance level 
 
 
     
     
Variable     Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     
Constant 0.004552 0.003503 1.299380 0.1980 
Manager Change -0.016589** 0.004921 -3.371393 0.0012 
     
     
R-squared 0.047394   
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4.3 Individual Mutual Fund Flow Results 
 
In our study we also estimate the impact of manager change and performance on the 
individual fund flows. More specifically, we apply a cross-sectional panel least squares 
approach with 207 cross-sections and 12,043 total panel unbalanced observations. We 
implement an unbalanced approach due to the fact that some fund managers in our data 
sample were in control of the funds for less than three years before and after the 
replacement. However, we did impose a restriction of one year minimum period of 
running the fund before and after the event date. Table 3.2 reports the results for the 
panel regression, where the mutual fund flows are the monthly abnormal flow for each 
fund and the Performance (AR(-1)) is the one month lagged abnormal return variable 
for each fund. There has been a wide literature that documents the relationship between 
the performance of funds and the level of their flows. Cooper et al. (2004) demonstrate 
evidence of a lagged relationship between performance and fund flows, where the 
performance of funds are able to affect the flow of funds up to a year. Due to the fact 
that our results in the event study methodology indicated a lagged positive relationship 
between performance and fund flow, we further investigate this link by using the lagged 
abnormal returns as a regressor. The results indicate that a change in fund manager will 
lead to a 1% decrease in the level of fund flows, as the manager change dummy variable 
is significant at 10% level. In addition, as expected, we find a positive relationship 
between one month lagged performance (AR(-1)) of the funds and their corresponding 
fund flows. Therefore, a one percent increase in returns of each fund will lead to a 22% 
increase in fund flows in the following month. According to the F-statistic, the two 
independent variables are jointly statistically significant and are able to explain the 
variation of fund flows throughout the period in our study.    
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Table 3.2: Determinants of Individual Mutual Fund Flows  
Cross-sectional Panel Least Squares Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     Constant -0.000474 0.004200 -0.112976 0.9101 
Manager Change -0.010431* 0.005609 -1.859512 0.0630 
Performance (AR (-1)) 0.221736* 0.129489 1.712395 0.0868 
     
     R-squared 0.000504               F-statistic 3.037074** 
                Prob(F-statistic) 0.048012 
     
     
*Significant at 10% significance level 
**Significant at 5% significance level 
 
 
 
4.3.1 Do Gender and Fund Characteristics affect Mutual Fund Flows?  
 
In our empirical model of individual fund flows, we further examine whether the gender 
of mutual fund managers has an impact on the level of fund flow. In particular, we 
assign a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for all the female managed funds and a 
value of 0 for the male managed funds. In addition, we also assess the different 
categories of funds to evaluate whether their traits may have different effects on the 
level of fund flow. In particular, we group the funds according to whether they belong 
to developed markets or emerging market, and whether they are bond mutual funds or 
equity mutual funds.  In the case of the developed and the emerging market funds, we 
assign a dummy variable of a value of 1 for the funds that are emerging market funds 
and a value of 0 for the developed market funds. We call this dummy variable Market. 
In the case of the bond and equity funds, we assign a dummy variable, Type, which 
takes the value of 1 for bond funds and a value of 0 for equity funds.  
 
Table 3.3 reports the results for the panel least squares regression, which includes the 
mutual fund flows as the dependent variable and manager change, one month lagged 
performance, gender, market and type as independent variables. The results of the 
regression indicate that only the one month lagged performance and the manager change 
dummy variables are statistically significant at a 10% level respectively. Therefore, 
when a manager change occurs, we expect the level of fund flows to decrease by 
approximately 1%. In addition, our results indicate a positive relationship between the 
past performance of the funds and their corresponding fund flows, where a one percent 
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increase in returns will lead to an approximate 22% increase in fund flows in the 
subsequent month. However, observing the remaining three dummy variables, Gender, 
Market and Type, the results of the t-statistic imply that all three variables are not 
statistically different from zero. Consequently, neither the gender of the fund manager, 
the market our funds invest in (emerging or developed) nor the type of fund according 
to asset class (equity or bond fund) has an impact on the level of fund flows. From this 
we can conclude that it is only the replacement of the fund manager, the past fund flow 
and performance that affects the level of fund flows incurred34. It should not make a 
difference on the level of fund flows when we are taking into account the gender of the 
fund manager, the market the fund belongs to or the type of fund in question.       
 
 
Table 3.3: Determinants of Individual Mutual Fund Flows  
Cross-sectional Panel Least Squares Regression   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     Constant 0.001326 0.004596 0.288567 0.7729 
Manager Change -0.010479* 0.005610 -1.867999 0.0618 
Performance (AR(-1)) 0.219969* 0.129527 1.698242 0.0895 
Gender -0.011137 0.008138 -1.368485 0.1712 
Market 0.006374 0.011234 0.567356 0.5705 
Type -0.003381 0.007045 -0.479873 0.6313 
     
     R-squared 0.000699             F-statistic 1.682754 
              Prob(F-statistic) 0.134950 
     
     
*Significant at 10% significance level 
**Significant at 5% significance level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 When testing these independent variables in univariate OLS regression models, the same conclusions 
were reached. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter examined the relationship between fund manager changes and fund flows 
of UK funds over the period April 2002 to December 2006. In particular, our study 
focused on determining the impact of a manger change on subsequent fund flows. We 
are able to answer this by using an event study methodology and an empirical model 
where we assessed whether the fund flows are influenced by the change in manager and 
in turn by the current and past performance. In order to accentuate the potential link 
between past performance and fund flows, we ranked the funds in the pre-event period 
(before fund manager replacement) according to their information ratios and examined 
the level of fund flow in the post-event period (after fund manager replacement). 
Furthermore, we assessed whether the gender of the fund manager and certain 
characteristics of the funds have a bearing on the level of fund flows. In particular, we 
categorize funds according to the gender of the fund manager, the market in which the 
fund invests (emerging or developed market) and the type of fund by asset class (bond 
or equity). 
 
By using our unique, hand-constructed dataset of UK fund manager changes from April 
2002 to December 2006 we are able to study the level of fund flows throughout our 
estimation period and determine whether the level of fund flows influences the 
occurrence of a fund manager replacement and to what extent that replacement has an 
effect on the level of fund flow. Specifically we measured fund flows as defined by Sirri 
and Tufano (1998) three years before and after the fund manager change. In addition to 
using a number of ordinary least squares models to test the impact of manager change 
on fund flows on an aggregate level, we further implemented unbalanced panel least 
squares models on an individual level as well, together with other potential determinants 
of fund flows.  
 
Our findings suggest that one of the factors that leads to a manager replacement may 
have been a fall in fund flows. In particular, one year before the change in fund manager 
the level of fund flow deteriorates substantially and continues to do so up to the point 
when the fund manager is replaced. Furthermore, we show that fund flows continue to 
decrease even after the manager leaves the fund, which we believe is largely influenced 
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by the market downturn of 2007 and 2008, which was included in the last two years of 
our post-event data.   
 
Indeed, using event study methodology and panel least squares we showed that good 
(poor) past performance leads to increases (decreases) in subsequent fund flows. In fact, 
we show that a twelve month past performance of funds remains significant in 
influencing the current level of fund flow. On the other hand, our findings suggest that 
funds with the highest information ratios in the pre-event period showed a substantial 
decrease in the level of fund flow during the post-event period, indicating a negative 
lagged relationship between past performance and fund flows over longer period 
horizons. However, we find no evidence that the gender of the fund manager, the 
market in which the fund invests or the type of the fund plays any determining role for 
the size of the fund flows. As a result, it is only the replacement of the fund manager 
and past performance of the fund that affects the level of fund flows. This paper 
presents the first evidence of such phenomena in the UK‟s fund management industry.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table A1.1 Total Sample Fund Flow AAFs and CAAFs 
 
Event Time Average Fund Flow T-test  Cumulative Average Fund Flow T-test 
t-36 
-0.0029825 -0.16 -0.0029825 -0.03 
t-35 0.012954 0.68 0.0099715 0.10 
t-34 0.006261 0.33 0.0162325 0.16 
t-33 0.031373 1.64 0.0476055 0.48 
t-32 0.039113 2.04* 0.0867185 0.87 
t-31 0.0122459 0.64 0.0989644 1.00 
t-30 
-0.0029277 -0.15 0.0960367 0.97 
t-29 0.0227591 1.19 0.1187958 1.20* 
t-28 0.0465956 2.43* 0.1653914 1.67* 
t-27 0.0193446 1.01 0.184736 1.86* 
t-26 0.039619 2.07* 0.224355 2.26* 
t-25 
-0.0085378 -0.45 0.2158172 2.17* 
t-24 0.008299 0.43 0.2241163 2.26* 
t-23 0.006324 0.33 0.2304403 2.32* 
t-22 0.0090002 0.47 0.2394404 2.41* 
t-21 0.0321681 1.68* 0.2716085 2.74* 
t-20 0.0143039 0.75 0.2859124 2.88* 
t-19 0.0036452 0.19 0.2895576 2.92* 
t-18 0.0209415 1.09 0.3104991 3.13* 
t-17 0.0007577 0.04 0.3112568 3.13* 
t-16 
-0.0024333 -0.13 0.3088235 3.11* 
t-15 
-0.0081659 -0.43 0.3006575 3.03* 
t-14 
-0.0095716 -0.50 0.2910859 2.93* 
t-13 0.0244045 1.27 0.3154905 3.18* 
t-12 
-0.0009081 -0.05 0.3145824 3.17* 
t-11 0.0058418 0.30 0.3204241 3.23* 
t-10 0.0065309 0.34 0.326955 3.29* 
t-9 
-0.0061207 -0.32 0.3208343 3.23* 
t-8 
-0.0192541 -1.00 0.3015803 3.04* 
t-7 
-0.0102359 -0.53 0.2913443 2.93* 
t-6 
-0.0186504 -0.97 0.2726939 2.75* 
t-5 
-0.0220742 -1.15 0.2506198 2.52* 
t-4 
-0.0161322 -0.84 0.2344876 2.36* 
t-3 
-0.02126 -1.11 0.2132276 2.15* 
t-2 
-0.024241 -1.27 0.1889866 1.90* 
t-1 
-0.0251174 -1.31 0.1638692 1.65* 
t=0 
-0.0247052 -1.29 0.139164 1.40 
t+1 
-0.0083306 -0.43 0.1308333 1.32 
t+2 
-0.0206582 -1.08 0.1101751 1.11 
t+3 0.0931706 4.86* 0.2033458 2.05* 
t+4 0.0024233 0.13 0.205769 2.07* 
t+5 
-0.0296015 -1.55 0.1761675 1.77* 
t+6 
-0.0243673 -1.27 0.1518002 1.53 
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t+7 
-0.022871 -1.19 0.1289292 1.30 
t+8 0.0287582 1.50 0.1576874 1.59 
t+9 
-0.0130857 -0.68 0.1446017 1.46 
t+10 
-0.0183275 -0.96 0.1262743 1.27 
t+11 0.0098554 0.51 0.1361297 1.37 
t+12 0.0152303 0.79 0.1513599 1.52 
t+13 
-0.0253175 -1.32 0.1260424 1.27 
t+14 
-0.0180324 -0.94 0.10801 1.09 
t+15 
-0.0204649 -1.07 0.0875451 0.88 
t+16 
-0.0143279 -0.75 0.0732172 0.74 
t+17 
-0.0362021 -1.89* 0.0370151 0.37 
t+18 
-0.0203404 -1.06 0.0166747 0.17 
t+19 
-0.0153484 -0.80 0.0013263 0.01 
t+20 
-0.0294885 -1.54 -0.0281622 -0.28 
t+21 
-0.0265025 -1.38 -0.0546647 -0.55 
t+22 
-0.0200933 -1.05 -0.074758 -0.75 
t+23 
-0.0082555 -0.43 -0.0830135 -0.84 
t+24 
-0.0207252 -1.08 -0.1037387 -1.04 
t+25 
-0.0225353 -1.18 -0.126274 -1.27 
t+26 
-0.023651 -1.23 -0.149925 -1.51 
t+27 
-0.0181172 -0.95 -0.1680422 -1.69* 
t+28 
-0.0202916 -1.06 -0.1883339 -1.90* 
t+29 
-0.0071993 -0.38 -0.1955332 -1.97* 
t+30 
-0.0141708 -0.74 -0.209704 -2.11* 
t+31 
-0.0284912 -1.49 -0.2381951 -2.40* 
t+32 
-0.0207619 -1.08 -0.2589571 -2.61* 
t+33 
-0.0233087 -1.22 -0.2822658 -2.84* 
t+34 0.0157896 0.82 -0.2664762 -2.68* 
t+35 
-0.0175418 -0.92 -0.284018 -2.86* 
t+36 0.0025033 0.13 -0.2815147 -2.84* 
*significant at 5% level 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Table A3.1 Male Managed Fund Flow AAFs and CAAFs 
 
Event Time Average Fund Flow T-test  Cumulative Average Fund Flow T-test 
t-36 0.00108 0.06 0.00108 0.01 
t-35 0.0198104 1.02 0.0208904 0.26 
t-34 0.0074204 0.38 0.0283108 0.35 
t-33 0.0321266 1.66* 0.0604374 0.75 
t-32 0.0482243 2.49* 0.1086617 1.35 
t-31 0.0066108 0.34 0.1152725 1.44 
t-30 
-0.0041033 -0.21 0.1111693 1.39 
t-29 0.0342427 1.76* 0.1454119 1.81* 
t-28 
-0.0010765 -0.06 0.1443354 1.80* 
t-27 0.0119057 0.61 0.1562411 1.95* 
t-26 0.0457015 2.36* 0.2019426 2.52* 
t-25 
-0.0053361 -0.27 0.1966066 2.45* 
t-24 
-0.0023828 -0.12 0.1942237 2.42* 
t-23 0.0095138 0.49 0.2037375 2.54* 
t-22 0.0072037 0.37 0.2109413 2.63* 
t-21 0.0405172 2.09* 0.2514585 3.13* 
t-20 0.0079422 0.41 0.2594007 3.23* 
t-19 
-0.0098392 -0.51 0.2495615 3.11* 
t-18 0.019245 0.99 0.2688065 3.35* 
t-17 
-0.0024886 -0.13 0.2663179 3.32* 
t-16 
-0.0030781 -0.16 0.2632397 3.28* 
t-15 
-0.0080306 -0.41 0.2552092 3.18* 
t-14 
-0.0035801 -0.18 0.251629 3.14* 
t-13 0.0346871 1.79* 0.2863162 3.57* 
t-12 
-0.0160731 -0.83 0.270243 3.37* 
t-11 0.0098306 0.51 0.2800737 3.49* 
t-10 0.0081598 0.42 0.2882335 3.59* 
t-9 
-0.0032046 -0.17 0.2850289 3.55* 
t-8 
-0.0194842 -1.00 0.2655447 3.31* 
t-7 
-0.0102522 -0.53 0.2552925 3.18* 
t-6 
-0.0196211 -1.01 0.2356715 2.94* 
t-5 
-0.0182109 -0.94 0.2174606 2.71* 
t-4 
-0.0092063 -0.47 0.2082543 2.60* 
t-3 
-0.0138274 -0.71 0.1944269 2.42* 
t-2 
-0.0218132 -1.12 0.1726137 2.15* 
t-1 
-0.0224426 -1.16 0.1501711 1.87* 
t=0 
-0.0215898 -1.11 0.1285813 1.60 
t+1 
-0.0019881 -0.10 0.1265932 1.58 
t+2 
-0.0168138 -0.87 0.1097794 1.37 
t+3 0.1208547 6.23* 0.2306341 2.87* 
t+4 0.0122551 0.63 0.2428892 3.03* 
t+5 
-0.0290955 -1.50 0.2137937 2.66* 
t+6 
-0.020563 -1.06 0.1932307 2.41* 
t+7 
-0.0167912 -0.87 0.1764394 2.20* 
t+8 0.0434575 2.24* 0.219897 2.74* 
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t+9 
-0.0073574 -0.38 0.2125396 2.65* 
t+10 
-0.0140921 -0.73 0.1984474 2.47* 
t+11 0.0206338 1.06 0.2190813 2.73* 
t+12 
-0.0139078 -0.72 0.2051734 2.56* 
t+13 -0.0220979 -1.14* 0.1830756 2.28* 
t+14 -0.0147342 -0.76 0.1683413 2.10* 
t+15 -0.0165164 -0.85 0.151825 1.89* 
t+16 -0.0137688 -0.71 0.1380562 1.72* 
t+17 -0.0370588 -1.91 0.1009974 1.26 
t+18 -0.0171415 -0.88 0.0838559 1.05 
t+19 -0.0103666 -0.53 0.0734893 0.92 
t+20 -0.0237169 -1.22 0.0497723 0.62 
t+21 -0.0190897 -0.98 0.0306827 0.38 
t+22 -0.0157451 -0.81 0.0149376 0.19 
t+23 0.0005932 0.03 0.0155308 0.19 
t+24 -0.0140551 -0.72 0.0014757 0.02 
t+25 -0.0168559 -0.87 -0.0153802 -0.19 
t+26 -0.0165662 -0.85 -0.0319464 -0.40 
t+27 -0.0176103 -0.91 -0.0495567 -0.62 
t+28 -0.0173217 -0.89 -0.0668783 -0.83 
t+29 -0.0122262 -0.63 -0.0791045 -0.99 
t+30 -0.023615 -1.22 -0.1027195 -1.28 
t+31 -0.0261953 -1.35 -0.1289148 -1.61 
t+32 -0.0183856 -0.95 -0.1473004 -1.84* 
t+33 -0.0231491 -1.19 -0.1704495 -2.12* 
t+34 0.0223709 1.15 -0.1480786 -1.85* 
t+35 -0.0173197 -0.89 -0.1653983 -2.06* 
t+36 0.0077106 0.40 -0.1576877 -1.97* 
*significant at 5% level 
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Table A3.2 Female Managed Fund Flow AAFs and CAAFs 
 
Event Time Average Fund Flow T-test  Cumulative Average Fund Flow T-test 
t-36 
-0.0305172 -0.54 -0.0305172 -0.16 
t-35 
-0.0281842 -0.50 -0.0587015 -0.30 
t-34 
-0.001117 -0.02 -0.0598185 -0.31 
t-33 0.0267884 0.47 -0.0330301 -0.17 
t-32 
-0.010348 -0.18 -0.0433781 -0.22 
t-31 0.0444461 0.78 0.001068 0.01 
t-30 0.0030971 0.05 0.0041651 0.02 
t-29 
-0.030831 -0.54 -0.0266658 -0.14 
t-28 0.2673928 4.71* 0.240727 1.24 
t-27 0.0535637 0.94 0.2942907 1.51 
t-26 0.0123924 0.22 0.3066831 1.58 
t-25 
-0.0220407 -0.39 0.2846424 1.46 
t-24 0.0561353 0.99 0.3407777 1.75* 
t-23 
-0.008296 -0.15 0.3324818 1.71* 
t-22 0.0171532 0.30 0.349635 1.80* 
t-21 
-0.007651 -0.13 0.3419839 1.76* 
t-20 0.0463572 0.82 0.3883411 2.00* 
t-19 0.067696 1.19 0.4560371 2.34* 
t-18 0.0288973 0.51 0.4849344 2.49* 
t-17 0.0163401 0.29 0.5012745 2.58* 
t-16 0.0008981 0.02 0.5021726 2.58* 
t-15 
-0.0088699 -0.16 0.4933028 2.53* 
t-14 
-0.0415259 -0.73 0.4517769 2.32* 
t-13 
-0.0307786 -0.54 0.4209982 2.16* 
t-12 0.0788304 1.39 0.4998286 2.57* 
t-11 
-0.0147258 -0.26 0.4851028 2.49* 
t-10 
-0.0019194 -0.03 0.4831834 2.48* 
t-9 
-0.0212477 -0.37 0.4619357 2.37* 
t-8 
-0.018046 -0.32 0.4438897 2.28* 
t-7 
-0.0101496 -0.18 0.4337401 2.23* 
t-6 
-0.0134936 -0.24 0.4202465 2.16* 
t-5 
-0.0428392 -0.75 0.3774073 1.94* 
t-4 
-0.0535756 -0.94 0.3238317 1.66* 
t-3 
-0.0616746 -1.09 0.2621571 1.35 
t-2 
-0.0374422 -0.66 0.2247149 1.15 
t-1 
-0.0397452 -0.70 0.1849697 0.95 
t=0 
-0.041548 -0.73 0.1434217 0.74 
t+1 
-0.0426198 -0.75 0.1008018 0.52 
t+2 
-0.041442 -0.73 0.0593598 0.31 
t+3 
-0.0564963 -1.00 0.0028635 0.01 
t+4 
-0.0501155 -0.88 -0.047252 -0.24 
t+5 
-0.0323929 -0.57 -0.0796449 -0.41 
t+6 
-0.0453526 -0.80 -0.1249975 -0.64 
t+7 
-0.0560154 -0.99 -0.181013 -0.93 
t+8 
-0.0504282 -0.89 -0.2314412 -1.19 
t+9 
-0.0439446 -0.77 -0.2753858 -1.42 
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t+10 
-0.0410069 -0.72 -0.3163927 -1.63 
t+11 
-0.0475137 -0.84 -0.3639064 -1.87* 
t+12 0.1754898 3.09* -0.1884166 -0.97 
t+13 -0.0436364 -0.77 -0.232053 -1.19 
t+14 -0.0365703 -0.64 -0.2686233 -1.38 
t+15 -0.0426584 -0.75 -0.3112817 -1.60 
t+16 -0.0174705 -0.31 -0.3287521 -1.69* 
t+17 -0.0313866 -0.55 -0.3601387 -1.85* 
t+18 -0.0387342 -0.68 -0.3988729 -2.05* 
t+19 -0.0434598 -0.77 -0.4423327 -2.27* 
t+20 -0.0618508 -1.09 -0.5041835 -2.59* 
t+21 -0.0672733 -1.19 -0.5714567 -2.94* 
t+22 -0.0440083 -0.78 -0.615465 -3.16* 
t+23 -0.0569231 -1.00 -0.6723881 -3.46* 
t+24 -0.0571724 -1.01 -0.7295605 -3.75* 
t+25 -0.0535696 -0.94 -0.7831301 -4.02* 
t+26 -0.0623648 -1.10 -0.8454949 -4.34* 
t+27 -0.020887 -0.37 -0.8663819 -4.45* 
t+28 -0.0365204 -0.64 -0.9029023 -4.64* 
t+29 0.0200894 0.35 -0.8828129 -4.54* 
t+30 0.0347366 0.61 -0.8480763 -4.36* 
t+31 -0.0406507 -0.72 -0.8887269 -4.57* 
t+32 -0.0348218 -0.61 -0.9235487 -4.75* 
t+33 -0.0242135 -0.43 -0.9477622 -4.87* 
t+34 -0.0206818 -0.36 -0.968444 -4.98* 
t+35 -0.0187541 -0.33 -0.9871981 -5.07* 
t+36 -0.0259197 -0.46 -1.0131178 -5.21* 
*significant at 5% level 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
Test in Difference of Means for Male and Female Managed Funds 
  
T-Statistic 5.191* 
P-Value 0.000 
*Significant at 5% significance level 
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293 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POTENTIAL EXTENSIONS OF THE 
THESIS 
 
The three chapters of this thesis have distinctively shown that performance is, if not 
most important then, one of the most crucial factors in asset management. Past studies 
have shown that investors base their investment decisions on past performance and for 
this reason it is imperative to examine various trading strategies and factors that 
influence and determine good performance.  
 
Using a multinomial ordered logit model in the first chapter, which to the best of our 
knowledge is the first research that uses a multinomial logit model for this question in 
the UK equity market, we demonstrate ways in which an investor can enhance the 
performance of the portfolio using style rotation strategies. We compare the profitability 
of the ordered logit model to momentum style rotation between four different market 
segments: FTSE Small-Cap, FTSE Large-Cap, FTSE Value 350 and FTSE Growth 350 
Indices, from February 1987 to April 2006. In the case of the ordered logit model, we 
applied macroeconomic, market and fundamental variables and the findings for the out-
of-sample tests suggest that the active multi-style rotation strategies can be developed in 
order to outperform the best performing buy-and-hold strategy even when accounting 
for transaction costs. In fact, our trading strategies are profitable at transaction cost 
levels up to 15 bps and 30bps. The results from our out-of-sample forecasts (February 
1997 to April 2006) indicate that forecasting the best performing index with accuracy of 
33%, was found to be sufficient to outperform the buy-and-hold strategies. 
 
Nevertheless, our results indicate that applying momentum based style rotation 
strategies achieve higher Sharpe ratios and even higher end-of-period wealth than the 
strategies based on the ordered logit model. Furthermore, the momentum-based 
strategies are profitable at transaction costs ranging from 13 basis points to 257 basis 
points, which is significantly higher than the multinomial ordered logit model. For 
future research it would be intriguing to examine and test whether our quantitative and 
momentum based strategies remain profitable during the turbulent market conditions of 
2007 and 2008, and possibly the extent of the impact that the financial crisis has on our 
strategies.  
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Sharpe (1992) showed that portfolio performance is driven mainly by the portfolio‟s 
asset allocation and that fund managers should classify equities into asset classes 
according to style and size. Therefore, the appropriate style classification will enable 
investors to experience benefits of diversification. This implies that in order to achieve a 
good portfolio performance the portfolio or fund manager essentially needs to have 
adequate skill to be able to successfully categorize the portfolio across a number of 
major asset classes. In the second chapter we test whether it is indeed the fund manager 
that determines the performance of a fund. In particular, we construct a unique database 
of 258 UK fund manager changes, from April 2002 to December 2005, which inevitably 
delivered a few data problems. In particular, many of the funds that had a manager 
change from our initial database had to be excluded as they were terminated after the 
change or the fund manager was in charge of the fund less than a year before s/he was 
replaced. A further limitation was the fact that there were only five value funds in our 
data sample, which indicates that the results for this particular group are not 
representative.  Subsequently, we use an event study methodology in order to examine 
the trend of the mutual funds‟ performance three years before and after the change in 
manager.  We also categorised the funds in order to assess whether the change in 
manager is particularly pronounced in female or male managed funds, emerging or 
developed market funds, UK or international funds, bond or equity funds, and small-
capitalization, value or growth funds. Furthermore, we test whether the top and bottom 
performing funds of the pre-event period (i.e. three years before the change in fund 
manager), persist in their respective performance once a new fund manager takes over. 
Using three different methodologies: (i) benchmark-adjusted model, (ii) mean-adjusted 
model and (iii) information ratio, our findings suggest that the funds performed poorly 
before the change and the performance of the funds broadly improves up to a year 
following the manager change. Therefore, on average the replacement of the fund 
managers was most likely a result of underperformance. Nonetheless, in the second and 
third year following fund managers‟ change, the performance deteriorates which we 
believe is the result of the 2007 and 2008 downturn of the financial markets. It would be 
interesting to have been able to examine the performance of these funds without the 
influence of the 2007 and 2008 market disturbances. Nonetheless, potential for further 
research and extension of the chapter remains. In particular, fund manager changes are 
continuously being updated and added to our database, which will allow us to examine 
the performance of these funds over different and longer periods.  
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Our results further suggest that female fund managers exhibited a more volatile 
performance in comparison to the male managers and the performance of the previously 
female managed funds improves more on average in the post-change period. We also 
find that for the majority of the categories of funds the improvement of the performance 
in the post event period lasts for duration of about eighteen months after a new fund 
manager takes over. Finally, our findings indicate that the past top ten percent of funds, 
or „winners‟, do not persist in their performance after the change in fund manager, while 
the bottom ten percent of funds continue to underperform when a new fund manager 
takes over. Although this chapter focuses on one of the main aspects of asset 
management, that is performance, it would be interesting to investigate the shifts in 
style of these mutual funds. In particular, determining whether the mutual funds change 
an investment style once a new fund manager takes over would be worthy to address. A 
shift in investment style after a new fund manager takes over may expose the investors 
to higher levels of style risk which would reduce the benefits of style diversification.  
 
The final chapter of this thesis studies the extent to which the level of fund flows 
change when a new fund manager takes over, and whether it is in fact the fund flows 
that lead to a manager being replaced. By studying the trend of the UK mutual fund 
flows from April 2002 to December 2006, we are able to indirectly study the behaviour 
of investors and fund manager asset allocation decisions, which ultimately, affect the 
fund performance. We used an event study methodology and an unbalanced panel 
analysis to determine the relationship between the change in fund manager and fund 
flows. Furthermore, we further test if gender of the fund manager, the market in which 
the fund invests (emerging or developed market) and the type of fund by asset class 
(bond or equity) shape the trend of fund flows throughout the estimation period. As 
argued by various literature, we further analyze whether investors base their investment 
decisions on prior performance by ranking the funds before fund manager replacement 
according to their information ratios and examining the level of fund flow after fund 
manager replacement. It is important to note the limitation that out of the initial 258 
funds, some were excluded from our study as the data on fund size provided by Lipper 
did not cover the manager change. More specifically, the monthly fund size provided 
for these funds was either before the manager change or after the manager change, 
leaving a final sample of 207 funds.  
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Our results indicate that the level of fund flows broadly deteriorate a year before the 
change in fund manager, which provides us with a possible reason for the replacement 
of the fund manager. In fact, the returns of these funds were at their lowest during this 
period, which may have caused the decline in fund flows and hence led to the 
replacement in fund manager. However, once the new fund manager takes over the 
funds continue to experience a withdrawal of flow, which we believe is highly 
influenced by the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008. Furthermore, our findings in the 
event study is concurred by the empirical model, unbalanced panel least squares, results. 
We show that there is a positive twelve month lagged relationship between performance 
and fund flow, whereas the relationship becomes negative over longer period horizons. 
However, our results indicate no significant relationship between the fund flows and the 
gender of the fund manager, the market in which the fund invests or the type of the 
fund. Sharpe (1998) documents that Morningstar‟s risk-adjusted ratings influence the 
investors‟ decisions and it would be interesting to further test this relationship on our 
data sample to validate whether the flow of funds is affected by their ratings. 
Furthermore, expenses, load fees and participation costs are worth exploring as they 
could be other factors that add to the sensitivity of fund flow movements (Sirri and 
Tufano (1998), Barber et al. (2005), Huang et al. (2007) and Gruber (1996)).  
 
